Japan-Republic of China Relations under US Hegemony: A genealogy of ‘returning virtue for malice’ Joji Kijima Department of Politics and International Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy November 2005 ProQuest Number: 10673194 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10673194 Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 Abstract Japan-Republic of China relations under US hegemony: A genealogy of ‘returning virtue for malice’ Much of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide baoyuan ) postwar Japan policy remains to be examined. This thesis mainly shows how the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ facilitated Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan during the Cold War era. More conceptually, this study re- conceptualizes foreign policy as discourse—that of moral reciprocity—as it sheds light on the question of recognition as well as the consensual aspect of hegemony. By adopting a genealogical approach, this discourse analysis thus traces the descent and emergence of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ trope while it examines its discursive effect on Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei under American hegemony. After tracing the emergence of Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as discourse, this thesis first delves into the rise of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as it demonstrates how the discursive formation of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei constituted US hegemony in East Asia at the inception of the Cold War. Second, this study then highlights the heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as it shows how a powerful coalition formed around the discourse in the domain of Japanese politics, thereby reproducing the recognition of Nationalist China as well as consolidating American hegemony at the height of the Cold War. Third, this research sheds light on the decline of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as it depicts the erosion of the Japanese discourse coalition and US hegemony due to the lack of consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington as the nature of the Cold War dramatically changed in East Asia. In short, the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy represented Chiang as the benefactor to whom the Japanese should repay their ‘debt of gratitude’, thereby making Japan’s recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan possible. In effect, this thesis presents a way of reading bilateral relations as it mainly shows how recognition can be constructed by the political actors who draw on hegemonic practices from the past—such as moral reciprocity—under hegemony. Contents Abstract i Abbreviations vi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Japan’s international relations under US hegemony: locating critical constructivism 5 1.3 Japan’s recognition o f‘China’ under US hegemony: explanation and understanding 16 1.4 Studies on ‘returning virtue for malice’: existing decision-making analyses and beyond 26 1.5 Methodology: genealogy as discourse analysis 39 1.6 Chapter outline 45 1.7 Notes 50 2 The discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ 52 2.1 Introduction: ‘returning virtue for malice’ as common sense 52 2.2 Denaturalizing the ‘returning virtue for malice’ announcement: prewar foundations of the postwar ‘foundation’? 58 2.3 Denaturalizing ‘returning virtue for malice’ as decisions based on beliefs 64 iii 2.4 ‘Returning virtue for malice’ beyond belief: the ‘revival’ of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ and the Sunist coalition 80 2.5 The emergence of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as discourse 109 2.6 Conclusion 117 2.7 Notes 119 3 The rise of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and US hegemony in East Asia 1948-52 128 3.1 Introduction 128 3.2 The ‘San Francisco system’ in the making: ‘Asianizing’ the Cold War 132 3.3 The discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’: bridging San Francisco and Taipei 153 3.4 Conclusion 187 3.5 Notes 189 4 The heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and US hegemony in East Asia 1952-64 194 4.1 Introduction 194 4.2 US hegemony Japanified 1952: prewar imperialists and postwar gratitude 198 4.3 The ‘1955 system’ and the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ 203 4.4 The heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ I: deconstructing ‘China’ in the 1950s 211 4.5 The heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ II: reconstructing ‘China’ in the 1960s 218 4.6 Conclusion 230 4.7 Notes 232 5 The decline of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and US hegemony in East Asia 1964-72 236 5.1 Introduction . 236 5.2 The bifurcation of the ‘1955 system’: ‘China’ in the LDP 1964-72 242 5.3 Japan and the fall of ‘China’ under US hegemony: the impact of the UN 1971-2 264 5.4 ‘Returning virtue for malice’ and the ‘end’ of the ‘San Francisco system’: making Tokyo’s de-recognition of Taipei impossible 1972 290 5.5 Conclusion 300 5.6 Notes 302 6 Conclusion 307 6.1 Introduction 307 6.2 General summary 308 6.3 By way of a conclusion:specific implications 311 Bibliography 316 v Abbreviations AAPSG Asian-African Problems Study Group ACJ American Council on Japan APSG Asian Problems Study Group APU Asian Parliamentary Union CCP Chinese Communist Party CHINGOM China Committee COCOM Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Areas CPSJC Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation DR Dual Representation GMD Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party, also KMT) GRC Government of the Republic of China IMF International Monetary Fund IR International Relations JSP Japan Socialist Party KMT Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, also GMD) LDP Liberal Democratic Party NSC National Security Council PIDG Peace Issues Discussion Group PRC Peoples’ Republic of China ROC Republic of China SC Security Council SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers SDF Self-Defence Forces UK United Kingdom UKL1M United Kingdom Liason Mission UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization US United States VMI Virginia Military Institute Note on Japanese and Chinese names For Chinese names, Pinyin is used without tone/diacritical marks except for names of individuals living outside of mainland China and commonly used spellings, such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Taipei, which use the Wade-Giles system. Japanese names are represented, according to Japanese convention, with the family name first followed by the given name. Where the writings of Japanese authors appear in English, surnames are placed first. 1 Introduction 6Now, when we negotiate with Japan, we claim that we represent the traditional and legitimate government o f China. The immediate reaction o f the Japanese is, u Why do you need to make such a false claim that you represent China when you are obviously in Taiwan? ” It is very difficult for the Japanese to understand and accept our claim. The only way we can persuade the Japanese is to remind them that they are indebted to Chiang Kai-shek for what he did for Japan in the wake o f the war. We tell them that Chiang Kai-shek is the one who strongly campaigned for the restoration o f the Japanese nation and economy and that he is the one who insisted China and Japan should peacefully cooperate with each other. In this way, we convince them that Chiang Kai-shek’s China therefore is the traditional and legitimate government o f China to which Japan should repay its debt o f gratitude. The Japanese are able to understand and accept this way o f reasoning. That is why we only have one trump card to play when we negotiate with Japan. That trump card is President Chiang. ’ (Chang Chun quoted by Huang 1995: 183-4) 1.1 Introduction In the post-war world, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime on Taiwan had the need to compensate its lack of internal legitimacy with its ‘dependence on external legitimacy’ (Wakabayashi 1992: 12-14). The lack of internal legitimacy was largely due to the government’s bloody crackdown on the Taiwanese uprising of 28 February 1947 known as the 2-28 Incident (Ibid.; Wachman 1994; Hughes 1997; Rigger 1999; Hsiau 2000; Chu and Lin 2001). It also stemmed from the fact that the Taiwanese had been de-Sinicized by the Japanese colonial regime which lasted for half a centrny (ibid.; Wakabayashi 1992; Wachman 1994; Hughes 2000; Hsiau 2000). Despite this lack of internal legitimacy, it was still possible for the Chinese regime in exile to 1 legitimate its rule on Taiwan by depending on American military, economic and political resources—for the defense of the Taiwan Strait, financial aid, and the maintenance of the ‘China seat’ in the United Nations (UN) (Wakabayashi 1992: 13- 14; Hughes 2000: 65-7). In the meantime, the Chiang regime faced the challenge of ‘legitimation via diplomatic recognition’ in international society (Kim 1994: 149-57). Put differently, the ‘politics of competitive legitimation of divided China’ emerged as an extension of the Chinese civil war following the outbreak of the Korean War (Ibid.: 149), in which Communist China militarily engaged with UN forces led by the United States.