Edward I and Wales R.R. Davies Conquest and foreign domination are the themes of this volume. They are probably the most traumatic experiences that any country can undergo. Medieval Wales is no exception. The impact of the final Edwardian conquest of Wales 1277–83 was, it is true, greatly reduced by the fact that much of eastern and southern Wales had already been conquered in a piecemeal fashion over two centuries; the inhabitants of those districts had thereby had ample opportunity to come to terms with Anglo-Norman rule over many generations. Even in the rest of Wales the prospect of foreign conquest had loomed dangerously close on several occasions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Nevertheless the shattering impact of the events of 1277–83 on north and west Wales and on what we may call the Welsh national psyche can hardly be denied. ‘Is it the end of the world?’ (Oes derfyn byd?), wondered one poet in a mood of suicidal despair; ‘Ah God, that the sea would drown the land!’ (Och hyd atat-ti, Dduw, na ddaw mor dros dir!) yearned another. The native Welsh chronicler was more prosaic, but the telegraphic brevity of his comment could not conceal his sense of utter cataclysm: ‘And then all Wales was cast to the ground’ (Ac yna y bwriwyd boll Gymru i’r llawr). It is not difficult to understand this hysterical response. Within the space of five years the three great Welsh princely dynasties of Gwynedd, Deheubarth and northern Powys were either virtually extinguished or peremptorily dispossessed or, at best, their surviving members were reduced to the status of distressed gentlefolk. Such dispossession and demotion were not only a tragedy for the families concerned; they also severed those ties of service, loyalty, patronage and reward which were the very cement of medieval social relations. A new governmental dispensation, with its centres at Caernarfon, Carmarthen and Chester, was installed; new offices and units, notably the shire and its sheriff, created; new surveys of financial dues compiled; and at the higher echelons of governance a new, exclusively non-Welsh administrative cadre took over the running of the conquered lands. This edifice of foreign rule was crowned by a new legal dispensation grandly proclaimed in the Statute of Wales in March 1284. There was much that was enlightened, tolerant and non-discriminating in the Statute, notably its permissive attitude towards Welsh legal procedures and inheritance customs. Nevertheless its purpose was clear: to introduce the Welsh, partly by command and partly by persuasion, to the superior habits of English law. It was ‘in defence of their laws’, as an English chronicler put it, that the Welsh had risen in revolt in 1282; part of the price of defeat was that they now had ‘the law of London’, as it came to be called contemptuously, foisted upon them. It is little wonder that a distinguished English historian should have referred to the Statute of Wales as ‘the first colonial constitution’. Conquest also meant foreign occupation. Garrisons were posted and, above all, castles were built or rebuilt throughout Wales. The mighty walls of Harlech or Denbigh, of Conway or Chirk still proclaim today more eloquently than any 1 document the determination of the conquerors who built them and the irreversibility of their achievement. Within a generation or so those castles became expensive white elephants but not before they had performed a vital military and, above all, psychological function. They not only, in the words of a contemporary, ‘contained and thwarted the attacks of the Welsh’, but also literally petrified them into subjection. Their physical and metaphorical domination of the Welsh countryside was the most visible and, thereby, the most effective reminder of the power and permanence of English conquest. In the words of a later Welsh poet they were ‘the tower of the bold conqueror’ (tŵr dewr goncwerwr). The borough was the civilian arm of this military rule. Indeed, in the long run the boroughs founded by Edward I and his magnates in Wales proved to be more effective and more offensive emblems of conquest and privilege than the castles. Built in the shadows of those castles, defended by their own strong walls, peopled by immigrant English burgesses and endowed with the most extensive commercial monopolies over their hinterlands, they quickly became the epitome of privileged exclusiveness and the most bitterly resented bastions of English rule. At the time of the conquest itself, the king had been advised that herding the Welsh into towns would be the quickest way to civilize them; but the reverse happened. Formally, though much less so in practice, Welshmen were excluded from the newly founded towns and, thereby, from the rich commercial privileges enjoyed by the burgesses. So it was that Welshmen came to feel outsiders in their own country. Their sense of exclusion was compounded by the stories and mythology of a new dispossession. By the standards of medieval, let alone modern, conquest, Edward I’s victory in Wales was not followed by a massive campaign of expropriation. Nevertheless every conquest leaves its scars and memories; that of Wales was no exception. The most flourishing borough of native Wales, Llan-faes in Anglesey, and one of the premier abbeys of Wales, Aberconwy, were both demolished to suit Edward’s strategic convenience; in Denbigh, more than ten thousand acres of the most fertile lands of the Clwyd basin were bestowed on settlers from Lancashire and Yorkshire, while the original Welsh holders of the land were forcibly resettled in distant and often poor parts of the lordship, just as a royal official in Glamorgan was later encouraged to remove the Welsh from the lowlands so that they could be replaced by English immigrants. Incidents such as these may have been few in number; but they are easily magnified in the folk memory and are the very stuff from which national paranoia and resentment are manufactured. Yet it might be argued that Wales for generations had lived on the edge of conquest and had become familiar with, and indeed hardened to, the experiences that came in the wake of conquest. Should not Welshmen therefore have adjusted fairly rapidly and smoothly to the final conquest when it came? There is, of course, a considerable element of truth in these comments; but they also overlook the dramatic changes which had taken place within Wales in the two or three generations before the Edwardian conquest. It is on this issue that historians of medieval Wales have advanced important reinterpretations of late. They now emphasize that the prospect of creating a united native Welsh polity under a single prince was no longer an idealist dream but a practical proposition. Indeed, during the decade 2 1267–77, it was briefly, if prematurely, realized. The shattering of that prospect — so recently glimpsed and even briefly realized — was thereby proportionately more traumatic. The Edwardian conquest was not just another and, as it proved, final onslaught against Wales; it involved the demolition of a new political vision. It was that which made it a national conquest and a national disaster. The evidence for this reinterpretation comes from various directions. It has become increasingly clear that Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Prince of Gwynedd, c. 1199–1240, and his grandson, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 1247–82, strove with remarkable determination, clarity of objective and considerable success to convert the primacy of Gwynedd among the native dynasties into the leadership of a united native Wales whose status as a separate and unitary principality would be acknowledged by the English Crown (as indeed it was in the Treaty of Montgomery, 1267). They seized every opportunity to bring the other native rulers of Wales under their firm control and to weld pura Wallia — as the unconquered parts of Wales were called in contemporary documents — into an effective political unit. The obstacles that faced them were wellnigh insuperable, the time at their disposal short and their success only provisional and limited; but the tenacity with which they pursued their aims — in their own words to secure ‘unity’ and ‘one peace and one war’, to defend ‘our principality’ and its ‘rights’ and to reduce other native rulers to the status of ‘Welsh barons of Wales’ — was remarkable and revolutionary. It is no wonder that Llywelyn ap Gruffudd was addressed by the poets as ‘the true king of Wales’ (gwir frenin Cymru) and ‘as the man who was for Wales’ (gŵr oedd tros Gymru). Such compliments were not mere poetic extravagance; they indicated that the nature of political ambitions, arguments and relationships within Wales and between Wales and England was changing profoundly. A growing sense of the potential unity of Wales was, however, not merely a by-product of princely ambition; it drew also upon a heightened awareness of a common nationhood within Wales itself. Such an awareness expressed itself negatively in hatred for the English and for English settlers in Wales, ‘the foreign alien-tongued people’ (estron genedl anghyfiaith) as one poet contemptuously called it. Even official documents were driven to concede that ‘the peoples of England and Wales have been at loggerheads for a long time’; in other words the tension between them was seen as national and popular, not merely as the result of the intransigence of individual princes. National pride and a sense of identity as a single people also had to them a positive dimension: the Welsh came to exult in their ‘liberty’ (as the Scots were to do later), their customs, their language and, above all, their laws. On the eve of the final catastrophe of December 1282 one of their spokesmen declared defiantly that the Welsh would never ‘do homage to a stranger with whose language, customs and laws they are unfamiliar’.