DC Paper No. 8/2014 (For discussion on 25 February 2014) Progress Report of the Traffic and Transport Committee The first meeting of the Traffic and Transport Committee (T&TC) in 2014 was held on 23 January 2014. The major issues discussed are summarised below: Industrial accidents relating to the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL) 2. Members had concern about details of the safety measures taken by the Government, MTR Corporation Limited (MTRC) and the contractor in respect of the construction of Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL), including occupational safety seminars and health checks provided for workers, number of resident site safety officers, work environment inside tunnel sites such as air quality, as well as lunch breaks and rest periods for workers. 3. The representative of the Railway Development Office (RDO), Highways Department (HyD) emphasized that occupational safety was the primary concern of the Government, MTRC and the contractor. He reiterated that MTRC and the contractor had devoted many resources for the purpose. Various government departments including RDO would monitor the situation through regular meetings, inspections and reporting. Furthermore, independent works consultants had been engaged to check whether the safety measures were adequate and effective. 4. The representative of MTRC responded that MTRC would ensure the safety of XRL construction works by a three-pronged approach: firstly, formulate a series of safety standards and measures with the contractor and perform monitoring through daily site inspection. Secondly, request the contractor to provide a suitable and safe working environment and thirdly, enhance workers’ awareness of occupational safety through organising various activities and publicity plans. In response to the enquiry about occupational safety seminars and health checks, the representative said that the contractor would arrange the workers to attend seminars and health checks by batches during work hours. Besides, resident site nurse was employed at each site to carry out simple body check for workers feeling unwell. As regards lunch breaks and rest periods, the representative said that workers would have a rest period for half an hour on ground level by batches after working for every two hours. Workers would have two rest periods each day. Some of the tunnels had air-conditioned common room where workers would choose to take a rest or have meals. Regarding the air quality inside the tunnel, the representative emphasized that the contractor would make sure that requirements of relevant labour guidelines and safety standards were met. Also, staff of the Labour Department would conduct checking regularly. So far as the number of resident site Registered Safety Officer was concerned, the representative said that these Safety Officers were employed by the contractor and the figure was not available at the moment. Lastly, the representative emphasized that MTRC’s resident site project team would conduct inspection at site every day and would contact the contractor promptly to handle any unsafe issues or irregularities. If any potential danger was identified, the contractor would be asked to suspend works immediately. Report on overhead line equipment problem leading to train service disruption in light rail in the morning of 22nd January 2014 by MTRC Request for MTRC to explain the fire broke out at the roof of a Light Rail Vehicle 5. Members had grave concern about Light Rail Vehicle (LRV) incidents that happened repeatedly and they opined that these incidents reflected problems in the maintenance and regulatory system of Light Rail (LR). Members suspected that the problems might be due to shortage of manpower or aging components. In respect of the incident happened in December last year, Members wished to know if MTRC had provided appropriate guidelines for train captains to respond to emergencies. Regarding the incident owing to an overhead line equipment problem leading to train service disruption that happened in January this year, Members opined that the emergency response of LR was not effective. Many passengers waiting at LR platforms were not informed of the incident through the broadcast system or information display boards promptly. Since MTRC had not deployed more trains to enhance the service of route nos. 705 and 706 so that passengers would have taken the West Rail line to Yuen Long Town and Tuen Mun, passengers had to wait for a number of trains before getting on board. The feeder buses despatched by MTRC after the incident would not effectively manage the crowd. Likewise, MTRC staff could not offer any proposals for passengers to transfer to other means of public transport. Members thought that MTRC should pay due regard to the problem by implementing specific improvement measures to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Members also proposed MTRC to make predictions about all possible incidents and then formulate corresponding contingency plans. Members requested MTRC to submit a report to T&TC and present its proposals on improvement measures in detail after MTRC had completed the comprehensive investigation reports on the two incidents. Members also proposed to urge the Transport and Housing Bureau to instruct MTRC to implement improvement measures. 6. The representative of MTRC apologised to passengers affected by the incident happened in the morning of 22nd January. He pointed out that at about 8:50am on 17 December last year, a coupled-set LRV Line 706 at the platform of LR Tin Wu Stop (to Tin Shui Wai Stop direction) was about to leave when passengers informed the train captain that smoke had emitted from the rear compartment near the air-conditioning system. In accordance with relevant guidelines, the train captain and the Control Centre arranged to evacuate about 160 passengers from the train to take the next train. No one was injured in the incident and train service was not disrupted. Upon confirming that smoke did come out, staff switched off the air-conditioning system, held down the pantograph of the rear compartment and drove the LRV away from the mainline to the emergency platform at Hung Tin Road. Upon arriving at the emergency platform, the train captain found sparkle at the position where smoke had emitted. He immediately notified the Fire Services Department for assistance. Another incident happened at about 6:15am on 22nd January. An overhead line between LR Hang Mei Tsuen Stop and Tong Fong Tsuen Stop activated the safety installation due to insulator problem, resulting in power supply for some LR Line sections being affected. Maintenance staff performed repair work immediately. During the period, LR Hang Mei Tsuen Stop and eight stops between Tong Fong Tsuen Stop and Yuen Long Station were affected, among them LR Lines 610, 614, 615, 751 and 761P had to be re-routed. MTRC had provided free feeder buses to run 130 trips, serving a total of around 7 600 passengers. It had also deployed staff to assist affected passengers and had informed the Transport Department (TD) to ask other public transport operators to strengthen their services during the period. At about 8:32am, repair work had completed and LR service gradually resumed to normal. The representative reiterated that the primary task of MTRC was to ensure the safety of passengers and staff members and it spent over $5,000 million each year on adopting advanced equipment and technology for the maintenance, updating and routine testing of its traffic system. Besides, all trains would be inspected each day before service commenced. After the incident that happened last year, MTRC had arranged to inspect Phase III trains of the same model which were manufactured in Australia with a view to ensuring that the trains would operate normally. The representative said that MTRC was investigating the two incidents thoroughly and would approach the suppliers concerned for follow-up. He emphasized that MTRC had provided adequate guidelines for staff to handle all kinds of incidents and in fact, staff involved in the above incidents had taken appropriate actions in accordance with the guidelines to handle the situation. In response to Members’ enquiry about why MTRC had not strengthened train service in Tin Shui Wai in the light of the incidents, the representative said that during that time, special arrangements could not be made as the road section leading to Tin Shui Wai was affected by the incident. As regards Members’ concern about inefficient dissemination of information, the representative said that MTRC had announced the relevant information to members of the public and passengers immediately through platform broadcast, mobile applications and the media. Moreover, additional staff had been deployed to the affected stations to assist passengers and informed them of the relevant arrangements. He apologised to passengers again for the inconvenience caused by the incidents. 7. After discussion, Members carried forward the following motion with an absolute majority of votes: “This Committee strongly condemns MTRC for the train incidents that happened repeatedly and urges the Transport and Housing Bureau to strengthen monitoring, provide stiffer penalties, enhance maintenance and staff training with the aim of ensuring the safety of passengers’ lives and properties.” Request for improving the uneven road surface of the zebra crossing next to Shui Moon House, Tin Shui Estate and the driveway opposite to GMB stop of route no.77 at Tin Shui 8. Members expressed appreciation towards HyD’s prompt action in completing the resurfacing works efficiently. Some other Members enquired about HyD’s arrangements of routine road maintenance works and whether HyD had examined if other materials would be used for pavement works to minimise resurfacing works owing to wear and tear of materials. 9. The representative of HyD thanked for Members’ appreciation and said that HyD staff would continue to inspect the road surface regularly with a view to identifying damages and carrying out necessary repair works as soon as possible.