Contents W. Callebaut/R. Riedl 2 Preface Donald T. Campbell 5 From Evolutionary Epistemology Via Selection Theory to a Sociology of Scientific Validity Linnda R. Caporael 39 Vehicles of Knowledge: Artifacts and Social Groups W. D. Christensen/C. A. Hooker 44 Selection Theory, Organization and the Development of Knowledge Andy J. Clark 49 Evolutionary Epistemology and the Scientific Method Ed Constant 55 Comments on Donald T. Campbell’s “From Evolutionary Epistemology Via Selection Theory to a Sociology of Scientific Validity” Steve Fuller 58 Campbell’s Failed Cultural Materialism Francis Heylighen 63 Objective, Subjective, and Intersubjective Selectors of Knowledge Aharon Kantorovich 68 The Rationality of Innovation and the Scientific Community as a Carrier of Knowledge Elias L. Khalil 71 Can Artificial Selection Remedy the Failing of Natural Section with Regard to Scientific Validation? Kyung-Man Kim 75 D. T. Campbell’s Social Epistemology of Science Marc De Mey 81 Vision as Paradigm: From VTE to Cognitive Science Erhard Oeser 85 The Two-stage Model of Evolutionary Epistemology Henry Plotkin 89 Knowledge and Adapted Biological Structures Massimo Stanzione 92 Campbell, Hayek and Kautsky on Societal Evolution Franz M. Wuketits 98 Four (or Five?) Types of Evolutionary Epistemology Evolution and Cognition: ISSN: 0938-2623 Published by: Konrad Lorenz Institut für Evolutions- und Kognitionsforschung, Adolf-Lorenz-Gasse 2, A-3422 Alten- Impressum berg/Donau. Tel.: 0043-2242-32390; Fax: 0043-2242-323904; e-mail: [email protected]; World Wide Web: http://www.kla.univie.ac.at/ Chairman: Ru- pert Riedl Managing Editor: Manfred Wimmer Layout: Alexander Riegler Aim and Scope: “Evolution and Cognition” is an interdisciplinary forum devoted to all aspects of research on cognition in animals and humans. The major emphasis of the journal is on evolutionary approaches to cognition, reflecting the fact that the cognitive capacities of organisms result from biological evolution. Empirical and theoretical work from both fields, evolutionary and cognitive science, is accepted, but particular attention is paid to interdisciplinary perspectives on the mutual relationship between evolutionary and cognitive processes. Submissions dealing with the significance of cogni- tive research for the theories of biological and sociocultural evolution are also welcome. “Evolution and Cognition” publishes both original papers and review articles. Period of Publication: Semi-annual Price: Annuals subscription rate (2 issues): ATS 500; DEM 70, US$ 50; SFr 60; GBP 25. Annual subscriptions are assumed to be continued automatically unless subscription orders are cancelled by written information. Single issue price: ATS 300; DEM 43; US$ 30; SFr 36; GBP 15 Publishing House: WUV-Universitätsverlag/Vienna University Press, Berggasse 5, A-1090 Wien, Tel.: 0043/1/3105356- 0, Fax: 0043/1/3197050 Bank: Erste österreichische Spar-Casse, Acct.No. 073-08191 (Bank Code 20111) Advertising: Vienna University Press, Berggasse 5, A-1090 Wien. Supported by Cultural Office of the City of Vienna and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Culture. Werner Callebaut/Rupert Riedl Preface his issue of Evolution and Cognition is dedicated relativism, or, as he called it, “‘cult-solipsism’, por- T entirely to the memory of Donald Thomas traying sciences as self-deceiving social systems in- CAMPBELL (1916–1996), one of the most remarkable capable of distinguishing truth from tribal myth” scientists and humanists of his generation. (CAMP- (CAMPBELL 1979; cf. KIM, this issue). ERISS convinced BELL never pursued scientific aims for their own many STS scholars that a dialogue with ‘the enemy’ sake, but was always motivated by deeper humanis- remained possible and could even be profitable (cf. tic concerns. See, e.g., his Presidential Address to the RESTIVO in press). CAMPBELL’s descriptive epistemology, American Psychological Association [CAMPBELL as developed in his William JAMES Lectures at Har- 1975].) CAMPBELL ended his scholarly career as Uni- vard University in 1977, relies on physiological, psy- versity Professor at Lehigh University, Bethlehem, chological, and sociological approaches to deal with Pennsylvania, after having taught at the University epistemological issues, for it includes the (fallible) of Chicago (1950–53), Northwestern University theory of how the processes studied by these ap- (1953–79), and Syracuse University (1979–82). proaches “could produce truth or useful approxima- A social psychologist by training (he was a student tions to it”. Isn’t it somewhat ironic or paradoxical of Edward TOLMAN and Egon BRUNSWIK at Berkeley), that CAMPBELL-the-naturalistic-psychologist in- CAMPBELL’s uniquely creative blending of method- creasingly stood for a respectful conversation with ological rigor and daring theoretical speculation the epistemological tradition (including its skepti- about the individual and collective human mind (cf. cist offshoot, which he deeply admired) at a time De MEY, this volume) was to make him highly influ- when many a philosopher (including such influen- ential in many other fields as well. Many psycholo- tial evolutionary epistemologists as Ronald GIERE or gists and social scientists know him best for his David HULL), following the QUINEAN suggestion that contributions to methodology, which include mea- psychology and sociology should replace epistemol- surement issues (e.g., convergent and discriminant ogy, surrendered to “nihilistic naturalism” (Susan validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix), HAACK), a position which CAMPBELL himself more experimental design (most notably, the method of graciously described as “epistemologically vacu- quasi-experimentation [COOK/CAMPBELL 1979]), and ous”? evaluation research. CAMPBELL for all his modesty (CAMPBELL 1981) Biologists and philosophers tend to regard him as could do all this, and more, because he was a true the major American evolutionary epistemologist of encyclopedist in Otto NEURATH’s sense, one of a our century. Scholars in the booming but divided handful of genuine generalists of the post-World new field of STS or Science and Technology Studies War II generation who transformed cybernetics into remember him most as the grand old man who sym- General Systems Theory (cf. HEYLIGHEN, this vol- pathized with all of the warring factions: philoso- ume). Contrary to a common perception, CAMP- phers speaking in the name of rationality and BELL’s EE is not neo-DARWINIAN in the dominant, correspondence truth, relativistic and constructivist reductionist sense of the orthodoxy promoted by, sociologists doing their thing, cognitive scientists say, George C. WILLIAMS or DAWKINSIAN sociobiol- painfully turning naturalistic, verstehende histori- ogy: Not only did he consider a hierarchy of levels on ans…His personal contribution to this ongoing de- which DARWINIAN mechanisms operate (which al- bate, which in his inimitable manner he dubbed lowed him to highlight the phenomenon of “vicar- ERISS, for “Epistemologically Relevant Internalist ious selection”); he also and increasingly took into Sociology of Science” (cf. his later “sociology of sci- account internal (“structural”) selection factors and entific validity”), was an attempt to reidentify the mechanisms. “something special about science, which gives it The concept of a nested hierarchy of vicarious selec- some greater legitimate claim to objectivity than tion processes, which was in part inspired by systems- other social systems” in the light of post-KUHNIAN theoretical considerations (cf. CAMPBELL 1973), may Evolution and Cognition ❘ 2 ❘ 1997, Vol. 3, No. 1 Preface well be CAMPBELL’s single most important contribu- learning select behaviors on behalf of natural se- tion to EE and evolutionary theory more generally lection. (RICHERSON/BOYD in press) (see, e.g., CONSTANT, DE MEY, and KIM, this issue). CAMPBELL’s insistence on the “blindness” of varia- RICHERSON/BOYD (in press) pinpoint its meaning and tion (and retention, but that is a different matter) relevance against the background of the inadequacy has generated quite some misunderstanding. Most of DARWIN’s theory of inheritance in The Descent of importantly perhaps, is that this has prevented peo- Man (1871). As a consistent naturalist, philosophi- ple in the Artificial Intelligence community from cally speaking (see, e.g., CAMPBELL 1988), DARWIN appreciating the useful complementarity of CAMP- took great care to suggest continuity between humans BELL’s views and those of that other great contempo- and other animals, which he secured by attaching rary polymath, Herbert SIMON, on levels ontology, great importance to imitation and other forms of the adaptive (“satisficing”) behavior, and reduction of inheritance of acquired variation: complexity in general (THAGARD 1988 is a case in His theory allowed him to account for the essen- point). Yet as CONSTANT (this issue) points out, the tial similarity of all living humans, while account- point CAMPBELL wanted to drive home may be for- ing for the vast diversity in human behavior, by mulated as a simple reductio ad absurdum. attributing the underlying similarities to conser- The U.S. and Austrian varieties of Evolutionary vative traits and by attributing variation between Epistemology (EE) turn out, then, to share some of human groups mostly to labile traits strongly in- their intellectual ancestry, for BRUNSWIK (who fluenced by inherited habits. DARWIN’s distinc- coined the term “ratiomorphic apparatus”) influ- tion between more