EPILOGUE: THE VALUE OF CULTURAL PLURALISM: SOME FINAL REMARKS ON AN UNEXPLORED TOPIC The justification of group rights laid out throughout this book is not connected to the value of preserving cultural diversity. Rather than as a good in itself, multicul- turalism has been conceived—as in most scholarly and political debates—as a social fact from which cultural conflicts and demands of recognition arise. To the extent that the arguments developed so far are compelling enough, group rights would be justified in order to meet certain requirements of liberal justice in diverse societies. In particular, the thrust of the theories discussed is related to a more general quest for expanding the notions of freedom, equality and dignity so as to accommodate the demands for a “politics of difference” in multicultural democratic states. But once these demands are accommodated, liberal culturalism does not offer independent reasons to claim that multiculturalism is, in itself, a central value; or, to put it in a different way, that multinational or multiethnic states confer upon their members an additional good. Rather the contrary: it is not uncommon to appeal to arguments in support of the relevance of cultural belonging as a political basis to jus- tify separatist ambitions. For this reason, group rights advocates should be able to respond to the alleged danger of “balkanisation” of society which, critics contend, will eventually result in societal fragmentation, thereby undermining solidarity and trust that, as explained, are widely regarded as important elements of democratic cit- izenship. This is a serious challenge that points to the unintended consequences in terms of social unity that the recognition of group rights could bring about. This is a central problem and would require a separate investigation, but let me finish this work with some observations that might be pertinent. At the outset, one would expect a complete theory of multicultural citizenship and group rights to incorporate an account of what might be the grounds for social unity in diverse societies. Note that this subject has far-reaching implications beyond the domestic level. Given that nowadays the state system is being replaced by new forms of governance, it is important to put forward a model of integration containing spe- cific guidelines for accommodating diversity within emerging supra-state political enti- ties while, at the same time, fostering unity and solidarity among their constituent units. More specifically, it is essential to entertain the idea that many of the existing devices and institutions for accommodating cultural diversity might be undermined by post-national forms of governance that disregard symbolic and substantive arrange- ments between different cultural groups within states. Although liberal culturalists have made central contributions to understanding a wide range of issues concerning 243 244 GROUP RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS justice in the treatment of minority cultures, its main exponents have mostly remained state-centred, ignoring the fact that the post-national reordering of the public sphere might reduce the significance of borders and, hence, the meaning of some classical ter- ritorial mechanisms to accommodate cultural diversity. Moreover, prominent theorists of multiculturalism do not clearly explain what might be the grounds for social unity in a multicultural state. Indeed, at the end of Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka tries to convey some thoughts on this issue, he considers the usual emphasis on shared values as a source of political allegiance between different groups but, ultimately, finds it unconvincing. In particular, he points to the fact that even if, for instance, Norwegian and Swedish societies converge on the same values (as Canadian Francophones and Anglophones increasingly do, too), this does not go along with support for a political union of both countries (or, in the Canadian case, it has not reduced the support to political auton- omy in Quebec). Consequently, “the fact that they share the same values does not, in itself, explain whether it is better to have one state or two.”1 Therefore, neither shared moral or political values nor similarity in the way of living and conceptions of the good seem to provide satisfactory grounds to account for the political union of dif- ferent cultural groups in a multinational or multiethnic state. What liberal culturalists do maintain is that, if there is a formula to promote a sense of solidarity and politi- cal loyalty to the state “it will involve accommodating, rather than subordinating, national identities.”2 In other words, if citizens perceive that their particular cultural attachments and identities are adequately protected, they will probably lack reasons for avoiding co-operation or demanding secession. In this vein, Taylor insists that not only respect for diversity in itself is an asset in multicultural states, but also respect for the diversity of forms in which members of different identity groups belong to the state.3 With reference to Canada, Taylor writes: To build a country for everyone, Canada would have to allow for second-level or ‘deep’ diversity, in which a plurality of ways of belonging would be acknowledged and accepted. Someone of, say, Italian extraction in Toronto or Ukrainian extraction in Edmonton might indeed feel Canadian as a bearer of individual rights in a multicultural mosaic. His or her belonging would not ‘pass through’ some other community, although the ethnic identity might be important to him or her in various ways. But this person might nevertheless accept that a Québécois, or a Cree or a Déné might belong in a very different way, that these persons were Canadian through being members of their national communities. Reciprocally, the Québécois, Cree, or Déné would accept the perfect legiti- macy of the “mosaic” identity.4 In short, contrary to the opinion that group rights will lead to state fragmentation, one could argue that this new trend towards the official accommodation of the different dimensions of cultural diversity does not necessarily erode the common public space and the levels of co-operation and civic education that are required to implement social schemes. In my view, this holds especially in those contexts that might be called “frac- tured nationhood;” that is, in states where old patterns of nation-building, aimed at making the cultural and the political congruent, failed. In these circumstances, public recognition and accommodation of the existing pluralism through group rights may turn out to be crucial to the preservation of democracy and social unity. Thus, in the Canadian example, it might have contributed to lessening the risk of secession. But a EPILOGUE:THE VALUE OF CULTURAL PLURALISM 245 comparable logic could apply to other states. Consider the case of Spain, for instance. After suffering a civil war and a long dictatorship, the recognition of official language rights and self-governing institutions of the different cultural communities by the 1978 Constitution provided the framework from which to begin a difficult process of recon- ciliation, democratisation and modernisation of society. Nowadays, most people would agree that the explicit recognition of linguistic and cultural diversity—including the fact that many Spaniards see their identities as primarily linked to, say, the Catalan or the Basque nation—has been central to the relative success of that process.5 Democratisation, economic solidarity and welfare might thus be enhanced, and not eroded or impeded, through the constitutional recognition of diversity and the attribution of self-government rights, and other group rights, to some historical cultural communities, as has been the case in Canada, Spain and other countries.6 Certainly, the contention that stability is more vulnerable in these cases might be correct. However, the success of the model is still remarkable if we bear in mind that previous nation-building policies designed to forcibly assimilate citizens into the dominant language or culture had already caused deep social fractures that threaten democratic values, trust and social unity. This underlying context should not be overlooked when assessing the implications of group rights recognition. Now, this idea still does not give us a clear clue as to the sort of elements that facilitate the generation of social cohesion in a multicultural state. Of course, if we already have a society encompassing various intermingled ethnic or national groups, then probably the best option is to find the means to preserve a peaceful coexistence together. But if the question at stake is, as in most multinational states (or even inter- national federations such as the European Union) whether to preserve (or enhance) the union instead of fostering the institutional means for maintaining or regaining a higher level of autonomy and independence, then it is legitimate to wonder why should the former option be favoured over the latter. Take again the Canadian case. Insofar as it can be argued that a fundamental constitutional disagreement persists between Quebec and Canada—and assuming that, all things considered, secession was a viable option—is there any reason to press for political unity even under such complex circumstances? Leaving aside the likely practical problems to implement secession, the point I am trying to make here is that, at first glance, the theories on multicultural citizenship and group rights analysed do not seem to offer, or