DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY DURING THE BERLIN CRISIS 1961 A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of a Master of Arts in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Schanett Riller ***** The Ohio State University 1998 Master's Examination Committee: Approved by Dr. Peter L. Hahn, Adviser Dr. Carole Fink Dr. Ahmad Sikainga ABSTRACT This thesis investigates the role bureaucracy played during the Berlin crisis in 1961/62. It focuses on two aspects: first, the process of decision making in the Kennedy administration before August 13, 1961, and second, the question of policy implementation in Berlin from September 1961 to April 1962. With regard to the question of decision making, this thesis finds that Kennedy's informal governmental style and accessability for his staff provided him with a broad range of opinions on all matters concerning the Berlin problem. He established several working groups on Berlin, who discussed policy options in an open atmosphere and made valuable recommendations. In Washington, therefore, the policy making body worked smoothly and enabled the President to make carefully considered decisions. The record of the policy-implementation process, however, looks different, for implementation was not ensured. Both technical problems and personal differences between commanders in the European theater disrupted the execution of instructions from Washington. General Clay's presence in ii Berlin as Kennedy's Personal Representative complicated the situation further. Though Clay had no authority technically, he still initiated actions of his own. The climax of this policy was the dangerous confrontation of U.S. and Soviet tanks at the Checkpoint Charlie in the end of October. It was no longer the President who made policy in Berlin but, in fact, his Personal Representative. This present thesis as a historical case study proves that lower levels of bureaucray can and do influence both the decision and the policy making. While the decision-making machine worked relatively well throughout the Berlin crisis, the implementation of the chosen policy was not ensured. Still, Kennedy approved of Clay's actions in Berlin and made Clay's policy his own ex post facto. Paradoxically, therefore, it did not matter that the machinery for implementing policy did not function smoothly. Kennedy could have improved the functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus by providing the Berlin personnel with more authorities than he did. To keep control of as many actions and decisions as possible, however, he chose to rather take the risk of delays in policy implementation than risk a nuclear war resulting from miscalculations on lower levels of the policy making body. iii For Emre iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank Dr. Bryan van Sweringen for helping me to find some of the sources for this research paper, and Prof. Allan Millett for helping me to find Bryan van Sweringen. I am very grateful to former Berlin Brigade Commander General Frederick Hartel for his willingness to answer my questions. Moreover, I thank John Davidson, who spent some of his precious time to read my draft. I also wish to thank Dr. Peter Hahn for his patience and his helpful suggestions on how to improve my thesis. And thank you very much to a dear friend, to whom this thesis is dedicated. v VITA August 4, 1973 ................. Born - Goslar, Federal Republic of Germany May 17, 1993 .................... Abitur, Christian-von-Dohm Gymnasium, Goslar October 1993- September 1994 ... Rheinische Friedrich­ Wilhelms-Universitat, Bonn October 1994-September 1997 ..... Universitat Hamburg October 1994 .................... Equivalent to a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science, Universitat Hamburg April 1996 ...................... Equivalent to a Bachelor's Degree in History, Universitat Hamburg May 1996 ........................ Equivalent to a Bachelor's Degree in Philosophy, Universitat Hamburg September 1997- present ........ Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, Graduate Research Associate, Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History Minors: Philosophy, Political Science vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page De di ca ti on . ............................................... iv Ac know 1 edgmen ts ............................................ v Vita ...................................................... vi List of Abbreviations ................................... viii Chapters: 1. Introduction . .......................................... 1 2. The Berlin Crisis: The Development of Berlin after 1945 ............................................ 10 3. The Kennedy Administration ........................... 19 3.1 Kennedy's Foreign Policy ......................... 19 3.2 The Organization of Foreign Policy and Kennedy's Governmental Style .............................. 29 3.3 The Crisis Organization after Vienna ............. 33 4. The Organization at Work ......................... 39 4.1 Consultations and Policy Planning Before the Wall . ................................. 39 4.2 Crisis Management After the Wall .......... 47 4.3 The Role of the German Elections .......... 56 4.4 General Clay in Berlin .................... 68 4. 4 .1 Steinstucken .............................. 7 5 4.4.2 The Tank Crisis ........................... 78 4.5 Petering Out of the Crisis ................ 92 5. Conclusion .......................................... 101 Bibliography ............................................. 115 vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CDU Christlich-Demokratische Union [Christian Democratic Union] CIA Central Intelligence Agency CINCEUR Commander in Chief, Europe F.R.G. Federal Republic of Germany G.D.R. German Democratic Republic !CG Interdepartmental Coordinating Group NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSC National Security Council NSAM National Security Action Memorandum SAC EUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe SBZ Sowjetische Besatzungszone [Soviet Zone of Occupation] SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei [Socialist Unity Party] SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe SMAD Sowjetische Militaradministration Deutschland [Soviet Military Administration Germany] viii SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Social Democratic Party of Germany] US COB United States Command, Berlin USIA United States Information Agency ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On October 27, 1961, Soviet and U.S. tanks faced each other in Berlin for the first time in the Cold War, while on- looking journalists awaited the outbreak of World War III. 1 Ten weeks earlier, access from East Berlin to West Berlin had been cut off when East German authorities erected a wall through the city. While the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact members publicly approved the closing of the border by the East Germans, 2 the Western Allies hesitated in supporting their West German ally: it took the United States one week before it demonstrated its commitment to the population in the Western Sectors of the divided city. One of the measures the U.S. took to calm the situation in Berlin was to send Lucius Clay to the city. Tension did not ease, however, and the tank crisis developed. Paul Ni tze later would confirm that the 1 See Peter Wyden, Wall - The Inside Story of Divided Berlin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 262. 2 Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Powers, August 13, 1961, reprinted in: Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, ed. by the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: U.S. Govern­ ment Printing Office, 1961), 721-723. 1 danger of nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Berlin crisis was higher than during the Cuban missile crisis. 3 A look at the scholarly writing on Berlin reveals that - despite Nitze's assessment - the Berlin crisis seems to stand in the shadow of the Cuban missile crisis. While there is extensive literature on the Cuban missile crisis, analyses of the Berlin problem are rather sparse. The most comprehensive books on Berlin may be Curtis Cate's The Ides of August (1978) and Norman Gelb' s The Berlin Wall (1986). 4 Both authors, though, "tell the story of the Wall" 5 rather than analyze the chain of events from any specific aspect. The same is true for the latest record of the Wall by Peter Wyden, 6 who gives a view of the developments from 1961 to 1988 from an East Berliner's perspective. In The Crisis Years, Michael Beschloss 3 , Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost. At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (New York: Grove Weinfeld, 1989), 205. 4 Curtis Cate, The Ides of August. The Berlin Wall Crisis 1961 (New York: M. Evans and Company, 1978); Norman Gelb, The Berlin Wall (London: Michael Joseph, 1986) . 5 Norman Gelb, The Berlin Wall, 5. 6 Wyden, Wall. 2 also addresses the Berlin crisis. 7 He focuses on the personal relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev and thereby implies that these two men were the main actors in the international crises between 1960 and 1963. Another recently published book covering the Berlin crisis is Frank Mayer's study of the German-American relations from 1960 to 1963. 8 Like Beschloss, though, Mayer concentrates on the personal relationship between the two countries' leaders, this time Adenauer and Kennedy. Mayer blames Kennedy for his lack of understanding of the German situation and policy, which finally led Adenauer to turn away from the United States and tighten Germany's bonds with France. While Kennedy's relationships with Khrushchev and Adenauer undoubtedly affected the outcome of the crisis involving the United