CHAPTER 9 SECURITY 157 CHAPTER 9 SECURITY 1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................159 2. BACKGROUND ...............................................................................................................160 3. THE PARTIES INVOLVED – BASIC ROLES ................................................................... 161 3.1 The Airport ................................................................................................................161 3.2 Aircraft Operators/ Air Carriers ..................................................................................162 4. THE GENERAL REGULATORY/STATUTORY SCHEME ................................................165 5. DEFINITION AND TERMS ...............................................................................................166 6. ICAO STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ..............................................168 7. SPECIFIC REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE MAJOR PARTIES RE: AIR CARGO SECURITY AT AIRPORTS .....................................................................................................169 8. NON-REGULATORY SECURITY BEST PRACTICES FOR AIR CARGO ........................ 170 8.1 Employee Issues: .....................................................................................................170 8.2 Non-Employee Issues: ..............................................................................................170 8.3 Physical/Equipment Issues: ......................................................................................171 9. IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FOR FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE ................. 171 9.1 Airside/Landside Demarcation ..................................................................................171 9.2 Site Fencing/Gate Security .......................................................................................172 9.3 Single-Tenant Facilities .............................................................................................172 9.4 Multi-Tenant Facilities ...............................................................................................172 9.5 Landside Access: ......................................................................................................173 9.6 Facility Design Considerations to Accommodate Air Cargo Screening ...................... 173 9.7 Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction .. 174 9.8 Other Important Considerations and a Look Ahead...................................................174 9.9 Inbound Freight: ........................................................................................................175 9.10 All-Cargo Airports:.....................................................................................................175 9.11 Implications of Cargo Security Costs:........................................................................175 10. CERTIFIED CARGO SCREENING FACILITIY (CCSF) ................................................176 11. CARGO SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES .....................................................................176 Appendix - Air Cargo Field Guide for Airport Operators ...........................................................178 158 1. INTRODUCTION The definition of “Cargo Security” has greatly evolved over the past decade. Where theft was once the main focus of an airport’s cargo security program, the acts of September 11, 2001 and other terrorism-related threats and incidents have changed the scope of cargo security forever. The new definition of cargo security pertains to the safety of aircraft and the safeguarding of aircraft from terrorism-related activities. As mandated by The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has set forth approved security programs for airports to implement and follow. Although cargo theft remains an important consideration in today’s cargo security arena, this chapter will focus on the requirements of Title 49 in the Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter XII, Subchapter C, Part 1542 on Airport Security. Airports are issued security directives by the TSA. Part 1542 provides specific requirements for an airport’s security program including the areas of access control, SIDA (Secure Identification Display Areas), and AOA (Air Operations Areas). Historically, air cargo consisted of time–sensitive or high-value products for which the higher cost of shipping by air represented a realistic trade-off for security and speed. Recognizing that the growth of the industry would in large part be linked to the protection of goods, air cargo security evolved as a loosely coordinated, inconsistent, but relatively efficient series of physical and administrative elements focused on the prevention of theft. The resultant business systems and physical infrastructure of modern goods movement in general were designed to reduce the potential for theft of goods by individuals within the employment envelope or by an external source. Security remains at the forefront of an airport’s air cargo agenda and requires constant vigilance and continuous monitoring of the rules and regulations set forth by our lawmakers and government regulatory agencies. To gain a working understanding of an airport’s role in air cargo security, we will look at this topic from an airport management perspective and ask four basic questions of ourselves. Cargo Screening – The Bottom Line Under the current regulations, cargo screening has been delegated to the air carrier or an approved agent by the TSA. The airport has no direct role in the screening of cargo and remains a support function as described in the initial section in this chapter. Critical elements include access control to include perimeter security, vehicle security, and control and detection of unauthorized individuals on the airport; badging and background investigations; and finally, emergency law enforcement response. The TSA will enter into voluntary agreements with airports to test new cargo screening technologies. In these cases, the airport provides facilities and support but the cargo screening function and responsibility remains with either the TSA or the approved private entity. The Role of the Airport Security Coordinator Each airport must identify at least one Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) who serves as the primary point of contact with the TSA and has the power to implement immediate corrective action in the case of violations of security requirements. This Airport Security Coordinator must be available on a 24-hour basis. These requirements are contained in the TSA regulation. Most airports also identify alternate Airport Security Coordinators to serve as backups for the primary ASC. It is important that the ASC maintain an ongoing operational dialog with the TSA Federal Security Director in order to ensure a highly functional security capability at the airport. Good security is a function of cooperation and collaboration at the airport level. The Importance of the Federal Security Director The relationship between an airport manager, the Airport Security Coordinator and their Federal Security Director is extremely important. All significant security measures, procedures, and changes must be reflected in the Airport Security Program and approved by the Federal Security Director. The maintenance of ongoing communications and an appreciation of each other’s roles are central to making this a mutually productive and beneficial relationship. 159 The Terrorism Threat In the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) which the TSA published prior to issuing extensive regulatory changes, two critical risks were identified in the air cargo environment. They were: the use of cargo to introduce an improvised explosive device aboard a passenger aircraft; and, the hostile take-over of an all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon. The magnitude of these risks was considered in view of credible threats and possible vulnerabilities. Extensive comments were received regarding the threat and proposed countermeasures from the time the NPRM was published (November 10, 2004 and the issuance of the Final Rule (May 26, 2006). Terrorists have attempted to attack aviation via air cargo in the past and aviation continues to be a priority of terrorists. Past related incidents include: • On American Airlines flight 444, a B727 flying between Chicago and Washington, DC, an IED constructed by Ted Kaczynski the Unabomber began smoking due to a reaction in the explosive. The pilot made an emergency landing. • In 1995 following his attempt to place leave-behind IED’s on U.S. carriers flying in Asia, Ramzi Yousef constructed two IED’s to be placed in cargo on board two U.S. carriers flying from Bangkok to the U.S. Upon arriving at the airport, one of Yousef’s co-conspirators was intimidated by the array of security measures in place at Bangkok and was deterred from attempting to introduce the IED’s as cargo. • In 2010 explosives were shipped from Yemen disguised as printer cartridges. While the aircraft was not the target this did increase the call for cargo security. It should be noted that this plot was foiled by intelligence gathering and not by cargo screening technology. 2. BACKGROUND Since the Gulf War in 1991, more and more carriers and airports have placed increasing emphasis on air cargo (especially belly cargo) as a key component of their overall revenues. In the case of airports, cargo capacity has become