September 18, 2018 Via E-Mail to [email protected] Mr. Brent Fields, Secretary U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 100 F Street NE Washington, DC 20549-1090 Re: Whistleblower Program Rules, Exch. Act Rel. No. 83557, File No. S7-16-18 Dear Mr. Fields: The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”)1 appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC’s” or “Commission’s”) proposed amendments to its Whistleblower Program Rules. SIFMA has supported and continues to support Congress’ and the SEC’s efforts to identify and address potential violations of the federal securities laws and regulations. SIFMA generally supported the SEC’s current whistleblower rules when they were first proposed in 2010,2 and SIFMA recognizes the value of robust and effective whistleblower rules. SIFMA strongly encourages as the best practice for the SEC and other regulatory agencies periodically to conduct a retrospective review of their rules to evaluate whether they have been as effective and efficient as possible, and SIFMA applauds the SEC for doing so with respect to the whistleblower rules in such a timely fashion as the end of their first decade approaches. SIFMA is pleased that some of the negative consequences feared by critics of the original whistleblower rules – that they might undermine internal corporate compliance programs and encourage baseless complaints – appear to have been limited in practice. But we agree that it is always worthwhile to review whether changes are needed to preserve or improve upon the delicate balance intended by Congress and the Commission. In that spirit, SIFMA submits these 1 SIFMA is the leading trade association for broker-dealers, investment banks and asset managers operating in the U.S. and global capital markets. On behalf of our industry’s nearly one million employees, we advocate on legislation, regulation and business policy, affecting retail and institutional investors, equity and fixed income markets and related products and services. We serve as an industry coordinating body to promote fair and orderly markets, informed regulatory compliance, and efficient market operations and resiliency. We also provide a forum for industry policy and professional development. SIFMA, with offices in New York and Washington, D.C., is the U.S. regional member of the Global Financial Markets Association (GFMA). For more information, visit http://www.sifma.org. 2 Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Director and General Counsel, SIFMA to Ms. Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, SEC re: Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Dec. 17, 2010) (https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-161.pdf). Washington | New York 1101 New York Avenue, NW | 8th Floor | Washington, DC 20005-4269 | P: 202.962.7300 | F: 202.962.7305 www.sifma.org Mr. Brent Fields September 18, 2018 Page 2 of 13 comments on the Commission’s Proposing Release3 concerning possible amendments to its current whistleblower rules (the “Proposed Rules”). I. Executive Summary SIFMA supports many of the Commission’s ideas set forth in the Proposing Release. • SIFMA agrees that the definition of “action” triggering a potential whistleblower award should be expanded to include Non-Prosecution Agreements or Deferred Prosecution Agreements entered into with the US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the SEC itself. These important prosecutorial tools should not deprive whistleblowers of an award where companies earn these resolutions through strong compliance programs, cooperation and substantial remediation. • SIFMA finds merit in the Commission’s idea that (within the statutorily mandated 10% minimum whistleblower award and the 30% maximum whistleblower award), some very large whistleblower awards could be reduced so as to increase the size of some of the smaller whistleblower awards. • That being said, SIFMA is skeptical whether the Commission has legal authority to adopt a discretionary award program for whistleblowers who do not meet the statutory standards for a whistleblower award. There are strong policy reasons not to do so. • SIFMA agrees that the Commission has inherent authority to sanction people who abuse the whistleblower program and waste both the Commission’s and the regulated community’s resources by filing baseless whistleblower claims. • While SIFMA recognizes that the Commission must update its whistleblower rules to reflect the US Supreme Court’s decision in the Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers case, SIFMA continues to believe that the first and best line of defense against violations of the securities laws is a robust internal compliance program responding to internal reporting of whistleblower claims. In the wake of Digital Realty, it is critical that the Commission strengthen its rules to maximize the incentives to encourage internal reporting of potential violations, and if necessary work with Congress to achieve that objective. • SIFMA encourages the Commission to provide clear guidance about what language private sector firms may use in employment agreements, severance agreements and during internal investigations to protect nonpublic customer information and trade secrets and preserve firms’ attorney-client privilege and work product protections, without running afoul of the whistleblower rules. The Commission has brought several settled enforcement actions in this area which have created a need for clearer industry guidance. 3 Exch. Act Rel. No. 83557 (June 29, 2018) (the “Proposing Release”). Mr. Brent Fields September 18, 2018 Page 3 of 13 • SIFMA encourages the Commission to review whether the current provisions of the whistleblower rules relating to culpable participants, which in some cases permit awards to individuals who participated in the violations at issue, effectively achieve the goal of preventing misconduct in the first place. II. SIFMA Supports Broadening the Definition of “Action” Triggering Potential Eligibility for a Whistleblower Award The Proposing Release suggests allowing Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) or Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) entered into with the DOJ or a state attorney general, or a similar cooperation-based resolution of an investigation with the SEC, to trigger eligibility for a whistleblower award.4 SIFMA supports this proposal, and agrees with the Proposing Release that the Commission has statutory authority to adopt it. The DOJ has adopted guidelines that make corporations and individuals eligible for NPAs or DPAs if they have strong compliance programs and provide extraordinary cooperation in DOJ investigations.5 NPAs and DPAs can involve monetary recoveries in the tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars – well over the $1 million threshold for a whistleblower award. In rare cases, the SEC has also utilized NPAs6 or DPAs7 for companies that have provided extraordinary cooperation in investigations. The DOJ and the Commission have concluded, very reasonably, that providing incentives for strong internal compliance programs, cooperation during investigations and remediation furthers the nation’s interest in preventing or detecting wrongdoing in the first place. NPAs and DPAs are effective tools for providing those incentives. At the outset of an investigation, it is impossible for a whistleblower to know if the investigation will result in a formal enforcement action or in a DPA or NPA.8 SIFMA also believes it would be contrary to the public interest in encouraging vigorous compliance programs and extraordinary cooperation in investigations if the DOJ or SEC decided not to offer a company a DPA or an NPA, for fear that as a result, a whistleblower who contributed to the success of the investigation would not receive a 4 See generally Proposing Release at pp. 17-18. 5 See US Attorney’s Manual 9-47.120 (Mar. 2018) (https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download) (announcing presumption of declination of prosecution in certain FCPA matters); Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, Remarks at the 32nd Annual ABA National Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 2, 2018) (https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-32nd-annual-aba- national-institute) (discussing cooperation credit more generally). 6 See, e.g., SEC Announces Two Non-Prosecution Agreements in FCPA Cases (June 7, 2016) (https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-109.html). 7 See, e.g., Regions Financial Corporation (June 25, 2014) (https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2014/2014-125- dpa.pdf). See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Enforcement Cooperation Program (listing SEC DPA and NPA agreements) (https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enforcement-cooperation-initiative.shtml). 8 In statutory terms, SIFMA agrees with the Proposing Release that both a DPA and an NPA comfortably fit within the definition of a “covered action” in Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), so there is no legal obstacle to the SEC’s proposed change in the regulatory definition to include these types of actions. Mr. Brent Fields September 18, 2018 Page 4 of 13 whistleblower award. Similarly, it is unfair to whistleblowers who provide timely information about potential misconduct to be deprived of an award simply because of positive conduct by the very entities on which they are reporting. Allowing awards to whistleblowers whose information leads to a successful DPA or NPA will fairly balance the important goals of both rewarding