Book Reviews Ivan Lakovic´ and Dmitar Tasic,´ The Tito-Stalin Split and Yugoslavia’s Military Opening toward the West, 1950–1954: In NATO’s Backyard. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016. 285 pp. $95.00. Reviewed by Lorraine M. Lees, Old Dominion University The relationship that developed in the early 1950s between Communist Yugoslavia and the United States and its democratic allies is one of the more fascinating episodes of the Cold War. The break between Josip Broz Tito and Iosif Stalin in 1948 had not been foreseen by Western governments, but it provided the United States with an opportunity to pry open the Soviet bloc and demonstrate that Soviet imperialism, not Communism in and of itself, was a danger to the free world. Tito was an unusual and often reluctant partner in this endeavor, retaining his commitment to socialist principles and, above all, to his country’s survival. To secure the latter, he accepted U.S. military assistance and even appeared open to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Over time, however, he forged a rapprochement with the USSR and soon became adept at balancing one power against the other. Rather than adhere to either bloc, Tito eventually emerged as one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and by the late 1950s he moved away from some aspects of the relationship he had established with Western countries and with NATO. The rise and fall of the military relationship between Yugoslavia and NATO is the subject of this volume in the Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series by Ivan Lakovic´ and Dmitar Tasic.´ Lakovic´ is a research assistant at the Historical Institute of the University of Montenegro, and Tasic´ is a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for War Studies, University College Dublin. Both have written extensively on Yugoslavia and its military policies. LakovicandTasi´ c´ use the military aid programs involving Yugoslavia and the West in the late 1940s and early 1950s as the framework for their analysis, believing that such programs are a good way to assess relations between states. In addition to readily available sources, they cite published works not available in English and ma- terials from Yugoslav (now Serbian) archives. The latter illuminate the actions and reasoning of Tito and other officials and bring a vital new dimension to the subject. Throughout the book, LakovicandTasi´ c´ emphasize the differences in the goals that Yugoslavia and the West had for the military aid program. The Yugoslavs, in 1945 and again in 1947, had reorganized their military to follow Soviet norms. The break with Stalin denied them additional Soviet aid and supplies of spare parts, and the looming threat of a Soviet attack made the modernization of the Yugoslav armed forces even more crucial to the country’s survival. Out of necessity, the Yugoslavs turned to “yesterday’s enemy,” the United States and its NATO allies, who “extended the hand of salvation” (p. 2). However, the main goal of U.S. and Western military aid centered on securing Yugoslavia’s adherence to NATO and a commitment to the defense of the Ljubljana Gap. The authors provide detailed accounts of the often tor- turous aid negotiations undertaken by Yugoslav and Western officials as they sought to reconcile their conflicting goals. LakovicandTasi´ c´ also recount Yugoslav objections 262 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_r_00749 by guest on 24 September 2021 Book Reviews to several aspects of the American Military Assistance Staff’s operations. Using Yu- goslav sources, they demonstrate that such objections were motivated by more than Yugoslavia’s chronic feelings of insecurity and suspicions of mistreatment at the hands of the West. The divergence in the aims of each party precluded a truly harmonious relationship. A particularly noteworthy portion of the book analyzes the troubled history of the Balkan Pact, a centerpiece of the West’s plans regarding Yugoslavia. The authors devote considerable attention to the long-standing territorial and political conflicts between Greece and Turkey on one hand and Yugoslavia and Italy on the other and the role these disputes played in undermining the alliance. Western governments eventually came to see the Balkan Pact as a political rather than a military agreement, whereas Tito viewed it as a defensive arrangement that gave him the cover he needed to pursue his nonaligned policy. By placing this story within the context of the military assistance program and Yugoslavia’s relationship to NATO, LakovicandTasi´ c´ enrich our understanding of the episode. The United States and Yugoslavia ended the military assistance program at Yu- goslavia’s request in the late 1950s, although the Yugoslavs still received economic aid and could purchase military equipment from the West. Other scholars who have explored this subject, including me, have noted the skill with which Tito pursued his objectives in his dealings with the United States and its allies. LakovicandTasi´ c´ agree, observing that in negotiations with the West, Yugoslav officials “had a much more clearly defined platform of what was wanted and how to achieve it” (p. 45). Yet the U.S. position was less passive and more complicated than LakovicandTasi´ c´ indicate. The United States had to fit its policy toward Yugoslavia into a multifaceted, global strategy. Every move toward Yugoslavia, for example, could inflame relations with Italy. Yugoslavia’s focus, as least until the death of Stalin, was more regional; Tito had to obtain the aid necessary for survival, without provoking a Soviet invasion or weakening his power at home. Once the danger of a Soviet invasion had passed after Stalin’s death, both Tito’s rapprochement with the USSR and his adoption of a nonaligned stance undermined the U.S. government’s ability to obtain aid for his regime from an always reluctant Congress. Although both sides were cautious and de- veloped their policies in reaction to moves by the other (and by the USSR), they shared and achieved at least one common goal: the continued existence of an independent Yugoslavia. Despite the best efforts of the authors and translator, the book has some stylistic shortcomings. Sentences are sometimes convoluted, and shifting verb tenses make it difficult to know which time period is being addressed. The extensive use of the passive voice also weakens the account, insofar as the reader does not always know who is making the decision under discussion. The topical format chosen by the authors also leads to occasional repetition and confusion, as events are referenced before they have been fully explained. A more chronological approach, weaving in different aspects of the story, would have produced a smoother narrative. However, these relatively minor criticisms do not detract from the work’s overall importance. The analysis provided by 263 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_r_00749 by guest on 24 September 2021 Book Reviews LakovicandTasi´ c´ and the documents they have used to sustain it represent a valuable addition to the field of Cold War studies. ✣✣✣ Peter Ruggenthaler, The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin’s Foreign Policy, 1945–1953. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. 442 pp. $120.00. Reviewed by Radoslav Yordanov, Visiting Scholar, Harriman Institute, Columbia University This comprehensively researched book explores the Soviet Union’s policy toward Ger- many, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway from 1945 until the death of Iosif Stalin in 1953. In confronting this ambitious task, Peter Ruggenthaler seeks to answer a basic question: “What did neutrality look like when seen from Moscow in the early stage of the Cold War” (p. xx). He argues that Stalin viewed neutrality as a foreign policy instrument or “propaganda tool.” To demonstrate this point across several countries, Ruggenthaler highlights “the plans, strategies, tactical considerations and goals of the Soviet Central East European and East European policies on the basis of the most up-to-date state of research” (p. xvi). Covering all of this in a single vol- ume would be nearly impossible, and Ruggenthaler therefore offers the caveat that he will not be presenting “theoretical disquisitions” on “neutrality,” “neutralization,” and “nonalignment” (p. xix). The resulting fast-paced, dense, insightful narrative, which is minimal on context and rich on well-documented facts and events, provides ample evidence to corroborate Ruggenthaler’s premise. The book is based on exhaustive mining of important Russian archives. Through in-depth archival research at the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) and less-thorough study, owing to access restrictions, at the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, and the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Ruggenthaler elucidates Stalin’s “‘real’ thinking and motives” and takes us “behind the scenes of the decision making process at the top level in Moscow” (p. 367). Consequently, one of the book’s major academic strengths is its painstakingly organized treasure trove of documentary evidence, which will have lasting and undeniable value for historians of the period. The meticulously presented references, which constitute almost a third of the book, will stand the test of time, and their scholarly utility as a starting point for further research on the topic goes well beyond the scope of the tightly woven narrative. The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with the period from 1945 until the watershed year of 1949, which plays a crucial part in the narrative by marking, on the one hand, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, on the other hand, the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. The second portion covers the final few years of Stalin’s life.