Taiwan,1 can the United States reach Irresistible a grand bargain with China,2 and does US policy toward Taiwan need to be Trend unambiguous?3 Behind these discus- 4 sions lies a core question: Is Taiwan’s The US–China security a core concern of the United Interest Asymmetry States? Like in the United States, and Taiwan’s Future there are also different views in Dr. Zuo Xiying China. This article will try to provide an interpretation. The Taiwan Issue in American Foreign Policy In the context of China’s rapid rise, a growing number of US-based analysts have endorsed Taiwan as a core con- cern in the past decade. This trend is related to two factors. First, US policy toward China has undergone funda- mental changes. Since the Obama ad- ministration, the United States has gradually adjusted its China policy, trying to strengthen US–Taiwan rela- aiwan is one of the core issues tions, while dealing with the unstable in US–China relations. Amer- situation in the Taiwan Strait. Second, ica’s position on the Taiwan is- mainland China’s desire for reunifica- T tion will be promoted accordingly. sue has been the weathervane in the Western Pacific. This was true during With Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen’s rejec- the early stages of the Cold War, in tion of the 1992 Consensus, Beijing US–China strategic cooperation after has switched its guideline for promot- the Sino-Soviet split, and in the con- ing reunification from “placing hope on temporary context of China’s rise. the Taiwanese” to “placing more hope China’s rise after the Cold War.. In on the mainland itself.”4 the past decade, with the deterioration In the United States, analysts debate of US–China relations, some US ana- whether Taiwan’s security is a core lysts have discussed crucial issues con- concern or not. Supporters of this idea cerning Taiwan. Three profound ques- point to the island’s strategic value for tions needing further thought are containing mainland China and to the should the United States abandon issue of American credibility. Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 14 Irresistible Trend Opponents are concerned about the China embodies the fundamental in- worst-case scenario: a showdown be- terests of the Chinese nation.”5 On tween China and the United States. this point, there is a fundamental con- This situation will ascertain the high flict between China and the United costs that the United States will have States. to pay if it is determined to intervene Historically, the United States has to prevent a nonconsensual reunifica- abandoned and revalued Taiwan sev- tion. However, Taiwan’s status as an eral times since World War II. In Chi- issue in American foreign policy is dy- nese interpretations, Taiwan is a vital namic. Whether Taiwan’s security is a card that the United States can use to core concern of the United States de- contain China. However, China and pends not only on the historical frame- the United States have asymmetric in- work but also on the United States, terests on this issue.6 For China, Tai- Taiwan, and mainland China. In dif- wan is related to the nation’s reunifi- ferent periods, the answer will not be cation, which is a core issue of sover- the same. eignty upon which there can be no To be sure, Taiwan is related to some compromise. Regarded as one of vital interests of the United States, China’s constant core interests, Tai- and the cost of abandoning Taiwan wan is at the forefront. For the United would be high. The United States States, of course, Taiwan is also criti- would lose an essential tool with cal. Still, its significance is much lower which to contain China in the Asia-Pa- than for China, which means it is a cific region. Meanwhile, it would make wavering core interest. Under some a significant dent in the US commit- extreme circumstances in China and ment to its alliances, arguably weak- the United States, interests might be ening America’s reputation in this re- compromised. The constant core inter- spect. However, China is politically op- est is one of the fundamental differ- posed to the United States regarding ences between Beijing’s One-China Taiwan as its core interest and even Principle and Washington’s One- more opposed to the United States re- China Policy: policies can change, garding Taiwan as part of its sphere of whereas principles do not. influence. Almost all Chinese people Will the US Intervene in a Future agree that the Taiwan issue concerns Taiwan Strait Conflict? China’s sovereignty. As stated in China’s white paper, The One-China Another critical issue is whether the Principle and the Taiwan Issue, “[s]et- United States would intervene by tlement of the Taiwan issue and reali- force if there were a crisis across the zation of the complete reunification of Taiwan Strait in the future. This ques- tion seems easy to answer. In the Indo-Pacific Perspective │15 Zuo Three Communiqués, the United abandon Taiwan. After all, the United States has repeatedly reiterated its in- States has always been ambiguous terest in the Taiwan issue’s peaceful about the form and extent of any in- settlement. In the Taiwan Relations terventions it would take in Taiwan’s Act, the United States has also clearly defense; grave concern is a phrase expressed its “grave concern” about with a wide range of policy space. the use of nonpeaceful means.7 How- Therefore, it is uncertain how the ever, the United States’ stated inten- United States might intervene in fu- tion is one thing, and its realistic ture conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, choice when facing the conflict is an- particularly if Washington judged the other. The tangible answer to this costs of intervention to be high. An in- question is that it depends on the pre- tervention could be military in nature, vailing US calculation of its benefits but it could also take the form of polit- and costs. ical isolation or economic sanctions The United States has abandoned its against Beijing. allies twice in the Asia-Pacific: Pres. America’s conflicted position on Richard Nixon’s withdrawal from whether it would intervene militarily South Vietnam in 1973 and Pres. in the Taiwan Strait has implications Jimmy Carter’s establishment of dip- for China. According to common sense, lomatic relations with the People’s Re- it is unrealistic for China to formulate public of China and disconnection with its strategy and policy to assume that the Republic of China in Taiwan in the United States would not intervene 1979. These two abandonment in- in Taiwan. Instead, China must pre- stances have in common that they pare for the worst-case scenario: a US were both high-cost and highly benefi- military intervention in China’s reuni- cial from the US perspective. fication. The expectation of US inter- It is unlikely that the United States vention will be a constant in Chinese will choose to abandon Taiwan to be- strategic planning. This is not to say cause it eyes strategic gains. The stra- that China regards the United States tegic opportunity that China and the as an adversary. Rather, the expecta- United States had to balance against tion of US intervention is merely una- the Soviet Union during the Cold War voidable in the context of US equivoca- jointly will not repeat. Additionally, tion and ambiguity. the possibility of a grand bargain be- China welcomes the United States to tween China and the United States in play a constructive role in China’s the Western Pacific is also very low. peaceful reunification. As Huang However, China may impose high Jiashu, a professor at the Renmin costs to compel the United States to University of China, pointed out, “the Indo-Pacific Perspective │16 Irresistible Trend most ideal choice is to let the United economic sanctions, and military in- States help us in the final peaceful tervention. For the United States, the settlement of the Taiwan issue. If such price is bound to be very high. The fi- a goal can’t be achieved, at least we nal result will most likely be that the should not let the United States be- United States cannot stop China’s reu- come an obstacle. If such a goal still nification process militarily. Washing- can’t be achieved, at least we can let ton can only impose costs on China the United States play a positive role through political isolation and eco- in opposing Taiwanese independ- nomic sanctions to make up for its loss ence.”8 In the past, China and the in reputation. United States accepted the ambiguity Conclusion of each other’s positions. However, with the growing intensity of strategic There is a vast asymmetry of interests competition, all parties’ policy space is between China and the United States getting smaller, and the Taiwan Strait on the Taiwan issue, which leads to crisis is emerging.9 the asymmetry of resolve. That will be the crucial factor affecting the situa- The future conflict between China and tion in the Taiwan Strait in the future. the United States on Taiwan is a ri- If one day, China and the United valry of strength and a clash of re- States must make independent deci- solve—a contest between China’s de- sions on the future of Taiwan, whether termination to uphold its state sover- Taiwan’s security is a core concern of eignty and the United States’ resolve the United States will become a sim- to defend its commitment. As the ple choice.