FINAL REPORT T O NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH TITLE : HIG H TREASON: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF TH E RED ARMY 1918-193 8 VOLUME I I AUTHOR . VITALY RAPOPOR T YURI ALEXEE V CONTRACTOR : CENTER FOR PLANNING AND RESEARCH, .INC . R . K . LAURINO, PROJECT DIRECTO R PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : VLADIMIR TREML, CHIEF EDITO R BRUCE ADAMS, TRANSLATOR - EDITO R COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 626- 3 The work leading to this report was supported in whole or i n part from funds provided by the National Council for Sovie t and East European Research . HIGH TREASO N Essays in the History of the Red Army 1918-1938 Volume I I Authors : Vitaly N . Rapopor t an d Yuri Alexeev (pseudonym ) Chief Editor : Vladimir Trem l Translator and Co-Editor : Bruce Adam s June 11, 198 4 Integrative Analysis Project o f The Center for Planning and Research, Inc . Work on this Project supported by : Tte Defense Intelligence Agency (Contract DNA001-80-C-0333 ) an d The National Council for Soviet and East European Studies (Contract 626-3) PART FOU R CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE RKK A Up to now we have spoken of Caligula as a princeps . It remains to discuss him as a monster . Suetoniu s There is a commandment to forgive our enemies , but there is no commandment to forgive our friends . L . Medic i Some comrades think that repression is the main thing in th e advance of socialism, and if repression does not Increase , there is no advance . Is that so? Of course it is not so . Stali n 282 , M Events after they have occurred become the subjects of investigation . Historians want to know what caused Napoleon to lead the Grande Armée on it s catastrophic march to Moscow . Defending their opinions they polemiciz e bitterly, suggest reasons, cite facts . Even if they, as is usually the case , do not find a single formula, still the general understanding of history i s enriched with points of view and conceptions . The destruction of the Red Army was, in its consequences for the nation , Stalin's most important act . To date it has been very little researched . I n the preceding parts of this book we have tried to describe the path that le d to this catastrophe . Now we will talk of the catastrophe itself . Without access to the most important documents we will not be able t o discuss the problems with the depth we would like . We will try t o re-establish the course of events and suggest probable causes . That is al l that can be done today . 2 83 Chapter 1 7 The Political Background: Coup d'etat They unleashed it themselve s trying to lead, to master the country , and 1937 cam e not just misfortune but punishment . Korzhavin . After the 17th Congress nothing apparently threatened Stalin's position a t the pinnacle of power . Rivals and enemies had been politically an d organizationally destroyed . They had admitted their defeat and lost thei r influence . The cult of the great leader flowered profusely. References t o his utterances and toasts in his honor became an obligatory part of ever y public speech on any topic . Collectivization was accomplished . Stalin' s five-year plans were being fulfilled at full speed . Tha internationa 1 situation of the country was sufficiently secure . The reorganization of th e Red Army had made it one of the best in Europe . There were difficulties, however . True, as Stalin had said, " ou r problems are such, that they themselves contain thepossibilityforovercoming them .. .they give us the basis for overcoming them."1 Stil1 the problem s remained . Since 1929 the country had been experiencing a severe suppl y crisis . In 1935 the system of rationing cards was ended, but some products , particularly meat, were still in very short supply . The predominance of heav y industry and the demise of the private entrepreneur had led to deficits o f consumer goods . The quality of goods was extremely poor . Industry wa s 28 4 constantly short of metals and other materials, not to mention machinery . Plans were chronically underfilled in ferrous metals, energy and machin e construction . Available capita1 did not cover the demands of hug e capital-intensive projects . The government resorted to printing money, whic h caused inflation . In 1934 the problems of power became esp ecially acute . Stalin coul d understand that although he had achieved supreme power, it was by no mean s guaranteed . The economic failures of the first five-year plan, th e dissatisfaction of the population, the opposition's attacks of 1930-1933, th e fluctuation of moods at th e . 17th Congress - all revealed the vulnerability o f Stalin's position . Power, achieved at the cost of enormous efforts with th e help of painstaking intrigue and risky provocations, could be easily 1ost in a day . If a rebellious plenum or a disobedient congress should suddenly refus e to accept black as white and remove Stalin from his post, he would immediatel y turn into a pitiful oppositionist, a former great 1eader, a toothless lion, a general without an army . The fact that the opposition's efforts, however feeble, continued betwee n the 16th and 17th Congresses, after the victory over his most powerfu 1 opponents, Bukharin ' s group, must have put Stalin on his guard . As long a s thoughts were still stirring in Party minds, he could not sleep soundly . There was little comfort in the apparent fact that the centers of oppositio n were weak and their methods resembled partisan warfare . Stalin could and di d see in these desperate hit-and-run attacks the germs of more genera l dissatisfaction, nuclei around which that dissatisfaction could b e consolidated . Therefore his reprisals came rapidly and sharply, withou t discussions and organizational maneuverings . It is very likely that it wa s 2 8 5 precisely these minor manifestations of insignificant opposition which se t Stalin finally on the course of mass terror within the party . Three such little sorties are known . The first occurred in 1930 . Shortl y after the congress Syrtsov 2 and Lominadze, supported by the Komsomol leade r Shatskin, spoke out at a plenum of the TsK against Stalin's economic polic y which they labeled "Potemkin industrialization" . Stalin was able to take care of them immediately . 0n December 1 by a decision of the TsK and the TsKK , without a plenum, Syrtsov and Lominadze were declared a "right-leftist group" , were expelled from the TsK, and removed from their posts . Syrtsov had bee n chairman of the Counci1 of the National Economy of the RSFSR, where he ha d just replaced Rykov . The second occurred two years later. 1932 was marked by the appearance o f the Riutin-Slepkov group . These were apprentices to Bukharin, who in thei r time had worked heroically to destroy various oppositions . Stalin had hardl y begun to go after the rightists when Riutin began to regret the passing o f inner-party democracy . An extensive program was worked out that called for e a softening of the party regime, policy changes (including policy toward th peasantry) and the removal of Stalin . The program had hardly made its wa y into Party circles when leaders of the rightists, led by Bukharin, hastened t o dissociate themselves from it . Stalin took the case to court, but he did no t get Riutin's head . The majority of Politbiuro members preferred not t o execute their recent comrade . There are rumors that Kuibyshev, 0rdzhonikidze , and Kirov offered active resistance and were supported by Kosior and Kalinin . Voroshilov, Andreev, and Molotov took a temporizing position, while Kaganovic h alone remained loyal to Stalin . A11 three opponents of terror were themselve s soon dispatched : Kirov - December l, 1934 ; Kuibyshev - January 25, 1935 ; 0rdzhonikidze - slightly later on February 18, 1937 . Kosior also perished , 2 86 but later and in connection with other, Ukrainian, matters . Kalinin quickl y learned to behave, as did his vacillating comrades . Nonetheless in 1932 the Riutinists got only ten-year sentences, which did no t keep them from disappearing in the bowels of the NKVD . Until the Great Purg e got under way, any connection with the Riutin group, real or imagined, wa s certain cause for reprisal . Having known of the Riutin program and not havin g denounced it was cause for expulsion from the party at the very 1east . Third . The Eismont- A .P . Smirnov-Tolmachev group had barely reared it s head at the end of 1932 . These men, too, were unhappy with Stalin's violenc e and desired a change . A joint plenum of the TsK and TsKK, meeting Januar y 7-12, 1933 expelled them from the party . It was not announced in the press . There followed, as usual, a secret trial, 1ong sentences, and death . As we have seen in this brief digression there were real difficulties , which did, however, contain the means for their own liquidation . After th e 17th Congress Stalin could no longer only hold off the attacks of th e disgruntled . He understood that the next congress might be his last . It was impossible in Soviet conditions to establish a mechanism fo r life-long rule - a monarchy or legalized dictatorship . Stalin wa s sufficiently practical not to copy Bonaparte's career . Stalin deserves some sympathy . His way was much harder than that o f Mussolini or Hitler . Their power was based on nationalism and unquestionabl e personal authority ( " The word of the leader is the highest 1aw " ), which had a certain mystical quality .