ITALY IMPLICATIONS Italy and possible implications for eurozone stability After Italy’s unsuccessful push for reform at the EU Summit last month, many of its European partners may be tempted to write-off the country’s concerns. However, this somewhat complacent stance may be dangerous in that it underestimates the recent shift in Italian political dynamics that culminated in the formation of an unexpected coalition government and the extent to which this may impact financial markets and potentially EU stability. Erik Jones Abstract: Italy’s recent election surprised many are not natural political allies. While there are observers who expected a hung parliament areas of policy overlap, the diverse nature of and who were subsequently caught off guard the M5S’s political movement, its relatively by the success of the right-wing Lega and the more expensive policy agenda, and Lega’s populist Five Star Movement (M5S). This growing strength all suggest maintaining a outcome can be attributed to an increasingly united front may prove difficult. Nevertheless, volatile Italian electorate and a shift in political this unexpected political partnership ought dynamics brought about by the economic and not to be written-off by European partners. financial crisis. As the protracted coalition Finding ways to interact with Italy’s new negotiations demonstrated, the Lega and M5S government poses a considerable challenge 81 to EU leaders and, subsequently, the outlook Conte’s success with this complex agenda for EU macroeconomic governance reforms was not obvious. Moreover, there is nothing and financial markets’ stability. However, surprising in this lack of accomplishment. such efforts will be necessary to stabilize the Few heads of state or government achieve all eurozone and contain anti-EU sentiment. their goals at the European level, particularly during their first major summit. That said, Introduction Conte’s approach was unconventional. He started the meeting by threatening to veto any When Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte decision unless and until the migration issue headed to Brussels for his first European was addressed (Ciriaco and d’Argenio, 2018). Council summit in June 2018, he had a This strategy cost him significant credibility complicated negotiating agenda. Conte’s top and he progressively found himself isolated priority was to win a commitment from his in the conversation. He succeeded in pushing European partners that migrants who land in Italy’s views on some of the more prominent Italy from across the Mediterranean are not issues and yet he did not bring home a major strictly an Italian responsibility. negotiating achievement. Alongside the migration issue, Conte had to The temptation for Italy’s European partners push his own country’s vision for reforming will be to discount the new government in macroeconomic governance arrangements at light of this performance. If they do, they the European level (Jones, 2018a) [1]. He had risk underestimating just how much Italy has to call for more attention to be given to the changed since the onset of the economic and completion of the European Banking Union financial crisis in the country in 2011 (Jones, and specifically the elaboration of a European 2012). They also risk misinterpreting the new Deposit Insurance Scheme. He also had to Italy’s relationship with financial markets and make the case for greater European unity in its importance for the stability of the euro area. responding to protectionism coming from This new Italy is only just learning to express across the Atlantic and for greater flexibility in itself politically and it has large ambitions Europe’s relationship with Russia, specifically in terms of economic performance and in terms of relaxing sanctions imposed after government finances. Moreover, the whole Russia’s invasion of Crimea. of Europe has an interest in helping this new Italy find some measure of success. This is not Finally, Conte needed to prove his personal a political argument; many outside observers mettle as Prime Minister to European will want to take a normative position on the counterparts who may be under the varieties of populism currently on display impression that the real power in the Italian in the Italian Republic [2]. Such normative judgments are not the issue. What matters is government is shared unevenly by the Lega the fact that Italy is too big to fail. leader and Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini, and the Five Star Movement (M5S) leader and Minister of Labor, Luigi Di Maio. An unexpected electoral outcome Doing so meant not only putting a strong has resulted in a strange coalition face forward at the European level, but also On March 4th, 2018, the Italian electorate bringing home a list of accomplishments that delivered a parliamentary majority to the would not generate excessive public criticism Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Lega. from within his own government. The polling data prior to the elections did not The whole of Europe has an interest in helping this new Italy find “ some measure of success - what matters is the fact that Italy is too big to fail. ” 82 Funcas SEFO Vol. 7, No. 4_July 2018 Italy and possible implications for eurozone stability predict this outcome. On the contrary, a long This volatility in the electorate fundamentally run of polling data suggested that the M5S changed how the coalition negotiations took would get fewer than 30 percent of the votes place after the votes were translated into and that the Lega would come in behind the seats. There were only two options. Either the center-right party headed by former Prime Lega and the M5S could find a way to work Minister Silvio Berlusconi. [3] Reflecting on together or the President of the Republic, this data, most observers anticipated a hung Sergio Mattarella, could appoint a technical parliament; those few brave enough to pick a government with the broad support of clear outcome argued that the majority of the parliament. Neither of those options were seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and very attractive to either Salvini on the center- the Senate would go to the center-right (see, right or Di Maio in the M5S. Having spent for example, Rivara, 2018). weeks going in circles Salvini and Di Maio finally decided to work together. What the polling data failed to anticipate was the volatility of the Italian electorate. The M5S and the Lega are not obvious Although the polling data was consistent coalition partners. Although international over a long period, the voters were not. To observers were quick to lump the two see the variation, it is enough to focus on movements together as ‘populist’, they five political parties: two on the center-right, are in fact very different organizations, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the Lega; two with different demographic constituencies on the center-left, the Democratic Party and a and different geographic orientations. splinter group called ‘Free and Equal’; and the Five Star Movement (Table 1). The data is The Lega has its roots in an older style of Italian the monthly average across multiple polls for politics. The movement has a strong local January and February 2018 and the actual presence; it campaigns through public stands results for the Chamber of Deputies in the and gazebos; and it places great emphasis on March 4th elections. What is striking in the data its ‘retail’ presence. If the Lega is ‘populist’, is not just the gains made by the M5S or the that name fits because of the movement’s long redistribution of votes across the center-right, tradition of campaigning against Italy’s ruling but also the collapse of the center-left. The two elites and what it describes as the corruption parties of the center-left only got 22.1 percent of the Italian political process (Gilbert, 1995, of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies on ch. 4). And while Salvini has tried to make polling day (and 22.4 percent in the Senate – inroads for the Lega in the middle and south not reported in the table). of the country, including by dropping the Table 1 Electoral polls and outcomes Party January 2018 February 2018 March 4th, 2018* Lega 13.1 13.3 17.4 Forza Italia 16.3 16.5 14.0 M5S 27.9 27.6 32.7 Democratic Party 23.3 23.1 18.7 Free and Equal 6.4 5.8 3.4 (*) These are actual results for the Chamber of Deputies; the results for the Senate are consistent but differ slightly because of the higher age qualification for voters. Sources: Termometro Politico (https://www.termometropolitico.it/sondaggi-politici-elettorali) and La Repubblica (https://elezioni.repubblica.it/2018/cameradeideputati). 83 word ‘Nord’ (or North) from the movement’s The contrast in style and support for the Lega official name, the preponderance of support and M5S make them an unlikely pairing. comes from areas north of Lazio and Abruzzo The traditional structure of the Lega gives (IPSOS, 2018). it a strong programmatic coherence; the more flexible structure of M5S makes it more What the M5S shares with the Lega is a strong unpredictable and even whimsical because dislike of Italy’s ruling class. This was clearly on the movement responds to the changing display in the aftermath of the 2013 elections, ambitions of its supporters (and leaders). The when the M5S took every opportunity to Lega has its origins in a Northern tax revolt confound and embarrass party leaders who focused on the alleged waste and abuse of sought to try and bring it into a coalition their individual achievement by politicians government. This experience explains much in the South; the M5S draws support from of the antipathy that Renzi holds for the younger generations who are more focused on M5S.