Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School 1970 The Root Mission to Russia, 1917. Alton Earl Ingram Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses Recommended Citation Ingram, Alton Earl, "The Root Mission to Russia, 1917." (1970). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 1786. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/1786 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 71-3418 } INGRAM, Alton Earl, 1934- THE ROOT MISSION TO RUSSIA, 1917. [ [I' The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1970 History, modern University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan !■ i I ■ 1 ■■ ■■ ■■ !■ ■■ !■■■■! ■' ....... THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE ROOT MISSION TO RUSSIA 1917 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History by Alton Earl Ingram B.A., Northeast Louisiana State College, 1958 M.A., Louisiana State University, 1961 May, 1970 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to thank his faculty advisor, professor Burl Noggle, for his assistance during the preparation of this dissertation and his wife, Mimi, who has given unlimited assistance, encouragement, and under standing throughout the entire course of his graduate program. TABLE OP CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS....................................... ii ABSTRACT............................................... iv PREFACE ............................................... Vi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION................................. I II DECISION TO SEND M I S S I O N ................. 38 III SELECTION OF MEMBERS ........................ 65 IV WASHINGTON, D.C. , TO VLADIVOSTOK............ 96 V VLADIVOSTOK TO PETRGGRAD ............. 120 VI OFFICIAL RECEPTIONS. .................... 145 VII FINANCE....................................... 162 VIII THE MILITARY 189 . IX THE SOCIALISTS............................... 228 X LABOR, RELIGION, AND PROPAGANDA............... 253 XI CONCLUSION................................... 280 BIBLIOGRAPHY. ...................................... 317 VITA................................................... 323 iii ABSTRACT Tsar Nicholas XI of Russia abdicated on March 15, 1917. For several months, Russian politics was in a state of flux until Vladimir Ilych Lenin led the Bolsheviks to power in November and established the first government based upon Marxist Socialism. America's initial reaction to the abdication was one of extreme pleasure as the Americans expected the Russians to establish a government similar to their own. In addition, most Americans interpreted the events in Russia as beneficial to the Allied cause. Less than a month after the abdication, however, the united States entered World War I, and it soon became apparent that political unrest in Russia might weaken her ability to continue as a belli­ gerent. President Wilson sent a Special Diplomatic Mission, to Russia in the summer of 1917. The nine-man Mission, headed by former Secretary of State Eliliu Soot, was a good-will mission and a fact-finding group whose work was to determine Russia's material and financial needs and to assess the political and military stability of the new government. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the work of the Root Mission and to evaluate its accomplish­ ments . iv in the preparation of this work, many unpublished sources were used. The state Department Records in the National Archives contain hundreds of items, including reports from each member as well as a detailed log of the trip. The private papers of seven of the men furnished significant material and the detailed diaries of three of the members were utilized. These and other sources were examined in an attempt to present an accurate account of the Root Mission and its effect on American policy. v PREFACE News of the March, 1917, revolution in Russia ar­ rived in the united States at approximately the same time that president Woodrow Wilson decided to enter World War I. Most Americans reacted favorably to the events in Russia and were especially pleased with initial reports that the provisional Government would probably be based upon a political ideology similar to that of the United States. The overthrow of the Tsar was timely in that Americans could now more realistically accept World War I as a struggle between the forces of democracy and autoc­ racy. Americans soon began sending messages to congratu­ late and encourage the new Russian government. And many began to suggest that the United States send a special fact-finding Mission to Russia. President Wilson accepted the idea, envisioning the Mission as an elaborate goodwill venture as well as a way to observe at first-hand Russia's military needs. This Mission, headed by former Secretary of State Elihu Root, was to be Wilson's most ambitious attempt to deal with revolutionary conditions in Russia. It departed from Washington in May, 1917, and returned in August of that year. While in Russia, Mission members encountered events vi which were evolving so rapidly that even the most expe­ rienced observers of the Russian political scene understood and interpreted them with difficulty, if at all. When Elihu Root departed for Russia, American public opinion, as reflected by journalists, was that the aged diplomat could effectively encourage political stability in Russia and persuade that nation to continue its role as an effective ally in World War I. Historians, however, view the Root Mission as a dismal failure. Some have gone so far as to suggest that both Allied and American diplomacy during the period in which the Pro­ visional Government ostensibly was in control in Russia was based upon the false premise that the Russian government could continue the war while consolidating its political strength. The Root Mission is a prime example of diplomacy based upon this premise. Historical judgment of the worthlessness of the Root Mission is far more accurate than was contemporary opinion of its value. Most historians, however, have reached this conclusion without a thorough study of the Mission's activities in Russia. I have sought to examine in detail the Root Mission in an effort to determine why it was sent, what was expected of it, what it accomplished while in Russia, and what effect, if any, this Mission had on United States-Russian relations during this critical vii period. I did my research for this study almost entirely in primary sources, many of which have never been fully utilized before. I undertook this work with the realiza­ tion that the Root Mission, in all probability, contrib­ uted very little toward establishing a significant Russian policy by the united States Government. I pursued it, however, with the conviction that in historical research and writing it is as valid to study policies and experi­ ments which have failed as to peruse those which have had tangible and lasting results. viii CHAPTER X INTRODUCTION On March 15, 1917,^* Tsar Nicholas II of Russia abdi­ cated the throne from which his family has reigned for more than three hundred years. This event followed a brief period of rioting in the Russian capital of Petrograd but, nevertheless, came as a surprise to almost everyone. The causes for the Tsar's overthrow and subsequent abdication were complex and, as is the case with most events of such magnitude, resulted from many factors. The underlying causes of the collapse of absolutism in Russia had roots deep in the nineteenth century, but the event which precipitated it in 1917 was Russia's involve­ ment in World War I. This first total war simply placed unbearable strains on an already deeply riven (some would say disintegrating) society. The tsarist government enjoyed a brief period of popularity at the beginning of the war. Popular support declined, however, as the war began to go ^Throughout this work all dates cited will be according to the Gregorian calendar. The Gregorian calen­ dar was thirteen days ahead v ? the Julian calendar which remained in use in Russia until February 14, 1918, Thus, the term "February and October" Revolutions refers to events which occurred in March and November according to the Gregorian calendar. 2 against the Russians early in 1915. on July 1, 1915, a combined Austro-German offensive wiped out most of the Russian gains of the previous year. From that point on, the military outlook was bleak and, with the exception of a few brief reversals, the war continued to go against the Russians.2 Because of the inability of Nicholas and his bureau­ crats to mobilize efficiently Russia's resources for the war, living standards for millions of Russian citizens quickly plummeted. The Russian peasantry, source of the bulk of the manpower for the Army, found it Increasingly difficult to obtain consumer goods, industrial workers, whose wage increases failed to keep pace with inflation, were periodically confronted with bread shortages in the cities. As early as 1915, small numbers of industrial workers began to strike in protest against these deplorable