1 British Foreign Office Perspectives on the Admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO, 1947-1952 Norasmahani Hussain Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Leeds School of History October 2018 2 The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. © 2018 The University of Leeds and Norasmahani Hussain The right of Norasmahani Hussain to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe a greatest debt of gratitude to my new supervisors Dr Peter Anderson, Dr William Jackson and Dr Elisabeth Leake, also my retired supervisor, Dr Martin Thornton for their immense practical help that enabled me to complete this research. Their invaluable advice, guidance, patience, excellent ideas, constructive comments, kindness, and thoughtfulness, made me feel really grateful for having them as my supervisors. Massive thanks go to my advisor Dr Laura King for her continuing support and encouragement over the years. I would also like to give my thanks to Kementerian Pengajian Tinggi Malaysia and Universiti Sains Malaysia for funding my study in Leeds, United Kingdom. I extend my next gratitude to Professor Simon Ball and Dr James Ellison for their constructive comments during the viva. I express deep sense of gratitude to the School of History, University of Leeds, and its friendly and helpful staffs such as Emma Chippendale, Alice Potter and Maria Di Stefano. Also, I express my immense pleasure to the staffs of the National Archives in Kew, London. I should also like to express my gratitude to my cousin, Hajar and my friends such as [Dr] Kak Zuraidah, [Dr] Kak Nazlah, [Dr] Ikhlas, PPGian, Kautsar, Kak Chah, [Dr] Norsofiah, Dunita, [Dr] Tan Chee Seng, Wan Rawaida and many more names that I have not listed here for their help, support and encouragement particularly during the referral and resubmission period. Special debt also goes to my husband, [Dr] Mohd Farid who sacrificed a lot for me and my research. I will not forget his continuous support in every possible way, such as looking after the children, Elham and Jasmine, doing house chores, and occasionally collecting materials from the National Archive in Kew, London, LSE Archive, London and Nuffield College, Oxford on my behalf. Without him, I would never complete this research. I would also like to thanks to my mother, Hindoon and my father, Hussain for keep supporting and encouraging me all these years. Norasmahani Hussain 2018 4 ABSTRACT On 4 April 1949, NATO was founded with the ultimate objective to combat the Soviet Union’s aggression. Turkey and Greece were arguably ‘victims’ that suffered from the Soviet Union’s aggression, but they still were not considered as appropriate NATO members. Neither Greece nor Turkey were considered to be in Western Europe nor in the Atlantic; and both were considered by Britain that they should be included in a Mediterranean pact. Turkey and Greece were eventually accepted by Britain into NATO because of the MEC plan. This study will expound the British Foreign Office’s perspective with regards to the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO. The prime objective of this research is to identify their rejection and acceptance of the Foreign Office from the angle that has received less attention from other researchers. This thesis has focused on the significant perspective of the Foreign Office through the methodology of British primary historical resources. The study of these resources has found Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin wanted to have NATO swiftly formed, and the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece also encouraged him to not consider Turkey and Greece as eligible to be invited to join NATO. After NATO was successfully established, the Cyprus issue remained one of Britain’s reasons to continue its opposition towards these countries’ admission into NATO. Britain used the MEC as a means to prevent Turkish and Greek membership of NATO. However, due to the difficulties in creating the MEC, the new Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, eventually agreed to allow Turkey and Greece to join NATO. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………………………………......... 3 Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 4 Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………………………………….…………... 5 List of Abbreviations…………………………………..……………………………………………………..……………. 8 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………….…………….... 10 Research question and objectives………………...…………..………….....…………………………... 13 Literature review……………………………...…………………………………………………………….……… 17 Methodology and sources……………………………….....……………………………………………...... 26 CHAPTER ONE: The Eastern Mediterranean, the development of the Cold War and the Road to Containment: British and American Policy in Greece and Turkey, 1945-1949 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 30 The geostrategic importance of independent Greece and Turkey, 1936-1945………. 33 The Eastern Mediterranean and the early Cold War, 1945-1949…………………………... 36 British reactions to Soviets interest in Greece and Turkey, 1945-1947……………....…. 39 Towards American assistance to Greece and Turkey, 1945-1947….………………………. 50 American policy towards Greece and Turkey, 1947-1949………………………………….…… 54 Conclusion……………………………….……………………………………………………..……………….….... 65 CHAPTER TWO: British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the delays during NATO’s negotiation years, 1948-1949: No Greek and Turkish membership of NATO Introduction………………...…………..…………………………………………………………………….……… 68 Bevin, the European “Third Force” of the Western Union and NATO………….…………. 74 Delays in forming NATO, April 1948 to March 1949………........................................... 81 US hesitation in opening the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, and Bevin’s reaction……………………………………….…………………………………………… 82 The US delays in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security and 6 Bevin’s reaction………………..…………………………………………………………………….….. 95 Delays regarding Article 2 and Bevin’s reaction……………………………………...…….. 102 Prolonged discussion and last-minute delays regarding Italian membership and Bevin’s reaction…………………………………………………………………………..…….. 105 Delays and the Cyprus issue: Bevin’s negative attitude towards Greek and Turkish membership……….....……...………..……………………………………………………………... 116 Conclusion………………….………...……………………………………………………………..……………… 136 CHAPTER THREE: The Cyprus Issue and Turkish Interest in joining NATO: the MEC as a Means to Prevent Turkish, and thus Greek, Membership in NATO, 1949-1950 Introduction……...………………………………………………………………………...……………………... 138 Britain, Greece, Turkey and the ‘Cyprus question’, 1949-1950…............................. 140 The MEC as a means of preventing Turkish, and thus Greek, membership of NATO……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 155 Turkish interest in NATO and the defence of the Middle East, late 1949 to early May 1950: Towards Turkey’s inclusion in the MEC.......................... 158 Anglo-Egyptian efforts for a regional defence of the Middle East, 1946 and early 1950: An analysis of the MEC as a means of excluding Turkey from NATO…………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 169 The British Foreign Office against NATO enlargement: An analysis of the Cyprus issue as a contributory reason to this stance………………………………………...…. 186 Conclusion………………...………..…………………………………………………….……………...…..…... 211 CHAPTER FOUR: The MEC plan, Bevin, the new Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison and the full accession of Turkey and Greece to NATO, 1950-1952 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….………………………... 215 Bevin and the difficulties of creating the MEC, May 1950 - March 1951: Turkey and Greece remain outside NATO…..….……………….................................................... 220 The relentless uncooperativeness of Egypt towards the MEC plan…………...…... 221 The antagonism of Turkey towards the MEC plan……………………………………...…. 227 7 The unfavourable attitude of the United States towards the MEC plan……….... 233 Foreign Secretary Morrison and the continuous troubles in forming the MEC, March 1951 - October 1951: Towards the full accession of Turkey and Greece to NATO...…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 244 Criticism of Morrison’s suitability as Foreign Secretary………………………...…….… 246 The link between Morrison’s ineptitude in handling difficulties in MEC efforts and Turkey (and Greece)’s full admission into NATO......................... 250 Situation I: Turkish and American pressure for full Turkish accession to NATO………………………………………………………………………………………………..……... 251 Situation II: Morrison’s mishandling the issues with Egypt and Iran.............….. 257 Morrison yielded to Turkish and American pressure to help the MEC plan.…… 269 The Greco-Turkish Cyprus issue and the military implications for NATO…........ 280 Turkey: The issue of command and towards full admission……………….............. 283 Conclusion……………..…………………..……………………………………………………………………….. 292 CONCLUSION: The British Foreign Office – Rejection and Acceptance of Greek and Turkish membership of NATO………………………………………………..…………….... 295 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………….………..……… 306 Appendix A: Map 1 – The Northern Tier (1946)……………………………………….…………….……. 326 Appendix B: Map 2 – The location of the Bosphorus