Cognitive and social action Rosaria Conte & Cristiano Castelfranchi Institute of Psychology, Italian National Research Council © Rosaria Conte & Cristiano Castelfranchi, 1995 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. All rights reserved. First published in 1995 by UCL Press UCL Press Limited University College London Gower Street London WC1E 6BT The name of University College London (UCL) is a registered trade mark used by UCL Press with the consent of the owner. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data are available ISBN: 1-85728-186-1 HB Typeset in Saban. Printed and bound by BiddIes Ltd., Guildford and King's Lynn, England. Contents Preface v Foreword by Jim Doran VII Acknowledgements viii Introduction 1 PART 1 From structural pre-conditions to micro-level action 1 Precognitive bases of social interaction 18 2 From precognitive conditions to social action: adaptive cognition 30 PART 2 Others as inputs to one agent's goals 3 Adoption of others' goals 44 4 Adoption of others' interests 57 PART 3 Macro-social inputs to micro-level action: the case of norms 5 The normative coin 74 6 The route of norms in the mind 89 7 The normative influencing 107 PART 4 Closing the micro-macro circle: macro-level effects as emergent inputs to micro-level action 8 Towards a unified theory of goals and finalities 120 9 Emergent social finalities among cognitive systems: the case of co-operation 142 111 CONTENTS 10 Objective and normative foundations of collective agents 150 11 Computational applications: conclusions and perspectives 164 Appendix 185 Glossary 191 Notes 198 Bibliography 203 Index 213 lV Preface What is the book about? In this book we aim to explore the role of the external (social) environment in the regulation of cognitive autonomous agents' behaviours. In particular, the following issues are examined: - how objective conditions and relations regulate social action, i.e., how they determine the agents' knowledge and motivations to act (their beliefs and goals); - how an autonomous agent becomes an instrument for external forces (an instrument for other agents' needs and requests, as well as for social conventions, norms, laws, etc.). In other words, when, why and how do external demands on one given agent become goals of that agent? We endeavour to show that cognition is a fundamental medium between individual action and external (social) forces, cognitive medium meaning the mental interpretation and processing of these external forces. Why read it? The field of cognitive science has developed as a consequence of the impact of cybernetics and artificial intelligence (AI) on the human sciences (linguis- tics, psychology, logics and philosophy). Computational models and method- ologies influence the social sciences (sociology, economics, political science, etc.) in many ways. What new disciplinary synthesis will arise from this con- tamination? In this book, we claim that a cross-fertilization is both possible and desir- able. AI can provide the social sciences with conceptual and experimental tools, namely the capacity to model, and make up in parallel, reactive and cognitive systems, and the means to observe their interactions and emerging effects. Therefore, AI is essential for solving the vexata quaestio of the rela- tionships between psychology, on the one hand, and economics, sociology and political science on the other. More generally, AI is required in the treat- v PREFACE ment of the well-known problem of the micro-macro link. Only by repre- senting (either formally or experimentally) agents' internal mechanisms, interactions and global functions can we have a chance to solve this problem in a non-speculative way. On the other hand, in order for AI to provide a significant contribution, and deal with issues of social theory in a non-naIve way, it must be able to handle social science's typical puzzles and relevant data, and closely approach exist- ing theories. Who should read it? - All interested in computer science and its applications, particularly to theories of action and agent architecture, multi-agent systems and dis- tributed AI, computer supported co-operative work (CSCW), etc. - Cognitive scientists, philosophers and psychologists. - Social scientists, especially sociologists and theorists of rationality, game-theorists and social simulators. How should you read it? For a book on AI, this has too many formal motions and too much theoretical discussion. For a social science text, it is too obsessed with conceptual defini- tion and the challenge of formalization. Its philosophical content lacks refer- ences to relevant theoretical debate. However, to transcend the boundaries of all these disciplines, a level of compromise and a relaxation of traditional (subject specific) style have been adopted. In reading the text, it is possible to bypass the formulae (although you are invited to help us to improve them). You could also skim over the discussions and arguments. We know that there are other hypotheses, but we believe that all hypoth- eses and proposals cannot simply be tested within the confines of the indi- vidual disciplines, and their own standards and criteria. We will feel that we have come some way towards our objective if, on reading this book, psy- chologists and sociologists start to reformulate some of their own eternal questions in an operational way, or if AI scientists persuade themselves that in order to deal with autonomous (social) agenthood, they should turn to the instruments used by cognitive and social scientists. VI Foreword Those born of more than one cultural or intellectual tradition encounter spe- cial opportunities, but face special problems. They have access to a richness of ideas and techniques, but are not quite at home with any of them. They can often see connections, contradictions and opportunities that others miss, but their insights are not easily accepted by those embedded in just one tradi- tion. And so those of mixed ancestry must struggle to be heard and to be per- mitted to follow their own way. So it is with this book. Rosaria Conte and Cristiano Castelfranchi are working where ideas from social science, psychology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence meet. They are interested in social cognition and social action, and in the complex linkage between environmental structuring and the micro and the macro phenomena (including phenomena of "emergence") of society. More generally, they are striving to bring rigorous order, insight and development to the study of societies and of action within society - a study domain in which dispute and polemic have always been endemic, and which of late has frequently seen an explicit rejection of science method. Conte and Castelfranchi have built an international reputation by deploying to these ends the new intellectual and technical repertoire of Distributed Arti- ficial Intelligence which has emerged over the past decade. This is a timely and exciting, but difficult and controversial endeavour. Dis- tributed AI studies the properties of systems and communities of formal or computational agents. In its gift is the ability to explore in precise, repeatable terms the relationship between cognition within agents, and the behaviour of agent communities in particular environmental settings. Realistic models may be created and their implications found by exploiting the computer's ability to handle otherwise intractable amounts of detail. But it has to be said that many, even most, social scientists will find the technical content of such work alien, even ideologically alien, and difficult to assimilate. I encourage such readers of this book to make the effort needed to master it, and to reject the temptation of an easy dismissal on ideological or methodological grounds. AI specialists will have no similar difficulties. The potential linkage between Distributed AI and social science (analogous to that between AI and psycho 1- vii FOREWORD ogy) will be apparent to them. The danger, rather, is the naivety of those who believe too easily that their everyday view of society corresponds to reality, or the intellectual elitism of those who insist on formal sophistication even when it is not needed. And even within DAI there are clashes of culture, for there exist two sometimes discordant subtraditions: the formalist and the experi- mental. These subtraditions Conte and Castelfranchi work to integrate (start- ing from a more formalist position) and that is one of their achievements. Distributed AI based formalisations and simulations of society have the potential to open a new and productive dimension to the social sciences. This is more than merely a reworking of general systems theory or mathematical sociology. It is the opportunity to add the previously missing ingredient to precise models - the details of cognition and the internal representations it uses. Conte and Castelfranchi are creatively, skilfully and with determination working to realise this potential. This book reports the end of a fascinating and important beginning. PROFESSOR JIM DORAN University of Essex Acknowledgements We are grateful to our colleagues Amedeo Cesta and Maria Miceli for their helpful suggestions and kind encouragement. Many ideas presented in this book have been discussed together, and several hypotheses in some way or another refer to a common research program. We would also like