© 19 March 2020 White Paper 2 Leave no one behind Global lessons for implementing an effective Public Warning System March 2020 This White Paper follows on from our first, titled “Getting it right first time”, published by Public Safety Communications Europe (PSCE) in March 2019: https://www.psc- europe.eu/white-papers/psce-white-paper-12-implementing-reverse-112/download.html 1 © 19 March 2020 Leave no one behind When media commentators worldwide are regularly using the term “unprecedented” to describe manmade and natural hazards, it is not surprising that governments are looking to implement an effective Public Warning System (PWS). The global Coronavirus Pandemic is a prime example of the need for an effective national PWS. In December 2018, the European Council passed legislation that expects Member States to have in place their PWS by June 2022. Whilst Article 110, European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) is a “Directive”, the text uses the word “should” throughout to reflect that it does not have the mandate to compel Member States to act. Nevertheless, authorities across Europe are actively exploring how to achieve an effective and compliant PWS. However, effectiveness goes beyond technologies alone. Of greater importance is that the PWS meets the community safety outcomes expected and the functional and operational requirements of its user-authorities. This paper explains how we can achieve both operational and technical effectiveness by optimising the investment in a future-proofed all hazards, all agencies PWS. I am the former Emergency Services Commissioner for Victoria, Australia, and National Director of Australia’s “Emergency Alert Program” (2011 to 2015). In 2012, I oversaw implementation of Australia’s “Location Based Solution (LBS)” as Phase 2 of the national PWS programme known as “Emergency Alert (EA)” - “EA-LBS”1. At its core, is a technology platform powered by Location Based SMS (LBSMS). Two years after its launch, I commissioned a nationwide survey of the communities across the country who had received an alert and the Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs) that sent them. The resulting 129-page review provides important lessons for successful implementation and continuous improvement. These, along with my own leadership experiences offer a unique evidence- base to help guide both the design and operational use of an effective PWS. Since that launch just over seven years ago, EA-LBS has proved highly effective at reaching close to everyone with a mobile phone in the affected area. Australia’s system is accessible automatically to 100% of mobile phone users the moment their device connects to a network. Hence it is inclusive equally both to citizens and international roamers. Overall, throughout more than 1,500 activations since 2012, its 15 million SMS messages have reached in excess of 97% of the mobiles in the warning area. To bust the first myth about LBSMS, it does so without congesting the networks. The other 3% were made up, primarily, by devices that connect to the networks but cannot receive SMS, such as early model tablets. Today, with the capability to filter out non-mobile telephone handsets, access and reach will be much closer to 100%. When countries with a Cell Broadcast (CB) PWS reach less than 80%2, due to ongoing worldwide handset incompatibility issues, you will understand my objective in showing authorities the actual facts and risks they must consider when designing an effective PWS. 1 EA-LBS was developed by a consortium of suppliers that included Mobilaris and Genasys and managed by Telstra. The platform upgrade for Phase 4, to be launched in 2021, will be supplied by Everbridge. Genasys, amongst other suppliers, is bidding to renew the interfaces between the MNOs and the EA-LBS platform. 2 Canada: “Alert Ready” – only available to compatible 4G handsets when within 4G coverage = less than 60% of mobile phone users. New Zealand: “Emergency Mobile Alert” – target reach is 70% of mobile phone users. The first national test in November 2017 reached 34% of mobile phone users and another 15% of the population, who were near someone who did. The Netherlands: “NL Alert” – December 2019 test indicated 78% reach. 2 © 19 March 2020 Throughout 2019 and now in 2020, together with Public Safety Communications Europe (PSCE), I am facilitating a series of workshops for authorities to collaborate on the design to delivery of an effective PWS. The events are also sponsored by some of the world’s leading suppliers3 of PWS technologies. The latter are focused on the digital innovations they can deliver to help authorities better protect communities for the enduring and emerging hazards we face. Our collective purpose is to demystify and thereby accelerate the implementation process to meet the EECC June 2022 deadline. Wherever possible, we are also keen to leverage the economies of scale and cross-border interoperability provided by multi-state collaboration. The following paragraphs outline what we have learned so far from these workshops; in particular the overriding principle that the PWS should leave no one behind. 1. Much has been written about PWS technologies, mostly by technology standard-setters. All too often they begin with what their technologies can do rather than start with the emergency services’ and civil protection agencies’ Concept of Operations. These deal with why, when, for what, who and how they will actually use this life-saving capability. Of fundamental importance is that use of the PWS must fulfil the public safety expectations of the community it is aimed at protecting. To summarise, for the PWS to be truly effective, the critical success factors against which to measure the design are that it satisfies: • the multi-dimensional natural and manmade threats affecting each nation; • the operational requirements of the user-authorities and their emergency management arrangements; • the statutory duty of these authorities to warn and inform the community about imminent and actual emergencies; • the needs and expectations of the community for how they want to be alerted, • and the content of the message, so the public recognise and understand immediately its authenticity and the action(s) authorities need them to take to protect their safety. 2. The problem faced by authorities today is how, given the prominence of social media and fake news/misinformation, they can implement an effective PWS. As stated, the first step is determining the Concept of Operations. The objective is a multi-channel PWS platform that enables all user-authorities: (i) To provide inclusive, timely, trusted warnings and information relevant to the public in the geographic area affected, and (ii) Gain situational awareness automatically through remote, near real-time access to the data generated from the incident ground back to the PWS platform to visualise the human impacts of their actions. 3. Therefore, one of the fundamental lessons identified from our European workshops is that authorities want a PWS that maximises their investment by going beyond just broadcasting the alert. It has to be a multi-channel platform that enables the emergency services both to warn the public and visualise remotely at the Incident Control Centre what is happening on the ground. The PWS needs to give Incident Commanders and Controllers near real-time intelligence4 to make sense of cause and effect. Consequently, they can make more meaningful decisions about how to protect the public. For example, they want the PWS to help them identify: • The number of people in the area affected (from the number of mobile phones); • Whether they can be reached with an alert on their device; 3 Ericsson, Everbridge, Gedicom, Genasys, Intersec, Mobilaris, and Opencode. 4 In this context, “intelligence” means information designed for action. 3 © 19 March 2020 • Their nationalities; • Whether they received the alert and are now acting on its instructions; • Where the people are who cannot escape and now need rescuing, and • The resources needed to achieve that. 4. In addition, post-incident, they want the data generated by the PWS to help them reconstruct events in order to satisfy the public’s expectations that the emergency services responded effectively. It is commonplace in Australia for members of the public to enquire why they may not have received an alert. Because EA-LBS processes the data needed to answer this, it is possible for the authorities to give a definitive response very quickly. Hence, the PWS has an innate community assurance capability built into it. As regards system security, to bust another myth about LBSMS, there is no evidence of EA-LBS (and its equivalents in other countries) being either hacked or spoofed. 5. Authorities may also want the PWS to initiate two-way communication. This can be achieved with SMS, whereby authorities can embed in the message the capability for the recipient to respond either by SMS or pressing specific numbers on their keypad, such as: 1 = “Message received, and I am acting on the instruction”, or 2 = “Message received, but I need help”. Emergency services can control these to limit inappropriate/malicious responses. Authorities can also embed links in the SMS to official websites and social media channels, and a telephone number to connect with the Operations Centre. 6. In the context of the Coronavirus, health authorities can use the PWS to enable the public to provide daily status updates by responding to the SMS request using a simple 1 to 5 reply for whichever is most relevant to their situation. For example: 1 = “At home - no symptoms” 2 = “At work or travelling to/from - no symptoms” 3 = “At home - self-isolating due to me or someone in my household/workplace having symptoms” 4 = “Out shopping for essentials” 5 = “Out for my daily exercise”. This automated reporting and remote monitoring would save the police from having to physically visit every street to check on compliance across the community.