Background Report V: 14 March 2017 Post-ISIS States by Dr. Gina Lennox Kurdish Lobby Australia Email: [email protected] T: (02) 649 40079 (Dr. Gina Lennox) Mobile: 0433 227 977 (Zirian Fatah) PO Box 181, Strathfield, NSW, 2135 Website: www.kurdishlobbyaustralia.com Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................. 3 Iraq .............................................................................................................................. 3 Government of Iraq (GoI).................................................................................................... 3 Mosul offensive .................................................................................................................. 5 IDP/Refugee crisis ..................................................................................................................... 9 Turkey’s intentions in Nineveh ................................................................................................. 9 Post-ISIS Nineveh .................................................................................................................... 10 Kirkuk ............................................................................................................................... 10 ISIS threats elsewhere ....................................................................................................... 11 Kurdistan Region of Iraq .................................................................................................... 12 Ways forward .................................................................................................................... 15 Syria .......................................................................................................................... 16 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 16 Military realities ................................................................................................................ 16 Political machinations ....................................................................................................... 18 Idlib .................................................................................................................................. 23 The fall of eastern Aleppo city ........................................................................................... 24 Turkey’s occupation of northern Aleppo ............................................................................ 27 Al-Bab ..................................................................................................................................... 28 Manbij ..................................................................................................................................... 29 Raqqa ............................................................................................................................... 30 Rojava ............................................................................................................................... 33 Ways forward .................................................................................................................... 35 Turkey ....................................................................................................................... 36 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 36 The purge continues .......................................................................................................... 37 Crackdown on elected Kurdish politicians and mayors .......................................................... 37 Judiciary .................................................................................................................................. 42 MIT .......................................................................................................................................... 43 Police ...................................................................................................................................... 43 NATO and other Security Forces ............................................................................................ 43 Education ................................................................................................................................ 44 Media ...................................................................................................................................... 44 Public institutions and NGOs .................................................................................................. 45 Companies .............................................................................................................................. 45 The economy..................................................................................................................... 46 Erdogan’s push for an executive presidency ....................................................................... 46 Terrorist attacks ................................................................................................................ 47 Civil war ............................................................................................................................ 48 International Responses .................................................................................................... 50 Ways forward .................................................................................................................... 52 Iran ............................................................................................................................ 53 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 54 2 Introduction With the likely defeat of the ISIS caliphate in 2017, experts predict ISIS or an offshoot will remain capable of spreading international chaos, using advanced weapons, suicide bombers, car bombs, chemicals1, scorched earth tactics and human shields for decades to come unless their capability is destroyed and their ideology discredited. In responding to the threat of terrorism and the wars raging in the Middle East, the international community has a choice: to spend resources on more wars or use resources in support of alternatives to the current dysfunctions. After the military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, ‘nation building’ has become a discredited concept. Yet to be tested is a process of collaboratively arriving at clearly defined political, economic and social goals and milestones, which are then linked to adequately resourced incentives and disincentives to building multiple checks and balances over a 30-year time frame. Otherwise one elite replaces another elite, and one terrorist group replaces another terrorist group. In our conclusion we suggest this does not have to be done on a national scale if there is a lack of will or resources. It costs less, may be more effective and inspire others if ‘islands of stability and influence’ are created with willing partners. Iraq Government of Iraq (GoI) The Government of Iraq (GoI) remains gridlocked and sectarian and is following an increasingly Islamised path. The influence of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilisation Units are destabilising factors. Rhetoric and legislation are not enacted, dismissed ministers are not replaced, other ministers rule chiefdoms of inaction, while any redress for Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Shia is repeatedly postponed. Provincial elections are scheduled for September 2017. The elected governors of Nineveh, Salahaddin and Diyala have already been replaced and insecurity means an indefinite delay to provincial elections in Anbar, Kirkuk and Nineveh. National elections are scheduled for 2018. Iran has pressured the Shia parties to unite, and in early October the Iraq National Alliance accepted the return of Moqtada al-Sadr’s Ahrar block, after Al- Sadr boycotted the alliance in April. The block’s return led to a hiatus in protests until Al- Sadr called for protests over the absence of electoral commission reforms in February. On 11 February protests turned violent resulting in the deaths of five civilians and two security officers and the wounding of another 320 protesters. Despite rhetoric promising decentralisation, in October the Iraq Parliament rejected a Sunni Arab request for new federal zones and declared Mosul’s administrative boundaries will not change. On 31 October, the ruling National Alliance announced a post-ISIS ‘Historical National Settlement’, which would be implemented with the help of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The document focuses on decentralisation and the distribution of powers, reconstruction and the return home of IDPs. But Sunni 1 IHS Conflict Monitor estimates that ISIS has used chemical weapons – ranging from chlorine to mustard gas – more than 52 times between 2014 and November 2016. 3 Arab leaders walked away from this ‘National Settlement’ because it proposed that the 60 odd largely Shia Hashd al-Shaabi militias form a single government force independent of other military and police. Despite Sunni Arab opposition, on 26 November, the Parliament ruled in favour of the independent force, although