May 1997 RELIEF AND REHABILITATION NETWORK RRN 22 paper NETWORK The war economy in Liberia: a political analysis by Philippa Atkinson Abstract n the light of recent research in Liberia and various policy strategies that may help to limit elsewhere on the role of economic factors in or counter the effects of the political economy Isupporting and fueling conflict, it appears that has developed. These may challenge the increasingly important for the humanitarian orthodox role of humanitarian relief, but radical community to attempt to understand the solutions are necessary because of the nature of dynamics of the political economy of war. In the prolonged crisis in Liberia. Liberia the NGO community has been assessing and developing its current policies, and exploring The study is divided into two parts with an alternatives to traditional relief provision. It is introductory background section. The first offers crucial for such policy development to consider a descriptive analysis of the workings of the war the implications of the way in which illegal economy, its effects and implications, while the economic activities provide the motivation and second focuses on the experience of NGOs in the means for the continuation of the conflict. Liberia and the possibilities that exist for them to respond to the realities of the conflict using This paper aims to provide an analysis of the advocacy and other non-traditional policies. mechanisms of the war economy in Liberia, Recommendations for further action include the examining the linkages between factional activity need for more detailed research on particular and the political process at government level, as aspects of the war economy, as well as the need well as the ways in which micro-level survival for the humanitarian community to lobby donors strategies feed into the illegal economy. Through and other actors to increase their understanding such analysis it is possible to highlight the of its mechanisms. ○○○○○○ Please send comments on this paper to: ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Relief and Rehabilitation Network Overseas Development Institute Portland House Stag Place London SW1E 5DP United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 171 393 1674/47 Fax: +44 (0) 171 393 1699 Email: [email protected] Web site: http://www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/index.html A copy will be sent to the author. Comments received may be used in future Newsletters. Notes on the Author Philippa Atkinson is currently working towards a PhD on the civil war in Liberia. She is also an independent consultant working on various aspects of the conflict, and is a part-time Regional Representative for the RRN. ISBN: 0-85003-366-7 a political analysis Price per copy: £5.00 (excluding postage and packing) © Overseas Development Institute, London, 1997. Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged. Requests for commercial reproduction of Network material should be directed to ODI as copyright holders. The Network Coordinator would appreciate receiving details of any use of this material in training, research or programme design, implementation or evaluation. 2 THE WAR ECONOMY IN LIBERIA: THE WAR 2 Contents ○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ 1. Introduction 4 1.1 History 4 1.2 Causes of the war 5 1.3 Sustaining the war 5 2. The war economy 7 2.1 Typology 7 2.2 Activities 9 2.3 Implications 14 2.4 Potential solutions 15 3. NGO policy 19 3.1 Introduction 19 3.2 Historically 20 3.3 Policy responses 21 3.4 Policy strategy 23 4. Conclusion 26 ECONOMY IN LIBERIA: THE WAR Maps 16 Annex 1 27 Annex 2 28 Acronyms 28 References 29 a political analysis 3 3 ○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 History Francophone countries refused to participate, with Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso open supporters of The Liberian civil war is a complex and dynamic Taylor. Taylor has benefited from the start of the conflict that has in its seven year duration caused war from the support of many prominent Liberian well over 150,000 deaths, and displaced as much and foreign politicians and business people. At the as 80% of the 2.5m population. The war has been cease-fire Taylor’s NPFL controlled the entire fought in various phases, with important country outside Monrovia, and he established a developments in the tactics and objectives of those separate administration, the NPRAG, in ‘Greater involved. The first phase, from December 1989 to Liberia’ (November 1990-October 1992), encour- November 1990, took the form of a revolutionary aging the resumption of upcountry economic struggle to oust the ten-year corrupt and repressive activity. The IGNU was established in Monrovia, government of Samuel Doe. Charles Taylor’s NPFL with the protection of ECOMOG, who were also swept through the country, gaining popular support, based in the capital. and reaching the capital Monrovia within six months. Both his rebel troops as well as those of The first cease-fire lasted until Taylor attacked the government army, the AFL, were responsible Monrovia in Operation Octopus of October 1992, for many ethnically targeted atrocities against in a second attempt to gain control by force. A new civilians, which greatly hindered his initial bid for faction ULIMO, set up by Krahn and Mandingo state power, damaging both his internal and external refugees associated with the former Doe a political analysis reputation. This first war led to major refugee government, and supported by ECOMOG, had movements into Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and however been attacking NPFL territory in western Guinea, and movements of displaced into Monrovia. Liberia since early that year. Following Octopus, ECOMOG launched an all-out attack on NPFL The arrival of West African peace keeping troops, territory, openly allying with ULIMO and re-arming the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG, in the AFL. From 1993 fighting again became Monrovia in August 1990, helped establish a cease- widespread, with ECOMOG bombing strategic and fire which was formalised in November in Bamako. civilian areas in NPFL territory. Many economic Nigeria took the lead within ECOWAS, encouraged operations closed down, and civilians fled into the by the US, to mount the world’s first regional safe haven of Monrovia or across the borders. The military intervention, with Ghana, Sierra Leone, Cotonou agreement of July 1993 had little impact Guinea and The Gambia also sending troops. on the fighting, but initiated the process of direct ECOMOG’s neutrality was questionable from the factional involvement in central government, beginning, as Nigeria’s President Babangida had allocating various government positions to each been a close business associate of Doe, and most faction. Another new faction, the LPC, emerged in THE WAR ECONOMY IN LIBERIA: THE WAR 4 late 1993, initially as a proxy for the AFL, and has developed this earlier pattern to an extreme, with ○○○○○○○○○ began attacking NPFL territory in the south-east. fighters controlling the production of civilians in ULIMO split in March 1994 into K and J, many areas, and members of factions and the Mandingo and Krahn factions respectively, who government enjoying the profits on resources directly began to fight each other in the west. as they are earned and exported. ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Fighting continued sporadically throughout 1994 The continuation of the war can be attributed to the and 1995 between all factions, and became interaction of a number of internal and external increasingly concentrated in diamond-rich western factors. The international community has Liberia, and in south-eastern Liberia where gold consistently failed to establish a resolution to the and timber resources are located. The Abuja accord conflict, focusing instead on support for the dubious was signed in September 1995, following Taylor’s operations of ECOMOG, and the provision of first visit to Nigeria since the start of the conflict. massive humanitarian aid, costing up to US$100m This accord completed the process of the annually. The fueling of the war through the illegal factionalisation of the government begun at sale of Liberia’s natural resources has been ignored Cotonou as Taylor himself arrived in Monrovia to at the international level, in spite of early evidence participate in the transitional government. Its and analysis of its nature and of the involvement of implementation has been continually delayed by major international players (Reno, 1993; The more outbreaks of fighting. NPFL territorial control Independent, 22 November 1992). The involvement has been gradually eroded since 1993, and no other of regional countries in supporting all parties to the faction has been able to emerge as a military conflict, and the partisan nature of the internationally winner. Monrovia was attacked again on April 6th supported peace-keeping forces, has been a major 1996, sparking six weeks of looting and fighting factor throughout the war. As in other complex for control between NPFL, then allied with emergencies, humanitarian intervention has been ULIMO-K, and the Krahn factions, ULIMO-J, AFL used as a substitute for effective international and LPC (see Map 1 on page 16 showing areas political action (Scott and Minear, 1995). held by the factions and recent NPFL territorial gains). Abuja II, signed in August 1996, is in the The internal economic, political and social factors process of implementation at the time of writing, fueling the war are highly complex, involving issues with all factions having nominally disarmed and of access to power and resources at local and national transformed into political entities. They are now levels. Politically-manipulated ethnicity has awaiting the rescheduling of the recently postponed remained a factor, as Krahn people identified with THE WAR ECONOMY IN LIBERIA: THE WAR elections, with other civilian candidates. the former government of Samuel Doe have continued to fight as a group to try to maintain their access to power in the face of increasing 1.2 Causes of the war marginalisation.