Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, on 15 December 1917. He took flying training at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918. After a tour in the Philippines, he returned to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 with a subsequent assignment in December 1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. Retained on the faculty as a bombardment in- structor, Walker became the epitome of the strategic thinkers at the school and coined the revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: “A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown air force attack will constitute an offensive that cannot be stopped.” Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the Air Corps in Washington, DC. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed this monu- mental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war. In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing mis- sions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat condi- tions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when aircraft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire. General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face of extremely heavy anti aircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the attack of an over- whelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force. Cut along dotted line Circle, MaxwellAFBAL36112–6428. to CADRE/AR,Building1400,401Chennault caustic––will begratefullyappreciated. Mailthem orsmall,complimentary comments––large give usyourfrankopiniononthecontents.All After youhaveread thisresearch report, please Thank youforyourassistance. A Intelligence Reform Question ofBalance Bansemer AIR FORCE FELLOWS COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH AND EDUCATION AIR UNIVERSITY Intelligence Reform A Question of Balance JOHN D. BANSEMER Lieutenant Colonel, USAF Walker Paper No. 5 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615 August 2006 Air University Library Cataloging Data Bansemer, John D. Intelligence reform : a question of balance / John D. Bansemer p. ; cm. –– (Walker paper, 1555-7871 ; no. 5) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-58566-151-1 1. Intelligence service––United States. 2. Intelligence service––United States––Management. 3. Administrative agencies––United States––Reorganization. 4. Military intelligence––United States. I. Title. II. Series. 353.170973––dc22 This publication includes copyrighted material. Copyright 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Not to be reproduced in any form without written consent from the Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Maxwell Dworkin 125, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138. (617) 495-4114. E-mail: [email protected] URL: http://www.pirp.harvard.edu This publication has been reviewed and approved by competent personnel of the preparing com- mand in accordance with current directives on doctrine, policy, essentiality, propriety, and quality. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public re- lease: distribution unlimited. This Walker Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil. ii Air Force Fellows Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of care- fully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours at dis- tinguished civilian institutions studying national security policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, these pro- grams were accorded in-residence credit as part of professional military education at senior service schools. In 2003 these fellow- ships assumed senior developmental education (SDE) force- development credit for eligible officers. The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military am- bassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their col- leagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key Depart- ment of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized schol- ars, foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the ex- change of ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of sig- nificant developments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for research and writing on important national se- curity issues. The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fel- lows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addi- tion, the Air Force Fellows program supports a post-SDE mili- tary fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. iii AIR FORCE FELLOWS On the level of intermediate developmental education, the chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force Legislative Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the Foreign Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows program in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed responsi- bility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows. iv Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . xi ABSTRACT . xiii 1 A NEED FOR CHANGE? . 1 Notes . 6 2 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AS A MODEL FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM . 9 Notes . 30 3 REFORMING INTELLIGENCE: A 50-YEAR EFFORT . 39 Notes . 63 4 THE 9/11 REPORT AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM LEGISLATION . 71 Notes . 96 5 THE PUSH AND PULL OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM . 107 Notes . 130 6 THE QUESTION OF BALANCE . 139 Notes . 156 Appendix A INTERVIEWS . 157 B CHRONOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM PROPOSALS RELATED TO IC REFORM . 159 Notes . 163 v CONTENTS Appendix Page C MILESTONES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY . 165 Notes . 169 ABBREVIATIONS . 171 Table 1 Elements in intelligence community reform . 151 vi Foreword In Intelligence Reform: A Question of Balance, Col John D. Bansemer shares his penetrating insights into reforming the US intelligence community (IC) to improve its performance. He of- fers valuable guidelines for thoughtful action on this perennial concern. The events of 9/11/2001 resulted in national soul-searching as we attempted to understand how such terrible events could happen. Congress investigated these events, and the 9/11 Com- mission studied them. Although the commission ultimately made 41 recommendations, the ones that called yet again for reform of the IC captured the most attention in both the press and Congress. Why has intelligence reform been called for so often over the years? Why has it proven so difficult to improve the performance of intelligence agencies to anyone’s lasting satisfaction? In addressing these questions, there is a direction that Banse- mer wisely does not take, namely attempting to sort out the rela- tive roles of intelligence failures and operational failures. Surely future studies of Hurricane Katrina will illustrate, through an example of nearly laboratory purity, that operational failures can occur even with nearly perfect intelligence, hence that intelli- gence reform may well need to go hand-in-hand with operational reform to improve overall performance. Bansemer examines the performance of the US intelligence community by focusing on underlying tensions that are not unique to