The Contemporary Relevance of Kant’s Transcendental Psychology Deborah Maxwell Alamé-Jones BA (Hons) Supervisor: Dr David Morgans Submitted in partial fulfilment for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy UNIVERSITY OF WALES TRINITY SAINT DAVID 2018 DECLARATION SHEET This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree. Signed .......Deborah Alame-Jones........................................................... Date .............. 17th May 2018.......................................................... STATEMENT 1 This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Sources are acknowledged by giving explicit references in the body of the text. A bibliography is appended. Signed ........ Deborah Alame-Jones............................................................. Date .............. 17th May 2018.......................................................... STATEMENT 2 I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. Signed .......... Deborah Alame-Jones........................................................... Date .............. 17th May 2018.......................................................... STATEMENT 3 I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for deposit in the University’s digital repository. Signed ........... Deborah Alame-Jones.......................................................... Date ................ 17th May 2018........................................................ i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Firstly, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the guidance, support and encouragement of my doctoral supervisor, Dr David Morgans, who took over the role of supervisory advisor midway through my candidature and to whom I am eternally indebted. I would also like to thank Professor Kelvin Donne for believing in the value of my proposal and my previous supervisor, Dr. Barry Ip, for his cheerful presence and invaluable comments whilst I was enrolled at the University of Wales, Trinity St David’s Swansea Campus. This thesis would have remained a dream had it not been for the encouragement and support of my colleagues and friends there, and for this I owe them my deepest gratitude. I also wish to thank the members of the Post Graduate Research team for their invaluable advice and support, and for their swift responses to my many questions Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their unconditional support and patience, and especially my husband Christopher for his tolerance of my almost complete absence of any free time, particularly during the latter stages of this work. ii Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Kant’s transcendental psychology against the orthodoxy of the dominant analytic school of philosophy, in an aim to salvage it from criticisms that resulted in the widespread view that Kant had little to say about the mind that was correct or useful. Historically, this had led to the near exclusion of Kant’s views of the mind from mainstream philosophical debate; those who acknowledged intellectually the psychological import of the work deemed as having transgressed the bounds of proper philosophy. It is argued that this was, and still is, an unfortunate and narrow view, since an interpretation which fully embraces the transcendental aspect can provide invaluable insights and direction for contemporary research in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. A major focus of this work is to provide a rigorous conceptual analysis of the modern problem of consciousness and to show that every approach has become a response, positive or negative, to the Cartesian distinction between body and mind. Today, more than three hundred years after Descartes’ philosophical dualism, this powerful and persuasive argument still continues to hold fast. Cognitive neuroscientists have amassed a deep and detailed understanding of how our brains process information from the external world, but the question of how this information is transformed into conscious experience is deemed an unsolved problem. It is proposed that, although Kant never uses the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia, his theory of the transcendental subject is a valuable tool in unravelling the philosophical complexities that are commonplace in current theories. iii Contents DECLARATION SHEET .................................................................................................................. I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: ............................................................................................................. II ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................... III CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................................... IV 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................... 13 1.2. KANT AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE – INITIAL COMMENTS .......................................................... 29 2. IN DEFENCE OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. ............................ 43 2.1. THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE DEDUCTIONS ...................................................................... 45 2. 2. THE HISTORY OF THE DEBATE.................................................................................................. 46 2.3. RETHINKING THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION ................................................................ 52 2.4. HOW KANT DOES NOT UNDERCUT HIS OWN PSYCHOLOGICAL CLAIMS. ................................ 60 3. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................................... 70 3.1. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHY ............................................................................ 74 3. 2. THE PARALOGISMS - APPERCEPTIONIS SUBSTANTIATAE ....................................................... 86 3.3. SYNTHESIS, RELATIONAL UNITY, AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF. ......................................... 92 3.4. THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT. ............................................................................................ 99 3.5. THE PECULIAR LOGICAL SEMANTICS OF SELF-REFERENCE .................................................... 106 3. 6. HIGHER ORDER THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS ................................................................... 117 4. TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND FUNCTIONALISM ............................. 127 4.1. WHAT IS FUNCTIONALISM? ................................................................................................... 127 4.2. KANT AND FUNCTIONALISM.................................................................................................. 135 4.3. BEYOND FUNCTIONALISM ...................................................................................................... 142 5. THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EXPLANATORY GAP ................. 149 5.1. PROPERTY DUALISM ............................................................................................................... 158 5.2. CHALMERS 2 DIMENSIONAL SEMANTICS ............................................................................... 161 5.3. FUNCTIONALISM PLUS QUALIA ............................................................................................. 178 5.4. THE NO-SELF THEORISTS ....................................................................................................... 195 6. KANT AND EMBODIED ENACTIVE COGNITIVE SCIENCE ....................................... 216 6.1. ON THE TENSION BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND ENACTIVE VIEWS. .................................... 225 iv 6.2. CONSCIOUS MACHINES .......................................................................................................... 239 6.3. ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT ............................................. 244 6.4. ON THE ROLE OF THE IMAGINATION. ................................................................................... 247 7. CONCLUSION. .......................................................................................................................... 252 BIBLIOGRAPHY/REFERENCES: ............................................................................................... 258 APPENDIX 1. NOTES ................................................................................................................... 280 v 1. Introduction The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Kant’s theory of mind, his “transcendental psychology” to cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience and also to the modern problem of consciousness, arguably the central issue in contemporary philosophy of mind today. Although written over two hundred years ago, his critical philosophical writings indicate that he had profound and original insights about mental functioning and cognition that have considerable significance. He held ideas about the nature of mental processing, the unity this requires, and also of consciousness and self-consciousness; some