Sects & Sectarianism The origins of Buddhist schools Bhikkhu Sujato 2006 This work is copyright©2006BhikkhuSujato.All rights reserved. Permission to reprintmay be obtained on application to the author. Available for free download online at http://sectsandsectarianism.googlepages.com Available for purchase from www.lulu.com. This isat COST PRICE ONLY. Neither the author nor Lulu receives any royalties for purchases. This book must not be sold for profit. Santi ForestMonastery http://santifm1.0.googlepages.com The Sangha of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis has been made unified. As long as my children and grandchildren shall live, and as long as the sun and the moon shall shine, any bhikkhu or bhikkhuni who divides the Sangha shall be made to wear white clothes and dwell outside the monasteries. What it is my wish? That the unity of the Sangha should last a long time. King Aśoka, Minor Pillar Edict, Sāñchī Contents Foreword 1 Abstract 2 1. The ‘Unity Edicts’ 4 2. TheSaintsofVedisa 15 3. The Dīpavaṁsa 24 4. Monster or Saint? 41 5. ThreeSins&FiveTheses 54 6. More on the Vibhajjavādins 79 7. Vibhajjavāda vs. Sarvāstivāda? 89 8. Dharmagupta:TheGreekMissions 98 9. The Mūlasarvāstivādins of Mathura 113 Conclusion 122 Appendix: Chronology 125 Bibliography 128 Mahāsaṅghika Śāriputraparipṛcchā Theravāda Dīpavaṁsa The Mahāsaṅghika school diligently study the collected Suttas and teach the true meaning, because they are the source and the center. They wear These 17 sects are schismatic, yellow robes. only one sect is non-schismatic. The Dharmaguptaka school master With the non-schismatic sect, the flavor ofthe true way.Theyare there areeighteen in all. guides for the benefit of all. Their way of expression is special.They Like a greatbanyan tree, wear redrobes. the Theravāda is supreme, The Sarvāstivāda school quickly gain the Dispensation of the Conqueror, unobstructed knowledge, for the complete, without deficiency or excess. Dhamma is their guide. They wear black robes. The other sects arose like thorns on the tree. The Kaśyapīya school are diligent and energeticin guarding sentient beings. They wearmagnolia robes. (Dīpavaṁsa 4.90-91) The Mahīśāsaka school practice jhana,and penetrate deeply.They wear blue robes. (CBETA,T24,no.1465,p.900,c12-18) Foreword THESE TWO QUOTES, each from essential texts, highlight the radical divergence in perspectives on the B uddhist schisms. Are we to see the emerging schools as a corruption ofan originally pure unity,or as unique unfoldings ofthe potential of the Dhamma?1 My own belief is that both of these perspectives are likely to contain some truth, and yet neither of them contains the whole truth. If we reflect on the basic issues that divided the schools, we find much that is reminiscent of contemporary B uddhist dialogue. It is a shame that the complex and profound history of B uddhist philosophical thought becomes so easily reduced to the facile dismissal of other schools simply because they disagree with the interpretation of one’s own chosen party. As much as we would like to imagine that all the answers are wrapped up, the nature of philosophy is such thatthe basicissues thatgeneratedschools of thoughtremain,andreappear in variedguises in discussions within the school itself. For example, the Mahāsaṅghika’s basic thesis was the transcendental nature of the B uddha. We might regard some of the extremes of this view with amusement - such as the idea that dirt never clings to the B uddha’s body, but he washes it in conformity with everyday usage – but it address a genuine B uddhist concern: how do we conceive of the nature of Buddhahood,so intensely human yetso totally beyondour lives of anxiety andfear? This is a live issue within modern Theravāda. While the ‘official’ (read ‘rationalist, modernist, middle-class’) position is that the B uddha was a perfected human, the devotional perspective of the vast majority of Theravādins sees the B uddha as something quite other. Similarly,the Sarvāstivādins espoused a philosophical realism that tended to treat external objects as ‘existing’ in andof themselves,so thateven an abstractrelation like ‘possession’comes to be consideredas a real substance.This comes across as naïve, but in shaping their philosophy they show a consciousness of a fundamental problem of metaphysics: if we allow the ‘existence’ of one thing it becomes difficult to deny the existence of everything. So the Sarvāstivādins considered that the past and the future ‘exist’ in exactly the same sense as the present. The Sarvāstivādins were perfectly aware that this appeared to flaunt the fundamental B uddhist axiom of impermanence. B ut they were trying to find a coherent philosophical interpretation of impermanence based not on ontology, but on causal efficacy: the present ‘exists’ just as the past and future ‘exist’, but the present is distinguished in that it is operative or functional. To invoke a modern analogy, compare this with the buttons on the Word document I’m typing; they all ‘exist’, but only become operative when I hover the cursor above them: that moment is the ‘present’. We may question the exact formulation of this idea, but we should do so as the Sarvāstivādins themselves did, that is, within a B uddhist context, seeking the best way to articulate B uddhist truths. We would need to address the same question faced by the Sarvāstivādins: if all is impermanent, what is there that connects the past, future, and present? This question is much more than an abstract musing. In a devotional religion like B uddhism, it is crucial in forming our emotional attitude towards our belovedTeacher,so presentin our consciousness,yetso remote in time.Theravādins, despite the stern official doctrine of radical momentariness, still popularly treat the B uddha as somehow still existing, resulting in an uneasy dichotomy between the official and the popular perspectives. The Sarvāstivādin approach would allow a less 1 It goes without saying that the Śāriputraparipṛcchā’s claims of the robe colors of the various schools should not be taken literally. F o r e w o r d 3 fractured understanding throughout the community, which might be one reason behind its extraordinary success in ancientIndia. As another example, the Puggalavādins took their standon the thesis thatthere exists a ‘person’who isneither identical with nor separate from the five aggregates that make up our empirical existence. This ‘person’ is indescribable,butis not the ‘self’of the non-Buddhisttheorists.Itis this ‘person’which experiences the fruitof kamma and which attains liberation. The Puggalavādins were not blind to the difficulties in reconciling this theory with the teaching of ‘not-self’. Quite the opposite; their main philosophical efforts went into a sophisticated articulation of how the ‘person’ was in fact the correct understanding of ‘not-self’. Once more, this is a key issue in modern Buddhist dialogue. How do we reconcile the ‘atomic’ reality of our empirical experience with the undeniable sense of personal identity? This problem is especially acute in the relation between B uddhist and psychological thought. Much of psychology is concerned with building a coherent and integrated ‘self’, a project that is anathema to a literal interpretation of traditional Buddhism. B ut the psychological approach has developed in response to a genuine problem, the fractured and alienated modern psyche. This is a very different context to what the B uddha was facing when he critiqued Brahmanical or Jainist theories of a permanent and enduring essence that survived death. As we develop our modern responses to such questions, it would seem sensible to recognize that we are not the first generation to grapple with how to applyB uddhism in a historical context far removed from the B uddha’s own. In pursuing the historical inquiry throughout this work, then, I take it for granted that the various sects all attempted to articulate and practice sincere interpretations of the B uddha’s teachings. When examined closely, the doctrines of the schools cannot be explained away as simplistic errors, or alien infiltrations, or deliberate corruptions. It would then follow that more sympathetic and gentle perspectives on the schools are likely to be more objective than bitterly partisan accounts. Itseems tome thatfartoomuch weighthas been ascribedtothe Dīpavaṁsa,the earliestSri Lankan chronicle. This version of events,despite straining credibility in almostevery respect,continues to exert a powerful influence on the Theravādin sense of communal identity. The fact that some modern scholars have treated it favourably only reinforces this tendency. The research contained in this work was primarily inspired by my involvement in the reformation of the bhikkhuni order within Theravāda. While we will only glance upon this issue here, one of the central questions in the revival of the bhikkhuni lineage from the Theravādin perspective is the validity of ordination lineages in other schools. The traditional Theravādin view would have it that the bhikkhunis in existence today are ‘Mahāyāna’. Mahāyāna, it is claimed, is descended from the Mahāsaṅghikas, and the Dīpavaṁsa asserts thatthe Mahāsaṅghikas are none other than the ‘evil’ Vajjiputtakas, who advocated the use of money bymonks, and who were defeated at the Second Council, but who later reformedandmade a new recitation.Hence the Mahāyāna is representative of a tradition whose fundamental principle was to encourage laxity in Vinaya.They are ‘schismatic’anditis impossible to acceptthem as partof the same communion. It seems to me that this view, ultimately inspired by the Dīpavaṁsa, underlies the position taken by many mainstream Theravādins today. I intend to show how the Dīpavaṁsa’s position is incoherentand patently implausible, and that a more reasonable depiction of the origins of B uddhist schools can be constructed from a sympathetic reading of all the sources. Recently I was at a meeting where these issues were discussed. A Vietnamese monk acknowledgedhis lineage from the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya; a Tibetan monk noted his heritage from the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya; but the Theravādins continued to speak as if they were simply ‘Mahāyāna’.