᭿ First published in Twentieth Century Mongolia, Cambridge, White Horse Press, 1999 45 THE GREAT PURGE Baabar Chapter Twenty-One: The Great Purge ASS officially expressed its condolences on Demid’s death. In Ulaanbaatar, TChoibalsan mourned the decease of “his only close friend in the world” by taking an oath of allegiance. After the burial ceremony, on September 2, Choibalsan became Commander-in-Chief and Minister for Defense. The next day he issued Order No. 366, which stated: There are indications that among us are individuals and groups whose political conscious- ness has become so dull that they have fallen under the influence of Japanese spies and provocateurs and have become traitors of their native land.1 Creating an impression of the omnipresence of spies and traitors and producing justifications for future arrests was part of the final psychological preparation for the Great Purge. The technical preparations for the massacre were already complete. Many important things had happened in the few days between Demid’s death and the day Order No. 366 was signed by Choibalsan. On August 13, 1937, the Central Committee of the All- Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party chaired by Stalin decided to station the Red Army in Mongolia and to send a Bolshevik delegation there to implement the decision.2 On August 24, 1937, a large delegation of the Soviet government arrived in Ulaanbaatar unannounced. It included Smirnov, Deputy Minister for Defense, Frinovski, Deputy Minister for Soviet Internal Affairs, and Mironov, the newly assigned representative in Mongolia. Apparently the delegation had not intended to meet with Demid in Mongolia, who had just been called to Moscow for the second time, but rather to present to Prime Minister Amar Japan’s plan to take over Mongolia. The next day, the State Bag Hural and the Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 22, which was an invitation to station the Soviet troops in Mongolia: We request that the Soviet government send military units of the Workers and Peasants’ Red army as soon as possible to counter the direct threat and its possible consequences to the people’s state of Mongolia in the current situation.3 1002 THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA The Soviet Army Arrives At the moment this decree was issued in Ulaanbaatar, the Seventeenth Soviet army had already crossed the Mongolian border at Altanbulag and Ereentsav, and was heading to its assigned places. One day before the decree, Choibalsan called the chief of Dornod aimag to tell him not to be disturbed when Soviet troops entered the aimag territory. This decision, which both Genden and Demid had resisted, was put into effect immedi- ately. The Soviet army, led by officers experienced in the Spanish civil war, was to transport its military equipment to the empty Mongolian steppe and to ship it later to the Chinese for the use in the Sino-Japanese War. The army was composed of two mechanized motor brigades, one ground troop division backed by artillery and auto- mobiles, one cavalry brigade, a communications unit, an anti-landmine unit, an engineering unit, and transport, air, and automobile brigades.4 There were almost 30,000 Soviet troops.5 Even before this, several Red Army units had already been stationed in Mongolia. Even earlier, on January 25, 1936, Soviet military assistance was requested.6 Frinovski mentioned that one special tank unit and one armored tank unit, as well as an air unit, were stationed in Mongolia with no legal permission.7 Stalin had other reasons to send troops to Mongolia. He was eager to exert influence in the Sino-Japanese War which had started one month earlier and was, in his view, key to maintaining the security of Soviet interests in the Far East. But he needed to have full control in Mongolia to keep the Japanese at bay. Genden and Demid were too crafty for Stalin’s liking, and had not proved to be the puppets he was looking for. He had to get rid of them and find a dictator the Mongols would fear, and who would in turn fear him. Choibalsan became that leader. Stalin’s intention was for China and Japan to fight each other and for the USSR to be a distant observer, but he was aware that the Chinese might retreat into Mongolia if they were defeated, possibly drawing the Soviets into the war. In fact, the downtrodden Chinese troops did retreat from the Heavenly Gates to the Mongolian border, and according to some sources, they approached the Soviets for permission to temporarily seek haven in Mongolia.8 So, Smirnov’s wish came true, and Mongolia was turned into a supply line for Chiang Kaishek. Ironically, after the Soviet troops arrived, a study done in Ömnögov’ aimag showed the impossibility of transporting military equipment across the Gobi sand dunes, thus making Xinjiang the primary transport route for the Soviet assistance. At this time, Frinovski was Deputy Minister for Soviet Internal Affairs. Frinovski began his assignment in Mongolia by calling Chopyak, adviser at the Ministry for Internal Affairs, to a meeting. Tairov, who was the Soviet representative in Mongolia and had returned to Moscow a few days earlier, had been interrogated by Yezhov himself, who managed to extract names of some Mongols out of Tairov. But according to Frinovski, not enough names were on that list, and he demanded that Chopyak supply more from his reserve lists. Chopyak indicated that, although as a result of the Yonzon-hamba case, which he personally managed, and the torture of Pürev, Genden’s relative, he had acquired a lot of new names, he was waiting for official instructions to launch the Great Purge.9 After that, Frinovski worked with Choibalsan for a few days to produce a list. Although Choibalsan later claimed that it was Frinovski who supplied him with the names of 115 persons participating in a plot, the list was devised by the two men.