TIBET ADVOCACY COALITION SUBMISSION TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS OF CHINA’S COMBINED FOURTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH PERIODIC REPORTS Joint Report Submitted on 30 July 2020 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 3 BROAD DEFINITION OF SEPARATISM 3 2.1 The Committee’s Concluding Observations 3 ​ 2.2 Tibet Advocacy Coalition’s Assessment 4 ​ DETENTION OF TIBETANS 6 3.1 The Committee’s Concluding Observations 6 ​ ​ 3.2 Tibet Advocacy Coalition’s Assessment 6 ​ ​ ERASING THE TIBETAN LANGUAGE 9 4.1 The Committee’s Concluding Observations 9 ​ 4.2 Tibet Advocacy Coalition’s Assessment 9 ​ ​ RESTRICTIONS ON TIBETANS’ FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 12 5.1 The Committee’s Concluding Observations 12 ​ 5.2 Tibet Advocacy Coalition’s Assessment 12 ​ ​ DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 14 6.1 The Committee’s Concluding Observations 14 ​ 6.2 Tibet Advocacy Coalition’s Assessment 14 ​ ​ 1. INTRODUCTION Tibet Advocacy Coalition presents this submission to the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the Committee) to inform the follow-up procedure in relation to the Concluding Observations on the combined fourteenth to seventeenth periodic reports of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in August 2018.1 As requested by the Committee, Tibet Advocacy Coalition evaluates China’s progress in implementing the Committee’s recommendations and would like to provide the following information in relation to: broad definitions of terrorism and separatism (paragraphs 36 and 37), Torture and ill-treatment (paragraphs 38 and 39), Tibetans (paragraphs 43 and 44); and employment (paragraphs 47 and 48). 1 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Concluding Observations, People's Republic of China, 19 September 2018, CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fCHN%2fCO%2f14-17&Lang=en 2. BROAD DEFINITION OF SEPARATISM 2.1 THE COMMITTEE’S CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 36. The Committee is concerned by reports that the broad definition of terrorism, the vague references to extremism and the unclear definition of separatism in Chinese laws could potentially lead to the criminalization of peaceful civic and religious expression and facilitate the criminal profiling of ethnic and ethno-religious minorities, including Muslim Uighurs, Buddhist Tibetans and Mongolians. 37. The Committee recommends that the State party review its existing relevant laws, regulations ​ and practices in order to ensure that they are narrowly tailored, that there are effective monitoring mechanisms and sufficient safeguards against abuse, and that they are implemented in a manner that does not constitute profiling or discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, descent, nationality, ethnicity or ethno-religious identity. The Committee requests the State party to provide in its next periodic report statistics, disaggregated by ethnicity, on prosecutions, convictions, sentences and other sanctions for crimes relating to terrorism, separatism and extremism. 2.2 TIBET ADVOCACY COALITION’S ASSESSMENT Tibet Advocacy Coalition regrets that in their follow-up information, the Chinese authorities continue to maintain that there is no racial, ethnic and ethno-religious profiling of Tibetans despite the widespread evidence to the contrary. Since the Tibet Advocacy Coalition’s original submission, the Chinese authorities have continued to further policies aimed at criminalising acts of ‘separatism’; a broadly-defined state security crime that authorities have used to detain community leaders, writers, monks and nuns and other groups who have engaged in protests or online dissent, such as Tashi Wangchuk, a Tibetan language rights advocate who was sentenced to five years imprisonment in May 2018. On 11 January 2020, the 11th People’s Congress of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) adopted "Regulations on the Establishment of a Model Area for Ethnic Unity and Progress in the ​ Tibet Autonomous Region" which serve to reinforce the Chinese government’s broad and the ​ unclear definition of separatism and formalise a system already geared towards eradicating the Tibetan identity. The law, which came into effect on 1 May 2020, codifies “safeguarding oneness ​ of motherland, strengthening ethnic unity, and taking an unambiguous stand against separatism” as the responsibility of each and every Tibetan. According to Article 46 of the new ethnic unity ​ law, individuals ‘harming ethnic unity’ by ‘taking part’ or ‘discussing separatism’ and ‘jeopardising social harmony’ will be subjected to ‘re-education’ and the state will administer ‘corrective courses’ thereby posing a serious threat to a further escalation of patriotic re-education ​ measures.2 The law dictates that “public security bureaus” will deal with individuals and ​ organisations that fail to abide by the law. Following the implementation of the law, the government announced incentives for inter-ethnic ​ marriages between Tibetans and Han Chinese individuals, including offering cash rewards and ​ scholarships for children, in a renewed attempt to interfere in Tibetan’s private lives and erase the Tibetan identity. On 20 May 2020, the Monastic Management Committee of Jangda Monastery, in Parga Town, Burang County in Ngari Prefecture of the TAR, launched a new initiative to promote patriotism among the monastery’s monks. At the event, the monks were requested to take the initiative in opposing separatism, and told that it was their duty to be patriotic and safeguard a unified China.3 On 12 June 2020, the Monastic Management Committee of Dengqi Monastery organised a similar campaign in the Dengqi Township in Sengri County, Lhoka Prefecture, in the TAR. Following the event, Tibetan monks were forced to state that they would consciously safeguard the unity of motherland and oppose separatism.4 In a similar effort to crackdown on ‘separatist activities’, the CCP Central Committee and CCP State Council announced a three-year campaign against organised crime across the PRC on 24 January 2018. In the Tibetan Autonomous Region, this was followed by a notification issued on 7 February 2018, by the TAR Public Security Bureau, which is accountable to the PRC’s Ministry of Public Security and which coordinates the work of the police across the TAR. The notification outlined the threats posed to the economy and to society by “underworld forces” and outlined 22 16 examples of organised crimes. S​ ome of the examples of organised crimes can be identified as ​ legitimate crimes (e.g. number 14, related to pornography, gambling and drugs, and number 21, related to extortion and blackmail, destruction of property and prostitution). Alongside these crimes are more broadly and vaguely worded offences, which could be used to punish Tibetans for protesting, celebrating their culture or exercising their right to self-determination. For example, the second crime listed cites “[u]nderworld forces interconnected with the Dalai clique, accepting remote control or command, or participating in 2 According to the law, detention in ‘education centers’ may be 5-15 days long, however Article 30 puts forth “educational placement” ​ of those who have been convicted of extremist crimes and empowers the intermediate people’s court to determine the modalities of the educational placement - this means that there is no minimum or maximum duration attached to the “educational placement” of a person and creates a legal basis for limitless detention i.e. through patriotic re-education. 3 Tibet Watch, Chinese authorities intensify patriotism campaign in Tibet, 24 June 2020: https://www.tibetwatch.org/news/2020/6/24/chinese-authorities-intensify-patriotism-campaign-in-tibet 4 Tibet Watch, Chinese authorities intensify patriotism campaign in Tibet, 24 June 2020: https://www.tibetwatch.org/news/2020/6/24/chinese-authorities-intensify-patriotism-campaign-in-tibet separatist and disruptive activities”.5 Since then, courts in Tibetan areas have used “gang crime” charges to sentence at least 51 Tibetans to up to 9 years in prison for peacefully petitioning or protesting issues related to religion, environmental protection, land rights, and official corruption.6 Information from official sources and information that has been smuggled out Tibet suggests that at least 400 Tibetans were arrested between early 2018 and mid 2019 as part of this ‘organised crime’ push.7 5 Tibet Advocacy Coalition in collaboration with Free Tibet, ‘The effects of China’s campaign against ‘organised crime’ in Tibet, ​ 2018-2019 A UN Special Procedures Briefing September 2019’, https://www.freetibet.org/files/Organised%20crime%20in%20Tibet%2C%20September%202019%2C%20HRC42%2C%20Tibet%20Ad vocacy%20Coalition.pdf 6 Human Rights Watch, ‘China: Tibet Anti-Crime Campaign Silences Dissent At Least 51 Tibetans Convicted for Peaceful Speech,’ 14 May 2020: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/14/china-tibet-anti-crime-campaign-silences-dissent ​ 7 Tibet Advocacy Coalition in collaboration with Free Tibet, ‘The effects of China’s campaign against ‘organised crime’ in Tibet, ​ 2018-2019 A UN Special Procedures Briefing September 2019’, https://www.freetibet.org/files/Organised%20crime%20in%20Tibet%2C%20September%202019%2C%20HRC42%2C%20Tibet%20Ad vocacy%20Coalition.pdf 3. DETENTION OF TIBETANS 3.1 THE COMMITTEE’S CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 38. The Committee, while noting that, according to the State party, the reports