WITTGENSTEIN AND GOETHE: TRACING METHODOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC LINKS BETWEEN 19TH CENTURY GERMAN ROMANTICISM AND WITTGENSTEIN’S LANGUAGE GAMES by Nathaniel L. Hanson Bachelor of Philosophy, The University of Pittsburgh, 2012 Submitted to the Faculty of The University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES UNIVERSITY HONORS COLLEGE This thesis was presented by Nathaniel L. Hanson It was defended on April 12, 2012 And approved by Robert Brandom, Distinguished Professor, University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy Thomas Ricketts, Professor, University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy John Koethe, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee Department of Philosophy Thesis Director: Mark Wilson, Professor, University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy ii Copyright © by Nathaniel L. Hanson 2012 iii WITTGENSTEIN AND GOETHE: TRACING THE METHODOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC LINKS BETWEEN 19TH CENTURY ROMANTICISM AND WITTGENSTEIN’S LANGUAGE GAMES NATHANIEL L. HANSON, B.PHIL UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, 2012 While, at the very least, one could attribute an academic connection between Goethe and Wittgenstein to the existence of a common Germanic scientific, literary, and philosophical tradition, the following paper attempts to lay the foundation for the possible mapping of the methodological and philosophical connections between the two thinkers in hopes to better understand Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. I focus on mapping explicit methodological connections between the two thinkers, using, on one hand Wittgenstein’s writings and personal notes, and, on the other, Goethe’s particular conception of organically-modeled explanations of phenomena. Specifically, I argue that Goethe’s method and philosophy of science directly influenced Wittgenstein’s work in epistemology and the philosophy of language. This paper, therefore, examines Wittgenstein’s language games through a Goethian methodological framework, one which bares striking resemblance to the language games of the Philosophical Investigations. Goethe postulated all plants to be connected via a universal archetypical plant. To Goethe, this plant was the conceptual and developmental basis for all other plants, which, he argued, were all possible stages of an infinite field of developmentally-linked possible floral forms. Nature, to Goethe, was continuously changing, adapting and interconnected; the archetypical plant stood as Goethe’s answer to the causally-focused models of the rapidly expanding Newtonian tradition of scientific explanation. Wittgenstein’s work is often split between a more static conception of the first half of Wittgenstein’s career, which was built upon explanations based upon strict, unchanging rules of logic and corresponding explanations, on one iv hand, and a more mystical, use-centered approach to philosophical method. This later work is often understood to be a substantial revision to its earlier counterpart. My paper argues the later Wittgenstein was reacting to methods of philosophical explanation similar to the scientific ideology and method of Newton with which Goethe was also reacting, namely closed causal- focused systems of scientific and philosophical explanation. This argument is augmented by the argued methodological connection between Goethe’s archetypical plant and Wittgenstein’s language games. By focusing on this Goethian connection, believe scholarship on language games, and the later Wittgenstein in general, will be able to be understood from a new philosophical vantage point. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………….............vii 1.0 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………...1 2.0 SCIENCE AS AN INFERENTIAL FRAMEWORK: ALTERNATIVES TO CAUSALLY-FOCUSED EXPLANITORY MODELS…………………………………..3 3.0 LINKING GOETHE AND WITTGENSTEIN…………………………………………..11 3.1 LANGUAGE GAMES AND THE URPFLANZE……………………………….11 3.2 CITIES AND SUBURBS: LANGUAGE GROWTH AND THE FIELD OF LINGUISTIC POSSIBILITIES………………………………………………….14 4.0 STORM AND STRESS: MORPHOLOGY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LINNAEUS……………………………………………………………………………...19 5.0 THE INFLUENCE OF GOETHE ON WITTGENSTEIN……………………………....23 6.0 SCIENCE, ABSOLUTISM, AND UNDERSTANDING…………………………….....28 6.1 PROBLEMS WITH CAUSALLY-FOCUSED EXPERIENTIAL MODELS AS EXPLANATIONS OF PHENOMENA………………………………………….31 6.2 LANGUAGE GAMES AS DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS TO ISOLATE AND UNDERSTAND THE FIELD OF LINGUISTIC POSSIBILITIES……………..35 7.0 PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS AND THE TRACTATUS LOGICO- PHILOSOPHICUS……………………………………………………………………….39 7.1 LOGIC AND PERFECTIONISM………………………………………………..39 vi 7.2 TURNING OUR OWN INQUIRY AROUND: CHANGING OUR PERSPECTIVE AS TO THE PURPOSE AND PROPER FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE GAMES…………………………………………………………..44 8.0 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………….46 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………….49 vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude to my teacher and advisor, Mark Wilson, whose academic guidance and patience has provided me with the invaluable opportunity to devote these past five semesters to the seemingly impossible project of serious undergraduate engagement with Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I would like to thank Robert Brandom (whose course on Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche influenced my philosophical ideas underlying this thesis, and also fundamentally affected my understanding of the relationship between philosophy, society, and one’s self) for sitting on my defense committee, John Koethe for taking the time to come to Pittsburgh to participate in my defense committee, and Thomas Ricketts for agreeing to do the same. I would also like to thank the University Honors College Brackenridge Fellowship, whose financial support made the completion of this thesis possible. Additional thanks are also due to G. Edward Broussard, Stephen Makin, and Stephen Crano, all of whom provided me with over two years of invaluable and incredibly stimulating conversations about life and philosophy. I would also like to thank Amanda Carto for her gracious and kind encouragement over the past year, as well as her patience during the many evenings out that that inevitably fell victim to those aforementioned conversations. I am indebted to my mother, Elizabeth Hanson-Bowen, for her infinite support, made possible by her correspondingly limitless strength of character and of spirit; my brother Jonathon Hanson, whom I believe can accomplish anything he likes; as well as my step-father, Brent D. Bowen, who taught me the fundamental maxim that anything worth doing is most likely extremely difficult, and should always be done well, regardless of circumstance or possible excuse. Lastly, I would like to thank my father, Timothy W. Hanson, for his innumerable sacrifices, intellectual focus, and tireless pursuit of a better quality of life, through which he rose from a farm in remote viii Cornstalk, WV to achieve the eventual provision of suburban comfort in which he rose his children; though he is not alive to read these pages, he would, no doubt, be incredibly proud. ix We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! -Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations x 1.0 INTRODUCTION Wittgenstein’s intended function and proper definition of language-games is presented in a notoriously vague style. In the following paper, I will examine the ideas of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a reaction to the ideas that Wittgenstein originally presented in his early work. Furthermore, I will argue that what Wittgenstein intends his language games to do, first and foremost, is to catalyze a radical shift in the perspective within the reader. This shift in perspective, I argue, is a shift from an attempt to define words and concepts based upon a strict rules of logic and analysis toward, instead, an attempt to understand instances of word usage in a variety of similar, but still distinct, ways. This method is, I argue, concerned with presenting language, and indeed, scientific understanding of phenomena, as best understood through investigation of organic development from a field of possibilities rather than in terms of an event’s causal nexus. Examining language games in light of Wittgenstein’s earlier ideas allows the reader to avoid traps that Wittgenstein himself fell victim to in his earlier work, while, at the same time, allowing the reader to understand language games in their overall context within the history of philosophy. While this context will place the reader in a better position to understand why Wittgenstein is employing language games in his later work, there still lie inherent issues in successfully determining what exactly constitutes a language game, as well as the proper role that language games play in Wittgenstein’s overall philosophy. To resolve these concerns, I argue that it is necessary for readers to shift their own focus from the mentioned attempt to isolate and characterize language games and their function, to, instead, understanding language games in terms of their methodology. To truly understand what language games are we must trace their underlying philosophical method back to their origins, namely, to the scientific and philosophical methods that influenced the later Wittgenstein’s 1 philosophical approach. The reason