Struggles for Power and Unity Constitutional Designs in the Palestinian Authority Tonje Merete Viken MA-thesis in Middle Eastern and North-African Studies Spring 2008 Asian and African Studies program at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages Faculty of Humanities UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Acknowledgements I want to thank my supervisor Dag H. Tuastad at the University of Oslo for challenging and stimulating feedback, and for always making me think twice about what I was actually writing about. Thanks to Bahjat for his excellent work as my interpreter, and for his patience and creativity in dealing with Gaza traffic and the PLC bureaucracy. I would especially like to thank all my informants in Gaza and Ramallah who took time out from their busy schedules to meet with the student from Norway. I am amazed at their patience, and I sincerely hope that I have treated their confidence with fairness and respect. Thanks also to Muhammed and Gudrun for help and advice during my stay in Gaza. I am indebted to Hilde Katrine Haug for commenting on the thesis underway and for giving me constructive advice. Thanks to Cecilie Endresen for proof reading. I am also grateful to Kåre Vollan for answering questions and providing me with information that I would otherwise have been unable to obtain. I also want to thank my fellow students, Andrea Liven Rivrud and Thomas R. Berdal for good times and our discussions in Tel Aviv and over the phone during our respective field works. I am also grateful to Martin B. Holter, Hilde Lysengen Havro, Ingrid Baltzersen and Erik Bolstad for commenting, listening to countless monologues on the Basic Law, and for asking difficult questions. Thanks to my friends Inger and the two Ingrids, Kristin, Synne, Anne and Audhild for tolerating my obsessiveness during the writing of this thesis. And finally, thanks to my parents Astrid and Ola for their openmindedness when their daughter told them she wanted to go back to school. I had the best time! Table of contents INTRODUCTION: THE PALESTINIAN CONTEXT ......................................................................... 1 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS ...................................... 4 Research question ....................................................................................................................... 4 Main theoretical assumptions ......................................................................................... 5 Constitutions are not above politics ............................................................................... 5 Constitutions can be nonconstitutionalist ...................................................................... 7 Evaluating constitutional reform ............................................................................................... 9 Previous research ...................................................................................................................... 10 Methodological concerns ......................................................................................................... 12 Fieldwork ...................................................................................................................... 12 The texts ........................................................................................................................ 14 Translations and usage ................................................................................................. 16 Thesis outline ........................................................................................................................... 17 PART I: DRAFTING AND AMENDING THE BASIC LAW ........................................... 19 2. 1994-1997: THE LOGIC OF THE PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW ................................................ 19 The Palestinian electoral system .............................................................................................. 19 The Palestinian system of government ..................................................................................... 22 The PLO drafts: Nonconstitutional presidentialism ................................................................. 23 The PLC Basic Law: Constitutional presidentialism ............................................................... 27 Paradoxes in Palestinian constitutional design ......................................................................... 31 3. THE 2003 AMENDMENT: DE-ARAFATIZING PALESTINIAN POLITICS ................................. 34 The 2003 amendment of the Basic Law ................................................................................... 35 Immediate impact: Abbas resigns ............................................................................................ 38 Cosmetic or real? ...................................................................................................................... 41 4. THE 2005 AMENDMENT: PREPARING FOR HAMAS .............................................................. 46 Passing a new election law ....................................................................................................... 48 Rejected proposals for amending the Basic Law ..................................................................... 53 The 2005 proposals in light of the 2003 amendment ............................................................... 57 SUMMARY PART I .................................................................................................................... 59 PART II: CABINET POWER AFTER THE 2003 REFORM .......................................... 60 5. 2003-2007: REFORMING THE “SECURITY CHAOS” ............................................................. 60 Constitutional framework ......................................................................................................... 61 Legislative efforts ..................................................................................................................... 62 Contesting competencies .......................................................................................................... 63 Security developments in light of the 2003 amendment .......................................................... 69 6. 2003-2007: REFORMING DIPLOMACY ................................................................................. 72 Constitutional framework ......................................................................................................... 73 Reform attempts ....................................................................................................................... 74 Bypassing the cabinet ............................................................................................................... 78 Palestinian diplomacy in light of the 2002-2003 reforms ........................................................ 80 SUMMARY PART II................................................................................................................... 82 PART III: REASSERTING THE PRESIDENCY .............................................................. 83 7. 2006: PASSING THE HIGH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ............................................................. 83 Constitutional framework ......................................................................................................... 83 Drafting the High Constitutional Court Law ............................................................................ 84 The High Constitutional Court Law in light of the 2003 amendment ..................................... 87 8. 2006-2007: INTERPRETING THE BASIC LAW ...................................................................... 89 Constitutional issues ................................................................................................................. 90 Calling for referendums ............................................................................................... 90 Dismissing the parliament and holding early elections ............................................... 93 Dismissing the cabinet .................................................................................................. 95 Declaring a state of emergency and ruling by decree .................................................. 98 A complete reversal ................................................................................................................ 102 SUMMARY PART III ......................................................................................................... 105 MAIN CONCLUSION: THE CIVILIZING FORCE OF HYPOCRISY? ............................................. 106 TABLES Main primary sources .............................................................................................................. 16 Failed PLC sessions in July 2007 ............................................................................................ 98 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 111 List of interviews in chronological order ............................................................................... 120 Appendix I: Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ......................................................... 123 Appendix II: Background, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs .................................................... 124 Struggles for Power and Unity: Constitutional Designs in the Palestinian Authority Introduction: The