Mediterranean Conflicts and the Geopolitical Context Keys Proxy Wars and Spheres of Influence in Post-Isis Syria Raymond Hinnebusch tral role, and after the Russian military intervention Professor of 2015, which allowed the regime to rebuff the ji- School of International Relations hadist surge that had threatened to overwhelm it University of St Andrews and begin recovery of territory from the opposition. Russia reached agreements with the US, which was being overtly drawn into the Syrian conflict against Context for the Struggle for Post-IS Syria ISIS, to eschew operations in the zones where the other was operating, effectively dividing control of In the last years of the 2010s, the competitive inter- the airspace between Russia in the west of the Mediterranean Conflicts and the Geopolitical Context vention of rival powers in the Syrian crisis escalated country and the US in the east. In parallel, Turkey’s into a contest to carve out spheres of geo-political alarm at US-supported Kurdish advances against influence in the country. As weaker opposition fac- ISIS had re-aligned its interests toward Russia. This tions either lost out or were co-opted by the rival enabled Russia to displace the UN/Western-cen- 78 intervening powers, the hitherto highly fragmented tred Geneva negotiations with a Russian-centred Syrian battleground was consolidated into three process at Astana and Sochi, also a result of its mil- major zones that came under the influence of these itary intervention having narrowed down options for powers, while at the same time the race was on to the exhausted opposition fighters and their Turkish fill the vacuum as ISIS contracted under US aerial backer. By bringing them, and also Iran, into the bombardment. In 2017, 73% of the population Astana process, Russia positioned itself at the cen- lived under Syrian government control, buttressed tre of a tripartite alliance through which it partly de- by Russia and Iran, 17% under Turkish control or tached Turkey from its alignment with the West’s influence, 10% under the US-backed Kurdish-led anti-Assad stance, and through which it would try to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – also possess- manage the outcome of the Syrian crisis without US ing vast territory and concentrated energy resourc- participation. Russia’s centrality to the crisis also al- es – with 1% remaining under ISIS (Lund, 2018). lowed it to mediate between key regional rivals – Russia, Iran, Turkey and the US each deployed Iran and Israel, the Syrian Kurds and Turkey. certain state capacity-building initiatives to coun- ter the insecurity in their own zones, but this very consolidation increased the risk of the permanent The Struggle for Northeast Syria 2020 division of the country and armed confrontation among the proxies and their patron states. Three The race to fill the IS vacuum in northeast Syria parallel but interlinked struggles of rival intervening (2016-19) powers and their Syrian proxies continued to rage at the end of the decade in northeast, northwest With US air support, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic and southern Syria. Forces (SDF) irregulars pushed IS out of Raqqa Mediterranean Yearbook Parallel to this, a new diplomatic alignment over Syr- and set out to govern this vast Arab-populated ia took place with the failure of the UN-sponsored province. In parallel, the Iranian-backed Assad re- Med. Med. IE peace process, in which the US had played a cen- gime forces moved toward Deir ez-Zor, a strategic location because of its oil fields and border cross- dominated eastern Syria and the energy resources ing at Abu Kamal, in competition with the SDF; re- concentrated there. Nevertheless, the PYD/SDF, Keys gime forces reached the border but the SDF seized uncertain of the extent of US commitment under the the main oil fields. erratic Trump Administration, tried to hedge its bets That the US sought to prevent the Damascus gov- by entering negotiations with the regime. The regime ernment from re-establishing control over its terri- had retained a presence in SDF areas, e.g. at Qam- tory was clear from its attacks on pro-government ishli airport, and in the negotiations, it insisted on forces when they advanced toward SDF positions control over border crossings and rejected any and toward the country’s eastern borders. US war- “separatist measure.” The SDF might have been will- planes intercepted Syrian aircraft or armored forc- ing to concede Damascus’ control over civil admin- es probing the SDF controlled areas three times istration, but would not give up its military control of between 2016 and 2018: famously, in February the east. The makings of a deal around certain inter- 2018, US forces repelled a column advancing on dependencies appeared possible: while the SDF an SDF base near Deir ez-Zor, killing scores, in- controlled much of the oil and gas fields, the regime cluding many Russian mercenaries. They also at- controlled the refineries; in the meantime, intermedi- tacked pro-regime forces probing the FSA enclave aries bridged the two sides. The US stayed in east- at Tanf on the Iraqi border (Hashem, 2017).The ern Syria to head off any political settlement be- competition to fill the IS vacuum also created con- tween the regime and PYD (Hamidi, 2018). flictual relations between the Russian and Iranian- backed pro-regime forces, the Turkish-backed eth- nic Arab Free Syrian Army and the US-backed SDF Mediterranean Conflicts and the Geopolitical Context (dominated by the Kurdish PYD). These conflicts Turkey was outraged that the US were about Kurdish rule of Arab areas, Turkey’s per- had employed Kurdish-led forces ception of the threat from the PYD; the regime’s de- to take back Sunni Arab areas termination to restore full sovereignty over the east from IS, which also inflated Kurdish 79 and the US’ resolve to block this and also to roll back Iranian influence in Syria. ambitions to establish a Kurdish state with a direct connection with The Turkey-Russian/Damascus – Kurdish/US tug the Mediterranean of war over northeast Syria Turkey was outraged that the US had employed Kurdish-led forces to take back Sunni Arab areas The Battle over Trump’s withdrawal bid from IS, which, it believed, inflated Kurdish ambitions to rule Sunni Arab areas of eastern Syria and also to The battle over Trump’s “withdrawal” from Syria, an- establish a Kurdish state with a direct connection nounced in December 2018, exposed the main- with the Mediterranean. In spite of some US conces- springs and unparalleled incoherence of US policy, sions to Turkish sensibilities, notably, conceding originating in the conflict between Trump’s anti-in- some joint responsibility over the outskirts of PYD- terventionist instincts and the deep-seated inter- controlled Menbij, Turkey remained dissatisfied, its ventionism of the foreign policy establishment’s 2020 interests somewhat converging with those of Russia Syria hawks, particularly National Security Advisor and Iran, as a result of US policy. Turkey’s shelling in John Bolton, Secretary of State Pompeo and Syria November 2018 of Kurdish Syrian territories, the envoy Jim Jeffreys. Much of Washington’s establish- US’ response to carry out joint military patrols with ment condemned the withdrawal as a move likely to Kurdish forces on the Turkish border and Erdogan’s empower US enemies and damage US credibility condemnation of these seemed to signal the irrec- and commitment to its allies, including Israel, which oncilability of US and Turkish goals in Syria. would feel it was left to face Iran by itself. Bolton’s Mediterranean Yearbook The US appeared intent, even as ISIS was defeated, fall back position was to keep US positions in Tanf, Med. Med. on establishing an indefinite protectorate in SDF- astride communication links to Iraq as a barrier to IE Iran, while Senator Lindsey Graham claimed he had Democratic Forces (SDF) and involving its proxies, Keys convinced Trump to make withdrawal conditional on including jihadists. The departure of thousands of a total ISIS defeat, ensuring Iran would not fill the refugees, particularly Kurds, from the area, which vacuum of the US withdrawal and protecting the Turkey did not allow to return, together with its plans Kurds – i.e. conditions that ruled out withdrawal for to settle Syrian Arabs in the area, raised the spectre the indefinite future. Trump was eventually persuad- of ethnic cleansing. ed of the need to keep a reduced but sufficient The prospect of a US withdrawal also seemed to presence in the area to enable the US to control present major new opportunities for the regime, ex- Syria’s hydrocarbons and communication links to acerbating rivalries between the Turkish-backed op- Iran, via Iraq; play the spoiler regarding Russian am- position and America’s SDF proxy in the east. With bitions in Syria; and force an Iranian withdrawal, the US withdrawal announcement and a Turkish thus reversing the apparent verdict of the geopoliti- move imminent against it, the PYD invited regime cal struggle for the Assad regime to survive and re- (and Russian) forces to take up positions in juxtapo- store its sovereignty by frustrating its ability to reas- sition with Turkish and US forces. In this period of sert control over its territory and oil resources, and uncertainty, the Kurds, in their negotiations with Da- thereby undermining the country’s post-war eco- mascus, lowered their sights from full sovereignty to nomic rehabilitation (Seligman and Hirsh, 2018). a deal. They sought a formal return of central gov- ernment sovereignty over the SDF areas in return Shifting regional alignments after the withdrawal for local autonomy, a “fair distribution” of the area’s announcement energy resources and the delegation of responsibil- Mediterranean Conflicts and the Geopolitical Context ity for security to SDF fighters nominally integrated Trump’s announcement of the US withdrawal (even into the Syrian army.