STANDINC - CL 1 General Principles A. Constitutional (p. 37) 1. Actual injury (concrete, personalized, can he non—economic) 2. Causal relation between injury and delëndant AND 3. Likely to be redressed by court decision. 13. Prudential (p. 48) I. No third party plaintiff (except obstacle and close relationship) 2. No generalized grievances 3. Plaintifl in zone of interests (usually’ statute) II. Application of Generalized Grievances A. Taxpayer — • l”rothingham is general rule no standing a. Flast exception — • Must be challenging legislation Art. 1, section 8 (Congressional appropriations) a. Valley Forge, Schlesinger, 11cm And 2. Must he claiming a speci tic Constitutional guarantee (maybe only Establishment Clause) a. Richardson, I 1cm [3. Citizenship status — No standing allowed on this basis C. No possible P not grounds lbr standing Ill. Congressional grant of standing A. Allowed if recipient is personally entitled — Congress can’t delegate power to enforce laws or permit a general citizen interest in laws ol procedures being enforced. Must be a specific interest (see page 35 in Lujan), hut can he widely shared (see Akins page 45). 13. USSC can’t invalidate Congressional grant of standmg on prudeiflial grounds, only Constitutional. IV. 2013 Cases A. Future injury = certainly impeding (Clapper) 13. Executive refuses = Do third parties have standing to defend? 1. No standing to defend on state law (ilollingsworth — 5/4) 2. Standing to defcnd in federal law-need authorization? (Windsor — 6/3) FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER — CL 2 A. Souiteof Power— Coast. Art. III. Sec. 2 Subject matter I imit 2. Must be case or controversy a. Advisory Opinion b. Standing (handout I) e. Ripeness d. Mootness 13. Judicial Power over other branches Judicial Review — availability to declare conflict with Const. — Marbury 2. Power over executive - Marbury a. No immunity ftw any office — all subject to mandamus or injunction 1,. Judiciary won’t do sonic things — political Question 1. Won’t order acts within political discretion 2. Won’t Fill office — Conlid. Agent 3. See l3aker v. Carr — p.57 C. Congressional control over Judiciary 1. Congress may grant jurisdiction in the positive; silence or absence of statute means no jurisdiction: can write in negative and lake away jurisdiction ilCongress so desires. McCardle 2. Congress can contro] except a. Other limits in the Consi. h. Can’t exercise judicial power — dictate result c. Can’t interfere in continuing jurisdiction — on—going ease 3. USSC a. Congress can’t reniove original jurisdiction in Const. b. Essential functions argument as a limit on Congress (probably not accepted) e. Practical problems 1. Freeze USSC precedent 2. Freeze lower cts. And state cts. d. Control number USSC Justices 4. Lower Ièderal courts a. liven lëwer theoretical limits b. If abolish all, state courts still hear D. Executive control over judiciary 1. Power to appoint, subject to Senate conlirmalion 2. Enforcement CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CL 3 CONGRESS A. Legislative in character & effect = Present. & Ilicameralism Cl JADI IA B. Excessive delegation not violated if Congress provides an intelligible principle. If not excessive delegation, call in rulemaking. Ml STRI 1’ l’A C. Rulemaking, ii appropriate & no interference with another branch Legislating MISTRETTA D. Once given discretion or power to exee., supervision or control = Legislating CI IADI IA E. Congressional discretion to give incidental power to other branches under App. CI. MORRISON II. EXECUTIVE A. President 1. C—in-C — military & foreign — limited domestic YOUNGSTOWN 2. No general power to solve national emergencies YOUNGSTOWN 3. Executive laws —- must have Congressional grant YOUNGSTOWN II. I ixecutive 0111cc — Appointment 1. Principal — President with Senate MORRISON 2. Interior — Congress vest in President, Judicial, Fleads of Dept. MORRISON 3. lnterhranch OK if appropriate MORRISON C. Executive Office - Removal I. At Will of President is rule Ml Yl l{S 2. Congress can’t remove executive officer — JR Cong. Removal BOWSI IER 3. Congress can list reasons if President ultimately removes FIUMP.FXFC. 4. II. Lx. — not pure exec. vs. quasi, hut, does limited removal of this office substantially interfere W/Pres. Running exec. MORRISON Ill. JUDICIAL A. Federal Judges generally hear cases — controversies, hut can have other service if appropriate MISTRIJTA B. Judiciary can make rules. lv. MARBURY & McCRADLF NO BRANCFI CAN PERFORM SUBSTANTIAL FUNCTIONS OF ANOTIIFR I3RANCI I USSC can’t act like executive — can’t order appointment of certain officers or order certain things. A. Congress can’t act like court — can’t prescribe decision or interfere in continuing jurisdiction. SEPARATION OF POWERS — A SECOND VIEW CL-3 If Control is legislative — A. If Legislative function, then CHADA problems if no Presentment and llicameralism in the function. 13. If’ I xecutive function, then 130WS1-II R problems because legislature can’t Control an executive function on general separation of powers nc iples even if the control satisfies Presentment and Ilicameralism. II. If Control is executive - A. If Legislative function, then the issue is excessive delegation of legislative power and the intelligible guidelines of Mistretta or separation of powers tinder llowsher. 13. If Executive function, Constitution should be satisfied and what is being done is either executing the laws, part of explicit or inherent executive power of’ rule nuiking. COMMERCE CLAUSE — CL 5 DEFINITION OF COMMERCE ITSELF A. Gibbons — Commerce = buying. sd line and transporting, not manulacturing or agriculture. Ii. Gibbons — “among’’ — points of origin and destination matter (two di IThrent states). don t break ourney into intrastate itrts. C. Jones and L — no labels; realistic assessment; national economy. II. REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE A. Channels of interstate commerce. 13. Any aspect or instrumentality of transportation (e.g., plans. railroads, interstate highway) or communication (e.g., phone, mail) including links that are intrastate. C. CLOSE RELATION TO, OR SUBSTANTIAL AFFECT ON, INTERSTATE COMMERCE Substantial = Wickard — aggregation (hypothetical multiplier). 2. Affects quantity, qtiality, identity, etc. of goods or people moving in interstate commerce. Ill. PROHI BITION (‘?T?) A. Darby — Congress may prohibit the movement of anything in interstate commerce (regulate = prohibit) 13. In exercise of power to prohibit. Congress can control conditions of maiiulhcturer or regulate manulhcture, production. or possession as a means to the end of prohibition (Ames, Darby). IV. MODERN RETHINKING — LOPEZ. MORRISON. RAICH AND SEBELIUS A. No federal power on subsiantially alThcts te.st regarding non—economic matters in iraditional areas of stale concern. 13. Federal power more likely if challenged action is part of’a larger, concededly valid statutory scheme. C. Failure to enter the market is not an economic event that can he regulated. D. Are we too entrenched in the commerce clause precedents to change? V. OTHER CLAUSES IN CONSTITUTION AS LIMITS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER (e.g., 1st A) I)ORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CL 6 Discrimination against out of state (Protectionism) A. On face — per se invalid (Phil. V. NJ — garbage. hughes — minnows) 13. Purpose — invalid (I lood — Boston milk, NY source) — legislative history C. Effect — some say invalid (I hint — North Carolina apples) — usually if believe there is a purpose but no good evidence. If not, then balancing burden on interstate commerce v local interests or benefits (although some justices question whether balancing is still valid — Scalia in CTS). If advances a real or “important” state purpose, burden on interstates commerce proIably declared incidental unless special need for national unithrmity (Kassell — Iowa trucks). If burden on interstate commerce is incidental, stale statute upheld unless burden is clearly excessive in relation to putative local benelits. Question of degree (Pike — Arizona cantaloupes). II. Exceptions A. Health or Safety — usually quarantine 13. Market Participant —— State not as regulating, but either 1. State itself producing or running a business OR 2. State providing subsidies or other incentives to aid in-state business. Article IV, Section 2 - PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE A. Fundamental Right — Private workers or public projects 13. Not absolute — OK if substantial reason C. No market participant exception PREEMPTION AND COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW CL 7 PRIiMPTION (CONGRESSIONAL INTLNT) I. CON’! PL [I’L A. hxplieit B. Implicit 1. So pervasive 2. Dominate federal interest 3. Object and character of obligations [I. PARTIAL A. I xplic it 11. Implicit I. Compliance with both impossible 2. State regulatory provision is an obstacle to lëderal goal If lèderal statute A. Power — see handout CL5 for Commerce Clause basis and limils 10th 13. Amendment additional limitation I. Garcia — National League currently dead — generally applicable federal laws can he applied to state Governments. 2. NY v US — federal can’t commandeer state legisLature 3. Printz v US — cannot commandeer state executive 4. Alden v Maine — can’t commandeer state judicial system II. If state statute A. Preemption (with federal state) 13. Dormant Commerce Clause CL 6 (with no federal statute) ELEVEN AMENDEMENT, TAXING POWER ANI) SPENI)INC POWER CL S 11111 Amendment — Can’t sue a state in federal court unless: 1. Plaintiff= United States government OR 2. Cause of action grounded in statule bused on Amendment later than I OR 3. Defendant is politically