Research Paper Elli Kytömäki International Security Department | February 2015 The Arms Trade Treaty’s Interaction with Other Related Agreements Contents Summary 2 Introduction 5 The ATT in the Landscape of Arms Control Instruments 7 The ATT at the Intersection of Other Policy Areas 12 The ATT’s Potential Contribution to Other Instruments 18 Conclusions and Recommendations 25 Acronyms and Abbreviations 26 References 27 About the Author 32 1 | Chatham House The Arms Trade Treaty’s Interaction with Other Related Agreements Summary The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), in force since 24 December 2014, is the first international, legally binding instrument to establish the ‘highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms’ (Article 1). The treaty was not created in a vacuum. It exists alongside a range of previously established international, regional and sub-regional instruments. These include measures to combat terrorism, organized crime and piracy, and to prevent the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). The ATT’s institutional context also encompasses frameworks to increase the transparency of weapons trading and possession, to increase transparency in military expenditure and to support development assistance. As states parties start to implement the ATT, its links with and impact on other instruments will be of crucial importance. A range of instruments1 partly overlap with the ATT, but the treaty was not developed to replace or duplicate them. This raises numerous questions. Could implementation of the treaty bring cross-cutting benefits, efficiency gains or cost savings? How could the ATT advance wider policy objectives such as combating piracy or corruption? How could it support implementation of other instruments? At the same time, there are concerns that the increasingly complex web of related instruments could produce confusion and contradiction. During the negotiation of the ATT, some felt it was unclear how the different instruments related to each other, and how the ATT would affect them. More work is needed to alleviate these concerns. None the less, the pre-existing framework for controlling the trade in conventional weapons is likely to be more of an asset than a hindrance to the ATT. Instruments developed at different times, for different purposes, and covering different types of weapons and equipment provide valuable context, information and examples of good practice that can be applied to the ATT. Implementing the ATT effectively and comprehensively will be a significant challenge, even for countries with sophisticated export control systems. The treaty also presents some real opportunities. As the treaty matures, states parties will have to learn how to navigate between the different actors and processes and work to support each other and enhance their cooperation. At present, for example, the link between officials making the political decision to transfer arms and officials in charge of overseeing the actual transfers is often inadequate; the ATT will strengthen that link. Effective implementation of the ATT will also impose demands on export authorization processes. To ensure the treaty supports anti-corruption, anti-crime and anti-bribery instruments, states parties will need systematically to screen arms transfers for corruption risk. They will need to check whether a recipient state has ratified and is effectively implementing the UN Convention against Corruption (or one of the regional conventions). If done effectively, however, this could improve controls over the 1 At the international level, these instruments include: the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA); the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; the UN Register of Conventional Arms; the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons; the UNGA resolutions on the exchange of national legislation on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology; and the UN’s reporting on military expenditure. 2 | Chatham House The Arms Trade Treaty’s Interaction with Other Related Agreements transfer of weapons to conflict regions and unstable societies, with potential benefits for peacekeeping and peace-building scenarios. The treaty does not seek to regulate domestic gun ownership, nor does it seek to limit the number of legally owned civilian firearms. To alleviate concerns and correct misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the ATT’s purpose, scope and operation, all countries – especially those with large legal civilian gun ownership bases and strong pro-gun lobbies – should communicate widely the benefits of the treaty. They should seek to reassure sceptics that the ATT is also in their interest in so far as it can help counter the illicit trade in weapons and that its goal of a more responsible and transparent international arms trade would be of benefit to all. Stressing the potential cross-cutting benefits of the treaty is all the more important because gun lobbies are not the only critics of the ATT. During negotiation of the treaty, for instance, some parties were concerned that its provisions could impact related instruments such as the UN Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Firearms Protocol and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). Such problems are likely to be outweighed by the benefits, however. During the first years of implementation the ATT is likely to boost the transparency of conventional arms transfers covered by international and regional instruments. The amount of available data is likely to increase, especially with regard to the authorized trade in SALW. The ATT will also support assistance and capacity-building efforts under way around the world to help countries control their conventional weapons arsenals better. States acceding to the treaty will require varying levels of assistance in drafting comprehensive laws on arms transfers and control systems. An important task for states parties in the early phases of treaty implementation will be to assess how effectively current policy assistance feeds into the ATT; to ensure efficient use of human, technical and financial resources; and to avoid duplication of effort. ATT-related assistance could include sharing good practices, for example through the drafting of a ‘user guide’ or checklist of ‘essential elements for ATT implementation’ to which aspiring treaty members could refer. Given that needs, policy frameworks and institutional environments vary from one region or country to another, bilateral and sub-regional exchanges of information should be further encouraged. The ATT has the potential to: strengthen the overall effectiveness of arms control instruments; ensure arms transfers are more transparent and responsible; improve national and international weapons control capacities; and ultimately decrease illicit arms trade, insecurity and corruption. However, for this to happen, states and implementing bodies must work to minimize clashes or overlaps between the range of instruments and measures while maximizing the potential synergies. The following ideas and recommendations are aimed at states considering acceding to the treaty or in the early phases of treaty implementation, and cover in particular the ATT’s relationship with other instruments and policies: • Interaction with relevant instruments and implementing agencies should be ensured at the onset of ATT implementation. Dedicated sessions during the ATT Conferences of States Parties should discuss potential connections between the ATT and other instruments and draw lessons from implementation of such measures. States should fund research into the ATT’s cross-cutting effects, including detailed potential benefits and potential connections between the ATT and other instruments – and including lessons from implementing other measures. States should take steps to ensure that different levels of commitment between instruments will not serve to undermine the norms of the PoA and Firearms Protocol. 3 | Chatham House The Arms Trade Treaty’s Interaction with Other Related Agreements • The ATT Secretariat could build on the states’ participation in other instruments and other organizations, such as the UNODC, World Customs Organization (WCO) and Interpol, and seek to establish regular, working-level interaction with the secretariats of these bodies to ensure timely and comprehensive information flow, and to maximize the complementarity and effectiveness of all related instruments. Practical synergies could be sought between the support structures underpinning related instruments, through organization of joint events – between, for example: the ATT and UNROCA on reporting; the ATT and the PoA on national arrangements and diversion of arms; and the ATT and regional organizations on regional aspects of the ATT. • There should be further cooperation between the WCO, Interpol and national control agencies over implementation of the ATT. States should support and facilitate such cooperation. • In discussions on transparency and reporting obligations under the ATT, states parties should examine the possibilities for harmonizing and linking the ATT categories with those commonly