RYOTA IIJIMA <http://scholar.harvard.edu/riijima> <[email protected]> HARVARD UNIVERSITY Placement Director: Gita Gopinath [email protected] 617-495-8161 Placement Director: Nathan Nunn [email protected] 617-496-4958 Graduate Administrator: Brenda Piquet [email protected] 617-495-8927 Office Contact Information Littauer Center 314, 1805 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA, 02138 617-301-2156 Undergraduate Studies: B.A. in Economics, University of Tokyo, 2009 Graduate Studies: M.A. in Economics, University of Tokyo, 2011 Harvard University, 2011 to present Ph.D. Candidate in Economics Thesis Title: “Essays in Games and Decisions with Uncertainty” Expected Completion Date: June 2016 References: Professor Drew Fudenberg Professor Tomasz Strzalecki Littauer Center 310 Littauer Center 322 [email protected] [email protected] Professor Benjamin Golub Littauer Center 308 [email protected] Teaching and Research Fields: Microeconomic theory, Game Theory, Decision Theory, Networks Teaching Experience: Fall, 2014 Decision Theory (graduate), Harvard University, grader for Professor Tomasz Strzalecki Spring, 2011 Calculus (undergraduate), University of Tokyo, teaching fellow for Professor Kazuya Kamiya Spring, 2010 Microeconomic Theory (graduate), University of Tokyo, teaching fellow for Professor Michihiro Kandori Fall, 2010 Microeconomic Theory (graduate), University of Tokyo, teaching fellow for Professor Akihiko Matsui Fall 2009 Microeconomics (undergraduate), University of Tokyo, teaching fellow for Professor Akihiko Matsui Spring, 2009 Mathematics for Economics (graduate), University of Tokyo, teaching fellow for Professor Akihiko Matsui Research Experience: 2013-2015 Research Assistant to Professor Drew Fudenberg Professional Activities Presentations: RUD (Bocconi 2015), World Congress of the Econometric Society (Montreal 2015), University of Tokyo (2013, 2015), Hitotsubashi University (2015), Kyoto University (2015), University of Wisconsin-Madison (Theory Lunch 2013), WINE (Harvard 2013), Games 2012 (Istanbul), 6th Pan- Pacific Conference on Game Theory (Tokyo Institute of Technology 2010), Darwin Seminar (Tokyo Institute of Technology 2010), Second Brazilian Workshop of the Game Theory Society (2010), The Chinese Game Theory and Experimental Economics Association (2010), Conference ``Evolution of Cooperation: Models and Theories" (Laxenburg 2009), Far East and South Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (Tokyo 2009) Referee: Dynamic Games and Applications, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Theory, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Theoretical Economics Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2015-2016 Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University 2011-present Harvard Grant 2011 Research Fellow of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (DC1) Publications: “Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility” (with Drew Fudenberg and Tomasz Strzalecki), forthcoming in Econometrica “Iterated Generalized Half-Dominance and Global Game Selection”, Journal of Economic Theory, 159: 120-136, 2015 “On Delayed Discrete Evolutionary Dynamics” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 300(7): 1-6, 2012 “Heterogeneous Information Lags and Evolutionary Stability” Mathematical Social Sciences, 61(2): 83- 85, 2011 Research Papers: “Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring” (with Akitada Kasahara) (Job Market Paper) (2nd revision resubmitted to Econometrica) Abstract: We study the implications of flexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of finite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to affect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise. The values of these state variables influence players' terminal payoffs at the deadline, as well as their flow payoffs. In contrast to the static case, the equilibrium is unique under a general class of terminal payoff functions. Our characterization of the equilibrium builds on recent developments in the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). We use this tool to analyze applications, including team production, hold-up problems, and dynamic contests. In a team production model, the unique equilibrium selects an efficient outcome when frictions vanish. “Comparative Measures of Naiveté” (with David S. Ahn and Todd Sarver) “Unique Equilibrium Selection and Potential: A Continuous-Time Approach” (with Akitada Kasahara) “Social Distance and Network Structures” (with Yuichiro Kamada) revise and resubmit at Theoretical Economics “Deterministic Equilibrium Selection under Payoff-Perturbed Dynamics” Research Papers in progress: “Racing to Decide: A Dual Selves Model of Response Times and Stochastic Choice” (with Mira Frick) “Naiveté about Temptation and Self-Control: Foundations for Naive Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting” (with David S. Ahn and Todd Sarver) “Coordination Failure and Network Structures” “Mean-Field Approximation of Forward-Looking Population Dynamics” (with Daisuke Oyama) “Timing of Trades, Welfare, and Price Dispersion” (with Yuichiro Kamada) .