Peace and War: Israel Versus Syria

Peace and War: Israel Versus Syria

CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 Fax: (202) 466-4740 Peace and War: Israel versus Syria Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies October, 2000 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No quotation, reference, or further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission in each single case. Peace and War: Israeli versus Syria 10/16/00 Page ii Introduction This report is a rough draft of a chapter prepared for a book on the Arab-Israeli Balance to be published by Praeger in early 2000. The readers should be aware that this text will be extensively revised in the final publication. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No quotation, reference, or further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission in each single case. Peace and War: Israeli versus Syria 10/16/00 Page iii Table of Contents SYRIAN CAPABILITIES IN WARFIGHTING ............................................................................................................ 12 Syrian Modernization, Military Spending, and Arms Imports...................................................................... 12 Syrian Land Forces..................................................................................................................................... 16 Syrian Air and Air Defense Forces.............................................................................................................. 18 Land Forces................................................................................................................................................ 22 THE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL IMPACT OF THE GOLAN ..................................................................................... 25 THE GOLAN AND ISRAEL’S OVERALL SUPPLY OF WATER .................................................................................... 29 THE IMPACT OF GIVING UP THE GOLAN.............................................................................................................. 32 WARFIGHTING ON THE GOLAN .......................................................................................................................... 34 Mobilization, Surprise and Mass................................................................................................................. 34 Expanding the Depth of the Golan Battlefield............................................................................................. 36 Israeli “Soft Strike” Capabilities in Strategic Bombing .............................................................................. 38 A New Type of War? ................................................................................................................................... 39 Syrian Risk Taking..................................................................................................................................... 40 AN ATTACK THROUGH THE GOLAN AFTER A SYRIAN-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT ............................................ 40 The Value of the Golan to Syria in an Attack on Israel................................................................................ 41 Can the Golan Stay Partially Divided?....................................................................................................... 43 CREATING A SECURE PEACE ON THE GOLAN...................................................................................................... 46 The Military Aspects of the Israeli and Syrian Positions ............................................................................. 47 Force Limitation Measures and Confidence Building Measures.................................................................. 49 Observation Points, Sensors, and Transparency.......................................................................................... 50 The Role of a Peacekeeping or Observer Force and the Role of the US ...................................................... 51 US Presence in a Peacekeeping Force...................................................................................................................... 53 A US-Israeli Strategic Alliance................................................................................................................................ 54 US “Extended Deterrence”...................................................................................................................................... 56 Including Arab States .............................................................................................................................................. 57 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No quotation, reference, or further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission in each single case. Peace and War: Israeli versus Syria 10/16/00 Page iv List of Tables, Figures, and Maps TABLE 8.1 .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE IN 2000 - PART ONE ................................................................................................ 5 TABLE 8.1 .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE IN 2000 -PART TWO................................................................................................. 6 FIGURE 8.1 ............................................................................................................................................................. 8 ISRAELI VERSUS SYRIAN OPERATIONAL FORCE STRENGTH IN 2000 ........................................................................... 8 FIGURE 8.2 ............................................................................................................................................................. 9 TRENDS IN SYRIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING: 1985-1995 .................................................................................. 9 FIGURE 8.3 ........................................................................................................................................................... 10 ANNUAL TRENDS IN SYRIAN ISRAELI ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES: 1985-1996 .......................................... 10 FIGURE 8.4 ........................................................................................................................................................... 11 SYRIAN-ISRAELI ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES: 1985-1997 ........................................................................ 11 TABLE 8.2 ............................................................................................................................................................ 19 FORCE TRENDS IN SYRIA - PART ONE..................................................................................................................... 19 TABLE 8.2 ............................................................................................................................................................ 20 FORCE TRENDS IN SYRIA - PART TWO.................................................................................................................... 20 FIGURE 8.5 ........................................................................................................................................................... 22 SYRIAN MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN 2000 ...................................................................................................... 22 FIGURE 8.6 ........................................................................................................................................................... 23 SYRIAN ARMS AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES BY MAJOR SUPPLIER: 1987-1998 ..................................................... 23 FIGURE 8.7 ........................................................................................................................................................... 24 THE SYRIAN RECAPITALIZATION CRISIS: ARMS DELIVERIES DURING 1985-1996 ..................................................... 24 TABLE 8.3 ............................................................................................................................................................ 33 SYRIAN MOVES AFFECTING WAR WITH ISRAEL OVER THE GOLAN: 1996-1997......................................................... 33 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No quotation, reference, or further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission in each single case. The risks of a new Israeli-Syrian conflict are mixed. There is a risk that Syria will provoke another proxy war between Israel and the Hezbollah or Palestinians if progress cannot be made towards an Arab-Israeli peace settlement that would give Syria back the Golan. This could lead to Israeli reprisals against targets that Syria values in Lebanon and even targets in Syria Syria. However, the risk of another large-scale Israeli-Syrian conventional conflict of the kind that occurred in 1967, 1973, and 1982 seems limited, in spite of the new tensions that have developed since later September 2000. Regardless of the Palestinian crisis, military

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