ASYMMETRICAL DETERRENCE FOR NBC TERRORISM A Master’s Thesis by BERK ECE Department of International Relations ...................................................... Bilkent University Ankara September 2004 To my family ASYMMETRICAL DETERRENCE FOR NBC TERRORISM The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University by BERK ECE In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BILKENT UNIVERSITY ANKARA September 2004 I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of IR in International Relations. --------------------------------- Assist. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Supervisor I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of IR in International Relations. --------------------------------- Assist. Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı Examining Committee Member I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of IR in International Relations. --------------------------------- Assist. Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya Examining Committee Member Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences --------------------------------- Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan Director ABSTRACT ASYMMETRICAL DETERRENCE FOR NBC TERRORISM Ece, Berk M.A., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu September 2004 The aim of this thesis is to analyze the framework of deterrence theory whether it may be suited to the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) terrorism as an asymmetrical threat. As a methodology, mainly qualitative means were applied. This thesis will argue that though the classical deterrence theory was primarily created for inter-state relations, its main premises and newly transformed features –due to the post-cold war era- can be applied on the asymmetrical relations between states and terrorist organizations which would initiate to use NBC material in particular. In the analysis of the problem of managing asymmetrical deterrence through revisiting orthodox ground of deterrence; the nature of the new threat and critics of classical theory of deterrence were discussed together to shape a unique asymmetrical deterrence. In conclusion, this thesis was finalized with the argument that to overcome the deficiencies of prevention models against asymmetrical threats as well as to remove obstacles for conducting a feasible deterrence theory against asymmetrical threats; benefiting from the deconstruction of classical deterrence iii theory is necessary in terms of recalling the concepts of rationality, capability and credibility. iv ÖZET NBC TERÖRÖİZMİ İÇİN ASİMETRİK CAYDIRICILIK Ece, Berk Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu Eylül 2004 Bu tezin amacı caydırıcılık kuramının, asimetrik bir tehdit türü olarak Nükleer, Biyolojik ve Kimyasal (NBC) terörizm olgusu çerçevesinde uygulanabilirliğini çözümlemektir. Yöntem olarak ağırlıkla kalitatif araçlardan yararlanılmıştır. Tezde, klasik caydırıcılık kuramının devletler arası ilişkiler bağlamında ortaya çıkmasına rağmen temel dayanaklarının ve soğuk savaş ertesi değişen yeni unsurlarının özellikle NBC terörizmini hedefleyen örgütler ile devletler arasındaki asimetrik ilişkiye uygulanabilir olup olmadığı savunulmaktadır. Caydırıcılığın ortodoks temelini tekrar irdeleyerek asimetrik caydırıcılığı uygulanabilir hale getirebilme sorunsalının çözümünde, özgün bir kuram şekillendirebilmek için klasik caydırıcılık kuramının eleştirileri ile ortaya çıkan yeni tehdidin doğası birlikte ele alınmıştır. Sonuç olarak bu tez, asimetrik tehditlere karşı ileri sürülen önleme modellerinin eksikliklerini ve bu tehditlere karşı ugulanabilir bir caydırıcılık kuramının önündeki engelleri ortadan kaldırabilmek için klasik caydırıcılık kuramının, rasyonalite, güvenilirlik ve yetenekler temelinde bir yapıbozumunun gerektiği savı ile noktalanmıştır. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the process of writing this manuscript, first of all I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to my supervisor Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu for his remarkable contributions and insightful opinions. Also I would like to present my sincere gratitude to my dear family. Last but not least, I would like to thank Zeynep Altınordu for her support and understanding during conducting my research. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………...….….ii ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………....iii ÖZET……………………..…………………………………………...…..iv TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………….…v LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………..vii ABBREVATIONS……….……….….…………………………………...viii CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………1 CHAPTER II: THE CONTEXT OF ASYMMETRICAL THREATS……5 2.1 – Historical Retrospect………………………………………………6 2.2 – Contemporary Context…………………………………………....11 CHAPTER III: NBC TERRORISM……………………………………...16 3.1 – Definition…………………………………………………………17 3.2 – Analysis of Motivations and Agents……………………………...19 3.3 – Capabilities and Providers………………………………………..26 3.4 – Reasons, Consequences and Threats……………………………..29 3.5 – Specific Cases…………………………………………………….44 3.6 – Asymmetrical Nature of NBC Terrorism………………………...46 vii CHAPTER IV: DETERRENCE…………………………………………….49 4.1 – “The Concept” and “The Context”………………………………….49 4.2 – Theoretical Underpinnings………………………………………….53 4.3 – “The Challenge”…………………………………………………….60 CHAPTER V: ASYMMETRICAL DETERRENCE……………………….64 5.1 – “The Challenge-II”………………………………………………….65 5.2 – Theoretical Underpinnings-II……………………………………….70 5.3 – “Rationality”………………………………………………………...82 CHAPTER VI: APPLICABILITY OF ASYMMETRICAL DETERRENCE.98 6.1 – “The Threat”………………………………………………………..99 6.2 – Deterring Asymmetrical Via Capability and Credibility…………….105 6.3 – Deterring Asymmetrical Via Strategies……………………………113 6.4 – Asymmetrical Deterrence………………………………………….119 CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION…………………………………………..124 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………130 viii LIST OF TABLES 1. Terrorist Incidents per year……………………………………………….73 2. Incident by Type of Event………………………………………………..74 3. Basic Breaks…………………………………………………………….133 4. Basic Continuities……………………………………………………….134 ix ABBREVATIONS ABM: Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty BW: biological weapons CW: chemical weapons CBW: chemical/biological weapons CIA: Central Intelligence Agency DRIS: Dutch Royal Intelligence Service DSTO: The Defense Science and Technology Organization DoD: Department of Defense ETA: Basque Fatherland and Liberty FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FSU: former Soviet Union HAMAS: Haraqat El Mukavama al Islamiya IDF: Israel Defense Forces IMU: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IRA: Irish Republican Army ITERATE: international terrorism: attributes of terrorist events LEU: low-enriched uranium MAD: mutually assured destruction MIRV: Multiple Independently Re-Entry Vehicle MOOTW: military operations other than war NDP: National Defense Panel NPT: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty NWFP: Peshawar North West Frontier Province x OOTW: operations other than war PKK / Kongra-gel: Kurdistan Workers Party TEPP: Tetraethyl Pyrophosphate SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review WMD: weapons of mass destruction WWII: Second World War xi CHAPTER – I INTRODUCTION As introductory remarks, a deterrent strategy can rely on one or both of two mechanisms. First, it can be based on threats to visit punishment on an enemy that significantly outweighs the gain of a particular course of action. This approach is traditionally viewed as targeting civilian assets and constituted the basis of the Cold War concept of mutual assured destruction. Another approach is based on the concept of denial. Specific capabilities deter enemies from pursuing either a given objective or a conflict strategy. This is achieved by undermining their ability, or belief in their ability, to realize a desired outcome. Deterrent strategies can include both punishment and denial mechanisms. For example, the United States appears to favor such an approach to deter unconventional weapons usage by a regime by combining denial capabilities like missile defenses with the threat of punishment. That is why this thesis will discuss the involvement of both to deter asymmetrical threats. A credible deterrent posture requires the capability to deliver on the deterrent message, or at least the appearance of it. The deterrer must 1 demonstrate the intent and resolve to fulfill the message and effectively communicate this to an enemy, including which lines not to cross. That is why this thesis will concentrate its efforts of credible capabilities and indirect deterrence through show of strength. Deterrence also assumes that a target will be a cost-benefit calculator—a rational actor who evaluates options in terms of costs and benefits, including likely responses. But what is accepted as rational by one actor may not appear rational to another because of cultural factors or decision- making processes. This is a major consideration in the war on terrorism because of the asymmetric nature of the opposing sides in almost every respect. A preventive strategy in this context—deterrent requires knowing enemy motives, worldview, resolve, capabilities (including conflict strategies and techniques), and vulnerabilities. That s why this thesis will imply and attempt to apply “relative rationality” while shaping asymmetrical deterrence.