University of Hawai‘i at Hilo HOHONU 2016 Vol. 14 The beginning of the war in Russia came as a Not a Step Back surprise to the Soviet government, even though they Leanne Crain had been repeatedly warned by other countries that History 435 Nazi Germany was planning an attack on Russia, and nearly the entire first year of the German advance into Russia was met with disorganization and reactionary planning. Hitler, and indeed, most of the top military minds in Germany, had every right to feel confident in their troops. The Germans had swept across Europe, not meeting a single failure aside from the stubborn refusal of the British to cease any hostilities, and they had seen how the Soviets had failed spectacularly in their rushed invasion of Finland in the winter of 1939. The Germans had the utmost faith in their army and the success of their blitzkrieg strategy against their enemies further bolstered that faith as the Germans moved inexorably through the Ukraine and into Russian territory nearly uncontested. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had kept Germany safe from any attack from Russia, “Such talk [of retreat] is lying and harmful, it weakens but Hitler had already planned for the eventuality of us and strengthens the enemy, because if there is no end invading Russia with Operation Barbarossa. Hitler was to the retreat, we will be left with no bread, no fuel, no convinced that the communist regime was on the verge metals, no raw materials, no enterprises, no factories, of collapse, and that the oppressed people under Stalin and no railways. It follows from this that it is time to would welcome the Germans as liberators, but at the finish with retreat. Not a step back!” same time, the Germans looked at those same oppressed -Order No.2271 people as sub-human, fit only for slave labor. There was also a practical reason for invading German Field Marshal Frederich Paulus Russia in 1941, and that was that after the disastrous surrendered his remaining exhausted and starved troops results Winter War, Stalin had initiated the largest mass of the Sixth Army on January 31, 1943 in Stalingrad. The promotion of officers in history in 1940 and had begun culmination of just over five months of intense fighting the rapid industrialization of the Red Army. Hitler would within the ruins of the sprawling city that sat against not want to face a stronger armed force if he delayed the banks of the Volga River. Operation Barbarossa, the invasion further.3 The confidence of the German the German invasion of the Soviet Union, began in Army of being able to easily invade Russia before late June 1941, but by the time of Paulus’s surrender, winter set in had echoes of World War I overconfidence the German army had been dealt a blow from which that the troops would ‘be home by Christmas.’ With it would never recover. Though Operation Barbarossa the utmost confidence in German superiority, Hitler was initially successful, Hitler and his commanders had began Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, and the vastly underestimated Russia. They believed, based Germans advanced quickly through Russian territory, upon the Russian defeat of the Winter War against fueling their confidence. The early days of the war in Finland, that Russia would be easily conquered and Russia were marked by brutality and ruthlessness on the that the “Bolshevik tyranny” would crumble, but this part of both armies. German SS teams moved in behind was shown to be a fallacy.2 The Russians held tactical the front lines, and began the process of mass murder advantages with sharp minds of the remaining high level of Communist Party members, along with any suspected military officials, the people’s knowledge of how to deal Party members and suspected Jews and POWs, as they with their particular climate, and the vast number of were not covered by the Geneva or Hauge Conventions.4 human resources that could be called up. The Russian The Russians resorted back to a scorched-earth policy, forces fought with desperation in the aptly named “meat one bent on leaving the Germans nothing to gain, and the grinder” of Stalingrad due to a mix of patriotic fervor, extent of the destruction of their own resources shocked stirred up by Stalin to inspire his troops into fighting for the Germans, who had hoped to use the raw materials their homeland, and the grim knowledge of both Order and already functioning factories to further provide for No. 227 – the infamous ‘Not a Step Back’ order – and the war production and domestic consumer demands.5 The wholesale mass extermination of Soviet party members overconfidence and brutality of the German Army would and civilians in German occupied areas. It was German prove to be a source of tactical advantage and luck for overconfidence, and the Russians’ tactical advantages, the Russians. luck, and fear that enabled the Battle of Stalingrad to The war had stalled during the winter of 1941, slow and eventually stop the German advance into but by summer, the press towards the Caucuses region Russia, and turn the course of the war. and the rich oil fields was moving again, even though 5 University of Hawai‘i at Hilo HOHONU 2016 Vol. 14 the morale of the German Army had begun to waver in the civilian population, arguing that the defenders the face of their inability to topple Russia and capture would defend a living city rather than an empty one, Moscow within a few months. It was at this point that thousands of refugees from the city waited for ferries the unassuming city of Stalingrad became a target. and ships to take them across the Volga in the aftermath Stalin, after having learned his own failings, began to of the initial bombing.9 The bombing had ignited fires rely more on the Stavka, which had been filled with the throughout the city, and though the city seemed gutted generals that Stalin felt to be trustworthy, and just before and ripe for conquest by the Fourth Panzer and Sixth the Battle of Stalingrad began, there was a change in the Armies, the Russian defenders refused to surrender, and chief of General Staff to General Aleksandr Vasilevsky, the Germans would have to capture every bit of the city who seemed to have a more rational and calming in order to succeed. The buildings of Stalingrad, built influence on Stalin than Marshal Gregory Zhukov, and during the early Soviet years and made of reinforced with the addition of General Semyon Timoshenko, the concrete, had roofs and windows blown out, floors Stavka began preparing to attempt to stop the German collapsed and burned from the bombs, but many of advance.6 the buildings were still standing and could take further Though Stalin, via the Stavka, had issued Order bombings due to their construction and the ease with No. 270 in August 1941, ordering the formation of which the pressure waves from a bomb would dissipate ‘blocking’ defensive units to stop the massive retreats of within the buildings. The buildings that did collapse did the Red Army, he went a step further in July 1942 with so within their own footprint, keeping destruction to a the issue of Order No. 227, which became characterized minimum for neighboring buildings, and the rubble and by its Draconian orders of ‘Not a step back.’ This order skeletonized building ruins were perfect for the guerilla detailed what Stalin and the Stavka saw as the main warfare and sniping that would become Stalingrad’s points plaguing the Soviet armed forces, which was legacy.10 Before the battle, the heavy artillery of the Red desertion and thoughts of retreat with the argument that Army had been moved across the Volga and established Russia had more than enough territory to maintain for along the banks of the river, where they were able to a long time. It would also form penal battalions, which easily aim at targets within the city. Within months, the would be sent to the most dangerous sections of the front Germans had almost complete control of the city, but lines so that these offenders could repay their cowardice the city was not taken totally. and desertion of their country with blood. In a calculated General Vasily Chuikov, an independent thinker move, Stalin did not have the orders published, knowing and determined fighter, was appointed to command the that if a copy fell into German hands, and it would turn 62nd Army two weeks after the battle had begun. His into propaganda against him and further demoralize his task was the monumental one of preventing the city troops. It was distributed verbally, to be read aloud to the from falling into German hands, and his unconventional armed forces.7 methods worked within the ruined city. He provided By 1942, the brutality of the German Army morale for his troops by keeping his headquarters within towards Russian POWs and civilians was known the city and only going across the Volga for reports and throughout the ranks, and it left the Red Army little inspection of the heavy artillery, but he also provided choice to either face the guns of the Germans or face the the grim reminder with his claim that for the 62nd Army, guns of their own countrymen, as the blocking units were there was “no land across the Volga,” indicating that fully authorized to shoot any deserters. Order 227 could they would either keep the city or die there.11 The luck have been a massive blunder, on par with Stalin’s early for the Russians came with Chuikov, who ordered No purges of military and tactical leaders in the late 1930s, Man’s Land be reduced ideally to zero and he ordered but it was his ability to coach the order into patriotic, his troops to ‘hug’ the German lines, forcing the Luftwaffe nationalist language and the force of his personality that into the friendly fire decision of dropping bombs onto made this order more of a morale builder and bolstered their own troops, along with the Russians.
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