Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 118 4.142.4 Western Sahara The United Nations Mission for the Referen- efforts to implement the referendum proposal, dum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) under- the Secretary-General appointed former US went a moderate restructuring in the course of secretary of state James Baker as his Personal 2005, in the context of deteriorating compli- Envoy. Baker was asked to work with the par- ance with agreements reached by Morocco and ties to the conflict to assess whether the settle- the Frente Popular para la Liberación de ment plan could be implemented in its exist- Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Polisario). ing form, or whether adjustments could be Meanwhile, the political stalemate over the made to make it acceptable to both Morocco future of Western Sahara continued. In October and Polisario. 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Peter Following a number of initiatives aimed at Van Walsum as his Personal Envoy in a new breaking the deadlock, Baker presented in Janu- effort to break the deadlock. ary 2003 the “Peace Plan for Self-Determination MINURSO was established in 1991 in of the People of Western Sahara.” The Plan accordance with “settlement proposals” that provided for a five-year interim period during called for a cease-fire and the holding of a which governance responsibilities would be referendum on self-determination. In 1988, shared between Morocco and Polisario, fol- both the government of Morocco and the lowed by a choice of integration, autonomy, or Polisario agreed to the plan in principle. independence. Both parties initially rejected In March 1997, following numerous failed the proposal, but Polisario accepted it in July 2003. Morocco rejected essential aspects of the plan, indicating that any solution would have to be within the framework of Moroccan sover- UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) eignty. Polisario, for its part, was unwilling to discuss implementation of the Baker Plan unless independence remained on the table. • Resolution passage 29 April 1991 (UNSC Res. 690) Seventeen years have passed since the settle- and start date • SRSG Francesco Bastagli (Italy) ment proposals, but MINURSO’s mandate to • Force commander Brigadier-General Kurt Mosgaard hold a referendum remains unfulfilled. Baker (Denmark) resigned in June 2004 after seven years as Per- • Budget $48.66 million sonal Envoy and was replaced by Van Walsum (1 July 2005–30 June 2006) in October 2005. • Strength as of Troops: 47 Despite the political stalemate during the 31 October 2005 Military observers: 202 year in review, MINURSO continued to moni- Civilian police: 6 tor the cease-fire, foster overall security in the International civilian staff: 131 region, and help build confidence between the Local civilian staff: 97 two parties. The mission worked with a number of other actors, including the International 118 Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 119 WESTERN SAHARA • 119 r e p p o H . S / R C H N U Western Sahara family visits to refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, June 2004 Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the a deterioration had been taking place progres- exchange of prisoners of war, and the UN High sively, including installation and upgrading of Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the radar and surveillance capabilities as well as implementation of confidence-building meas- restrictions on the movement of both civilian ures, including the exchange of family visits and military UN personnel. between the territory and refugee camps. After In the summer of 2005 the UN conducted being suspended for a period, the family visits a review of MINURSO’s military, adminis- resumed in November. Long-standing tensions trative, and civilian components. Aimed at over the status of prisoners of war (POWs) strengthening the mission’s capacity to mon- were alleviated on 18 August 2005, when the itor the cease-fire and military agreements, Polisario released all of the remaining 404 the review resulted in the launch of a restruc- Moroccan POWs. MINURSO welcomed this turing exercise, which entailed the closure of development and urged continued cooperation sector headquarters to enable MINURSO to between the parties and with the ICRC to deploy more observers to the nine military account for those that are still missing in rela- observer team sites, and the establishment of tion to the conflict. a civilian–military joint mission analysis cell. At the same time, both parties continued In October, a new concept of operations re- to accuse each other of violations. Since May, flecting these changes was approved. A fur- violent demonstrations in the territory, cou- ther adjustment of the mission’s administra- pled with allegations of human rights abuses, tive and civilian component—a net reduction were indications that the situation could be of thirty-nine posts while creating twenty- deteriorating. In March 2005, MINURSO com- four UN volunteer positions—was recom- pleted an assessment of the state of compliance mended. If approved, it will be implemented with Military Agreement Number 1, and found in a phased manner through mid-2006..