CRITICAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM A Defence of An Anarchist Approach to the Problem of Political Authority. Submission for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy by Magda Egoumenides University College London 2004 1 UMI Number: U602855 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U602855 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 For my beloved parents For Christo 2 ABSTRACT In this thesis I define and defend the philosophy of critical philosophical anarchism and show it to be superior to alternative (anarchist and non­ anarchist) approaches to the problem of justification of political institutions. In general I argue that the anarchist position within the contemporary debate on political obligation has been dismissed too easily and that the value of an anarchist approach to an understanding of (and solution to) the problem of political authority is underestimated in current thought. In particular, my thesis sets out and defends the critical philosophical anarchist approach to the problem of political obligation and contrasts this approach with traditional treatments of the problem. I advance a clearer statement of the critical philosophical anarchist position than those currently available and demonstrate the continued value of taking an anarchist approach to the problem of political authority. This thesis has seven chapters. In the introductory chapter I set out the basic problem of political obligation and the anarchist position I want to defend. The first chapter presents the main aspects of the central problem and the main argument for its solution to be developed in the following chapters. Chapter two provides an analysis and restatement of anarchist arguments against consent and contract theories of political obligation. Chapter three offers considerations against a natural duty theory of political obligation. Chapter four addresses a reciprocity-based theory of political obligation, to wit: the principle of fairness as formulated by Hart and Rawls. The fifth chapter provides a general illustration of the distinctive contribution of critical philosophical anarchism to the problem of political authority. It develops the argument set out in chapter one and references to that argument in the preceding critical chapters on alternative approaches to the problem of political obligation. In the concluding chapter I tie together my argument for critical philosophical anarchism, as developed over the course of the thesis, and set out the main aims of an anarchist approach to society in light of this discussion. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis is the result of a series of arguments and discussions about the issue of political obligation. I am indebted to those who inspired my thinking and helped me to formulate the ideas presented. They are too many to mention. I would particularly like to thank my supervisor Dr Veronique Munoz- Darde for her continual advice, encouragement and devotion. I would also like to thank my secondary supervisor Professor Jonathan Wolff for many inspiring conversations and for his final advice on my work. Furthermore, I would like to thank my fellow students for their valuable comments and their distinctive impression on my student life. Among them: James Wilson, Ian Hulse, Isabella Muzio and Alex Voorhoeve. Special thanks to Raj Sehgal, for his insightful criticism and recommendations; and to Saladin Meckled-Garcia for providing a permanent inspiration for my work. I am grateful to my parents for their endless love and support. I would like to thank professor Vasos Karageorgis, my mentor, for his constant support and influence on me; and Meropi Tsimili who has been a mother, a teacher and a real friend to me. Also, I would like to thank my dear friend Christo Yiannitsa, who helped me be disciplined at times of hard work. Special thanks to my friend and flatmate Marius for keeping me sane when I drove him to the edge and for his indispensable help with navigating the computer mystery; my cousin George for his humour and insight at difficult times; my friends Melina and Stella for making it all much easier and enjoyable; my childhood friend Rena for her impact on my intellectual growth and my life in general; and Alexander for his continued encouragement and belief in me. All my love and thanks to my beloved Kosta, who gave me the strength to make things that matter to me come true. Finally, I would like to thank especially the Arts and Humanities Research Board for financing my studies and thus making the completion of this work possible. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................7 1.T h e p r o b l e m o f p o l it ic a l o b l ig a t io n ................................................................................................................ 8 2.THE VARIETY OF ANARCHISMS. DEFINING CRITICAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM ..........................16 3.UNDERLYING IDEAS.............................................................................................................................................................21 CHAPTER ONE. WHAT THE PROBLEM IS................................................................................28 1.1.T h e p a r a d o x o f a u t h o r it y .................................... 28 1.2.DISSOLVING THE PARADOX. ROUSSEAU AS A PARADIGM OF STATE JUSTIFICATION .........................35 1.3.R a z ’s t h e o r y a s an illustration ..................................................................................................................... 37 1.4.THE ARGUMENT FOR CRITICAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM...................................................................45 1.4.1.An alternative to prominent positions on the state ...........................................................................................46 1.4.2.Improving the way critical philosophical anarchists see their position. Simmons’ theory as an illustration...................................................................................................................................................................... 49 1.4.2.i.Simmons’ theory ................................................................................................................................................. 49 1.4.2.ii.Specific arguments against Simmons ........................................................................................................... 55 1.4.2.iii.A more general departure from Simmons’ approach..........................................................................57 1.5.CONCLUSIO N........................................................................................................................................................................66 CHAPTER TWO. THE LIMITS OF VOLUNTARISM.................................................................68 2.1.AN ANARCHIST CRITICISM OF VOLUNTARIST THEORIES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION .........................70 2.1.1.Actual Consent ..............................................................................................................................................................71 2.1.2.Tacit consent ................................................................................................................................................................. 74 2.1.3.Hypothetical consent ....................................................................................................................................................81 2.1.4.Raz on consent .............................................................................................................................................................85 2.1.5.Social contract theories .................................................................................................. 86 2.1.6.A defence of hypothetical contractual ism .............................................................................................................93 2.2.DISMISSING ‘THE CONCEPTUAL ARGUMENT’ FOR POLITICAL OBLIGATION ............................................ 98 2.3.TH E IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANARCHIST CRITICISM OF CONSENT ...........................................................101 CHAPTER THREE. AN ANARCHIST CRITIQUE OF THE RAWLSIAN IDEA OF A NATURAL DUTY OF JUSTICE............................................................................................107 3.1.RAWLS’ THEORY AND THE NATURAL DUTY OF JUSTICE .............................................................................108 3.2.A n a n a r c h is t c r it ic is m o f t h e n a t u r a l d u ty o f j u s t ic e............................................................. I l l 3.2.1.Against the justice of political institutions as a ground of political obligation ........................................ I l l 3.2.2.The argument arising from particularity..............................................................................................................117