The Conditions of Moral Realism Christian Miller Wake Forest University [email protected] The Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (2009): 123-155. With the recent development of sophisticated expressivist, quasi-realist, and minimalist positions in contemporary meta-ethics, it has become increasingly difficult to isolate what it is that is meant to be at issue in discussions of moral realism. Quasi-realists, for example, can claim that moral facts exist and moral statements are true. Indeed, if Blackburn is to be believed, they can even help themselves to the language of mind-independence and objectivity.1 Thus it has seemed to some that there is nothing at stake between the quasi-realist and the traditional moral realist, and the same goes for realism and several other leading meta-ethical positions. In this paper, I hope to provide an account of the conditions of moral realism whereby there are still significant metaphysical commitments made by the realist which set the view apart as a distinct position in the contemporary meta-ethical landscape. In order to do so, I will be appealing to a general account of what it is for realism to be true in any domain of experience, whether it be realism about universals, realism about unobservable scientific entities, realism about artifacts, and so forth. I have developed and motivated such an account elsewhere, and will not take the time here to revisit all that went into its formulation.2 Rather, my goal in this paper is to take that account of what might be called general realism, and apply it to discussions of moral realism. If the result is an informative taxonomy of meta-ethical positions which can isolate something that is still at stake between the rival positions, then such a result should be of significant interest to philosophers working in this area. We shall proceed as follows. In the first section, I briefly summarize the formulation of general realism that was developed in previous work, and then apply it to the case of moral realism. Section two uses this formulation of moral realism as the basis from which to distinguish moral realism from the following positions: cognitivism, non-cognitivism, error theory, and constructivism. Finally, the paper ends by examining quasi-realism in section three and minimalism in section four in order to see to what extent each of them differs from moral realism, if they do so at all. I. GENERAL REALISM Realism debates arise in just about every domain of experience, and the realistic status of scientific entities, morality, God, numbers, and universals have been among the most contentious. Simplifying greatly, the realists about a particular domain have typically been those who are committed to the existence and objectivity of the disputed entities in that domain, or at least to the objective truth and falsity of statements which putatively refer to such entities. Platonists about universals, necessitarians about laws, and non-naturalists about the metaphysics of value are all paradigm realists in their respective domains. On the other hand, many anti-realists simply deny outright the existence of the disputed entities or the truth of the relevant statements in a given domain. Here eliminativists about mental states and nihilists about the external world are often taken to be representatives of this form of anti-realism. Other anti-realists, however, typically reject what they see as the implausibly strong objectivity conditions mandated by certain realist positions, and instead make the truth of the relevant statements or the existence of the disputed entities dependent upon the mental activities of human beings. Intuitionism about mathematics and subjectivism about morality serve as helpful examples of this brand of anti-realism. - 2 - When it comes to the various formulations of general realism that have appeared in the literature over the past fifty years, it turns out that they tend to be instances of one of the following kinds of thesis: Metaphysical Thesis: Realism about X is true iff and because X exists and3 X has an existence and nature which are not dependent in certain ways upon human beings. Thus Michael Devitt holds that according to realism, “tokens of most current common-sense and scientific physical types objectively exist independently of the mental.”4 Semantic Thesis: Realism about X is true iff and because certain claims which putatively refer to X are true (given a certain theory of truth) and/or meaningful (given a certain theory of meaning). Geoffrey Sayre-McCord writes that, “realism involves embracing just two theses: (1) the claims in question, when literally construed, are literally true or false, and (2) some are literally true. Nothing more.”5 Epistemic Thesis: Realism about X is true iff and because certain epistemic relations can obtain between human beings and X. According to Paul Horwich, the „essence‟ of realism concerns “how it is possible for us to know of the existence of certain facts given our ordinary conception of their nature.”6 Explanatory Thesis: Realism about X is true iff and because X is inelimitable from our best explanation(s) of certain phenomena in that domain. According to James Griffin, “realism about a kind of thing is the view that things of that kind must appear in the best account of what happens in the world.”7 Mixed Thesis: Realism about X is true iff and because more than one of the above kinds of conditions obtains. Hilary Putnam claims that for the realist, “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind- independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of „the way the world is.‟ Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things.”8 Quietist Thesis: The most sophisticated forms of what is often called „anti-realism‟ about some domain can satisfy all the reasonable requirements for being a „realist‟ about that domain. Thus at the end of the day there is nothing of substance which separates realists from anti-realists. The debate, if there even was a genuine one in the first place, has been dissolved. Gideon Rosen, for instance, at times flirts with quietism when he makes remarks such as the following: “[w]e sense that there is a heady metaphysical thesis at stake in these debates over realism . But after a point, when every attempt to say just what the issue is has come up empty, we have no real choice but to conclude that despite all the wonderful, suggestive imagery, there is ultimately nothing in the neighborhood to discuss.”9 - 3 - Which of these approaches should we adopt? Here is not the place to examine them at length as such a treatment deserves a paper in its own right. Rather I shall simply assume a conclusion for which I have argued previously, namely that a metaphysical approach to general realism seems to be the most promising.10 But there is a long list of different metaphysical formulations of general realism, and instead of considering each of them in turn, let me proceed to directly introduce my own preferred statement of the view.11 The best way to do so is in stages, starting with the following: (R1) Realism about X is true iff and because: (i) X exists. The problem with (R1) is that it is far too permissive – it lets far too many anti-realist views count as forms of realism. Thus common forms of subjectivism, relativism, and constructivism about a wide variety of domains such as mathematics and aesthetics would all count as realist views according to this account. Similarly, Putnam‟s internal realist countenances the scheme- relative existence of ordinary physical objects, a phenomenalist claims that tables and chairs exist, and both a quasi-realist and a minimalist can readily accept the existence of modal facts and causal relations. And yet all such views are widely taken to be alternatives to realism. So (R1) seems to badly mislocate the source of contention in the various realism debates.12 What we need in addition to an existence condition for realism to be true in a given domain is an objectivity condition. For what makes the various forms of, say, subjectivism or relativism typically count as anti-realist positions is that they tie the truth of the relevant statements or the existence of the relevant entities to the mental activities of human beings. Thus I have argued that (R1) should be supplemented at follows: (R2) Realism about X is true iff and because: (i) X exists. (ii) The existence and nature of X are independent of the intentional attitudes had by human beings which pertain to X.13 - 4 - (R2) is developed further by making use of the idea that to be a realist about X is to think that X‟s existence and nature would remain invariant under a wide range of different attitudes that I or any other human being might take towards X; whether or not the sun exists, for instance, does not change based upon my thoughts about the sun‟s existence. This characterization in turn suggests the following proposal for understanding „independence‟ in (ii): (ii*) The existence and nature of X do not exhibit counterfactual dependence on the intentional attitudes had by human beings in the actual world which pertain to X. where „counterfactual dependence‟ is taken in the usual way to mean that for two things A and B, A‟s existence counterfactually depends on B‟s existence iff if B did not exist, then A would not exist. Thus, for example, it is natural to think of characters in works of fiction as exhibiting this kind of counterfactual dependence on our attitudes pertaining to them.