Wittgenstein and Nietzsche: Two Critics of Philosophy by Anu Koshal Graduate Program in Literature Duke University Date: July 23, 2010 Approved: ___________________________ Toril Moi, Supervisor __________________________ Richard Fleming __________________________ V.Y. Mudimbe __________________________ Michael Hardt Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate Program in Literature in the Graduate School of Duke University 2010 ABSTRACT Wittgenstein and Nietzsche: Two Critics of Philosophy by Anu Koshal Graduate Program in Literature Duke University Date: July 23, 2010 Approved: ___________________________ Toril Moi, Supervisor __________________________ Richard Fleming __________________________ V.Y. Mudimbe __________________________ Michael Hardt An abstract submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate Program in Literature in the Graduate School of Duke University 2010 ii Copyright by Anu Koshal 2010 iii ABSTRACT Few philosophers have been more critical of the Western philosophical tradition than Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein did not just reject the conclusions of their philosophical predecessors; they rejected their most basic assumptions. They rejected the very idea of philosophy as the attempt to rationally develop objective theories of the world. And yet Wittgenstein and Nietzsche have now been absorbed into the discipline they wanted to abolish. This dissertation attempts to recapture the force and extent of their respective criticisms of philosophy, and evaluate their conceptions of what philosophy should be. I begin by examining Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophical problems rest on a misunderstanding of language. I show that this claim does not entail a quietist refusal to engage in philosophical problems, as many have argued. Rather, it offers new insights into these problems, insights which I demonstrate by considering Wittgenstein’s analysis of G.E. Moore’s attempt to refute external world skepticism. In the case of Nietzsche, I argue that his criticism of philosophy extends beyond the metaphysics of Plato, Descartes, and Kant to include even those anti‐metaphysical philosophical movements with which he is now associated: post‐structuralism and naturalism. In this way, his criticism of philosophy is more extensive than has been recognized. I conclude by describing his alternative conception of philosophy as the creation of new concepts, and compare it with Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as reminding us of how we ordinarily use words. iv For my parents Arti and Arvind Koshal v There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. Hamlet 1.5 (165‐167) vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract iv Acknowledgments viii Introduction 1 PART 1: WITTGENSTEIN Chapter 1: Wittgenstein’s Critique of the Augustinian Picture 23 1.1. How the Augustinian Picture Arises 1.2. How the Augustinian Picture Leads to Paradox 1.3. Platonism 1.4. Mentalism 1.5. Conventionalism 1.6. The Paradox Dissolved 1.7. Conclusion Chapter 2: Wittgenstein’s Positive Conception of Philosophy 86 2.1. Wittgenstein’s Response to Moore 2.2. Where and Why Justifications Come to an End 2.3. The Significance of Everyday Words and Concepts 2.4. Conclusion PART 2: NIETZSCHE Chapter 3: Nietzsche’s Critique of Philosophy 130 vii 3.1. Nietzsche and Metaphysics 3.2. Nietzsche and Post‐structuralism 3.3. Nietzsche and Naturalism 3.4. Conclusion Chapter 4: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Future 185 Conclusion 210 Bibliography 220 Biography 227 viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would first like to thank the members of my committee. My supervisor, Toril Moi, has overseen this project since its inception, in her seminar, in my first year in graduate school. She has been everything one can ask for in an advisor: critical, supportive, honest, and open. I feel fortunate to have been her student, and even more fortunate to call her a friend. V.Y. Mudimbe has been a constant ally, both personally and professionally, since my first year at Duke. He taught me everything from Descartes to Derrida, and when my interests turned to Wittgenstein, he sent me to Cambridge to learn it there. Richard Fleming has saved me from many interpretive errors, without any personal or professional obligation to do so. His insights into Wittgenstein and Cavell have provided many prompts and challenges for the ideas discussed here. And Michael Hardt’s utter reasonableness and sincerity in the often unreasonable world of academia has been both refreshing and inspiring. Many others at Duke have supported this project in various ways. Fredric Jameson first invited me to the Literature Program and encouraged me as my interests evolved. Tiwonda Johnson‐Blount helped with innumerable logistical issues, freeing me to write. At Cambridge, the members of the Faculty of Philosophy, in particular Jane Heal and Raymond Geuss, hosted me as a visiting student in 2007. Their respective lectures on Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, as well as fruitful discussions in individual meetings, have greatly influenced the ideas here. ix This project is also borne out of the personal and intellectual community I have shared with friends and family for years. I would not have enrolled in graduate school were it not for the encouragement and example of Aimee Shen. I am grateful for her continued support, even through difficult times. Ryan Hoskins, Jai Shah, James Rowe, Mark Cormier, Jason Curran, and Nick Leong have been my personal and intellectual anchors for fifteen years now: never letting me, or my thoughts, drift too far astray. Though they know little of the details of this project, their mark is everywhere on these pages. Arjun and Amit Koshal always provided a welcome distraction, putting me up and taking me out when I travelled to New York and Boston. Theirs is the kind of support that only siblings can provide: unspoken, but constant and refreshing. Erin Post has made every aspect of my life, including this dissertation, a source of joy. She also read every chapter and discussed every point, and this dissertation is much better as a result. I am lucky to have the rest of my life to show her my gratitude. And finally my parents, Arvind and Arti Koshal, have supported me at every stage of this project, even though they never understood it. All they knew was that it was something I wanted to do, and that was enough for them. I dedicate this dissertation to them. X INTRODUCTION Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein occupy a distinct place in the history of philosophy. Their writings are endlessly debated by professional philosophers, and they feature in debates about the nature of truth, objectivity, knowledge, language, ethics, and the self. In this respect they are among the most influential philosophers to have ever lived. And yet Wittgenstein and Nietzsche were both virulently critical of the philosophical tradition to which they now belong. Nietzsche believed that philosophy, “however solemn, conclusive, or definite its manner, may have been nothing but the infantile high‐mindedness of a beginner.”1 And Wittgenstein writes that “[w]hen we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.2 These are not the usual attempts to build on or correct the mistakes of their predecessors. Wittgenstein and Nietzsche believe that traditional philosophy, since its inception, has been beset by fundamental errors and faulty assumptions, and that a new kind of philosophy is needed in its place. My aim in this dissertation is simple: to examine why Wittgenstein and Nietzsche are critical of traditional philosophy, and what they advocate in its place. This project is motivated by my belief that, despite the massive amount of secondary literature on each, the depth and extent of their criticisms of philosophy have not 1 Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Marion Faber. Oxford UP, 1998, §5. (Hereafter BGE) 2 Philosophical Investigations. Third edition. Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, §194. (Hereafter PI) 1 been fully appreciated. Wittgenstein’s remarks about rule‐following and private language, for instance, have proven exceptionally fertile for contemporary philosophers, but few take seriously his more general criticisms philosophy. And the growing interest in Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism, his perfectionist ethics, and his psychological analyses of human motivation corresponds with an increasing neglect of his criticisms of philosophy. I do not wish to criticize these interpretive practices. The secondary literature on both philosophers has deepened our understanding of them and provided new insights into philosophical problems. But I hope that by considering Wittgenstein and Nietzsche’s discussions of specific philosophical issues in light of their more general criticisms of philosophy, we can illuminate a different, and no less philosophically significant aspect of their writings: the question of what philosophy is and should be. It would be useful to begin with an account of what Wittgenstein and Nietzsche mean by “philosophy,” but this is difficult for two reasons. First, both use “philosophy” to refer to what they criticize and what they advocate. This can be confusing. For this reason I often use the phrase “traditional philosophy” to refer to what each criticizes,