Case: 1:16-cv-05112 Document #: 33 Filed: 02/22/17 Page 1 of 16 PageID #:<pageID> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION LENORA BONDS, individually ) and as Independent Administrator ) of the Estate of TERRANCE HARRIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 16 C 5112 v. ) ) Judge Joan B. Gottschall ) CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal ) Corporation, and UNKNOWN ) OFFICERS, ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Lenora Bonds filed a motion to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), asking the court to vacate or reconsider its January 11, 2017 order granting Defendant the City of Chicago’s Motion to Dismiss Bonds’ complaint [Dkt. 27]. For the reasons set forth below, Bonds’ motion to reconsider is granted, the prior order [Dkt. 26] is vacated, and the court again grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss, although on different grounds than those originally articulated by the court in its prior order. Bonds is granted leave to file an amended complaint in accordance with the terms of this ruling. I. BACKGROUND Bonds’ son, Terrance Harris (“Terrance”), was killed by Chicago police officers on October 23, 2013. According to the allegations of Bonds’ federal court complaint [Dkt. 1], Bonds called the police to her home seeking assistance with Terrance, who had been diagnosed with a mental health issue. Bonds further alleges that Terrance was alone and unarmed when police entered their shared home, but that within a short period of time, Terrance had been shot Case: 1:16-cv-05112 Document #: 33 Filed: 02/22/17 Page 2 of 16 PageID #:<pageID> 28 times through a wall. Bonds also alleges that her son was denied proper medical care both before and after his death, that they were subjected to an improper search and seizure, and that after Terrance was killed, Bonds was taken to a Chicago police station and interrogated. About 18 months after Terrance’s death, on April 14, 2015, Bonds filed a pro se action in the Circuit Court of Cook County against the Chicago Police Department.1 (Dkt. 10-1). In that action, Bonds alleged “wrongful death, [r]estitution of home and undue trust recompense, and compensation of $80,000.00.” (Id.) However, Bonds apparently failed to appear before the court at a status hearing, and her case was dismissed less than two months later, on June 9, 2015, for want of prosecution. (Dkt. 16, p. 7; Dkt. 16-2). On May 10, 2016, Bonds filed the instant action (this time with the assistance of counsel) against the City of Chicago and Unknown Officers. In her complaint, Bonds sets forth five counts for relief: four counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force, false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and denial of medical care), each alleging a Monell unconstitutional policy and practice claim against the City of Chicago; and one count under Illinois state law for damage to property. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant moved for the dismissal of Bond’s complaint [Dkt. 9]. The court granted the motion on the basis that the Illinois savings statute, 735 ILCS 5/13-217, was inapplicable and thus could not be used to “revive” in federal court Bonds’ state court action. [Dkt. 26]. Now, in her motion for reconsideration, Bonds 1 See Lenora Bonds v. Chicago Police Department, Case No. 2015 L 003850, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Technically, Bonds should have named the City of Chicago as the defendant because the Chicago Police Department does not enjoy a legal existence independent of the City of Chicago and cannot be sued as a separate entity. See Chan v. Wodnicki, 123 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir.1997); Sabovcik v. Castillo, No. 2:08-CV-279RM, 2009 WL 1285889, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 5, 2009). This issue is discussed more fully infra, p. 12. 2 Case: 1:16-cv-05112 Document #: 33 Filed: 02/22/17 Page 3 of 16 PageID #:<pageID> argues that the court incorrectly applied the 1995 version of the savings statute, instead of the pre-1995 version, and that this failure was a manifest error of law. Defendant does not dispute that the court applied an incorrect version of the statute in its analysis, but argues that the court’s ruling was nevertheless correct on other grounds. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider Motions to reconsider serve the limited function of allowing the court to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to consider newly discovered material evidence. Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 505 (7th Cir. 2011). A “manifest error” occurs when “the [c]ourt has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the [c]ourt by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). “The decision whether to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion is entrusted to the sound judgment of the district court.” In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). In her Rule 59(e) motion, Bonds argues that the court made a manifest error of law when it granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the 1995 version of the Illinois savings statute, since that statute was ruled unconstitutional in 1997 by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). The court agrees that its reliance on an incorrect version of the Illinois savings statute was a manifest error of law. Some background on the Illinois savings statute. Prior to 1995, the Illinois savings statute included within its ambit causes of action dismissed for want of prosecution. It stated: In the actions specified in Article XIII of this Act or any other act or contract where the time for commencing an action is limited, if judgment is entered for the plaintiff but reversed on appeal, or if there is a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and, upon a motion in arrest of judgment, the judgment is entered against the plaintiff, 3 Case: 1:16-cv-05112 Document #: 33 Filed: 02/22/17 Page 4 of 16 PageID #:<pageID> or the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, or the action is dismissed for want of prosecution, or the action is dismissed by a United States District Court for lack of jurisdiction, or the action is dismissed by a United States District Court for improper venue, then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires during the pendency of such action, the plaintiff, his or her heirs, executors or administrators may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, after such judgment is reversed or entered against the plaintiff, or after the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, or the action is dismissed for want of prosecution, or the action is dismissed by a United States District Court for lack of jurisdiction, or the action is dismissed by a United States District Court for improper venue. 735 ILCS 5/13-217. In 1995, the savings statute was amended by the Illinois Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995. See Illinois P.A. 89-7 (the “Tort Reform Act”), at pp. 21-22. One effect of this amendment was to exclude from the savings statute’s protective arm actions that had been dismissed for want of prosecution. However, in 1997, the Tort Reform Act was ruled unconstitutional and struck down in its entirety in Best, and this resulted in a return of the savings statute to its pre-1995 form (shown above). The court, in its January 11, 2017 order, incorrectly applied the 1995 version of the savings statute in its analysis and found, on this basis alone, that Bonds’ federal cause of action—filed after the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations—could not be “saved” by the savings statute and thus was untimely. Because the court’s analysis rested on a misapplication of the law, that order is vacated. The court now reconsiders in its entirety the defendant’s motion to dismiss. B. Rule 12(b)(6) Defendant seeks dismissal of Bonds’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move for dismissal of a complaint if it “fail[s] to state a claim for which relief can be granted.” The court must accept all facts pleaded in the complaint as true, and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. INEOS Polymers, Inc. v. BASF Catalysts, 553 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 2009). In general, “the complaint 4 Case: 1:16-cv-05112 Document #: 33 Filed: 02/22/17 Page 5 of 16 PageID #:<pageID> need only contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’” E.E.O.C v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rule 8(a)), with sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice “of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (citations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint need not present particularized facts, but “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S.