The London School of Economics and Political Science Technocratic Governments: Power, Expertise and Crisis Politics in European Democracies Giulia Pastorella A thesis submitted to the European Institute of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London, February 2016 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 86852 words, excluding bibliography, appendix and annexes. Statement of joint work Chapter 3 is based on a paper co-authored with Christopher Wratil. I contributed 50% of this work. 2 Acknowledgements This doctoral thesis would have not been possible without the expert guidance of my two supervisors, Professor Sara Hobolt and Doctor Jonathan White. Each in their own way, they have been essential to the making of the thesis and my growth as an academic and as an individual. I would also like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council for their generous financial support of my doctoral studies through their scholarship. Friends and colleagues at the LSE have been a major part of my PhD life for three years, and I hope they will remain part of my life for years to come. Angelo, I am grateful for your patience with my hyperactivity and for the many crazy projects we shared together. Madalina, Paula, Pieter and Roch, thank you for being a reassuring presence in the PhD room. Eri, Thanasis, Abel and Ranj, I owe you some fun travelling and many stimulating discussions. A special thanks goes to the LSE100 crew, which made university teaching an enjoyable collegiate experience. All other European Institute doctoral students, from old and new cohorts, have also been a key component of my time at the LSE, sharing the ups and downs of PhD life: Mireia, Fabio, Marina, Chrysa, Sarah, Lukas, Lise, Toni, Sonja and many others. It was great to work with co-author Chris. While not always in agreement, I found our collaborative efforts very fruitful. My family deserves a special, big thank you. Mamma, Papà, Gillo and Otti believed in me, and accepted that I would be studying ‘just another year’… for several years. I am extremely grateful to Marie, who put up with a moody version of myself for (too) many months. Thank you for your patience and, most importantly, love. Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my grandma Deda and to Professor Maurice Fraser. Both passed away too soon to see its completion. I hope that this thesis would have made them proud. 3 Abstract The aim of my thesis is to investigate the reasons for the appointment of technocratic governments in Europe. In order to do this, I conceptualise what technocratic governments are, both in terms of their own characteristics and in comparison with party governments. I problematize classic elements, such as independence, neutrality and expertise of ministers, and add further ones including the relation to electoral outcomes, their particular type of agenda, and the echo they have in the media. Having established that technocratic governments require a shift in politicians’ preferences away from typical office-seeking behaviour, I proceed to enquire as to the situations that make their appointment more likely. Through a statistical analysis on all European cabinets from 1977 to 2013, I identify situations of economic and political crises – in particular scandals - as the main variables influencing the likelihood of technocratic government appointments. I further examine how these crises have lead to these appointments by exploring cases of over 25 technocratic governments in a range of countries and years. The qualitative illustrative evidence highlights the importance of institutional characteristics of the given political system in which such governments were appointed. The status of the party system, the role of the Head of State and external pressures coming from international or supranational institutionas are thus shown to be important in technocratic cabinet appointments. Finally, I assess whether technocratic governments fit within the European democratic standards and conclude that technocratic governments are symptoms of the decline of party democracy, identifiable in the loosening of delegation and accountability ties between parties and cabinets, increasing external pressures on domestic political actors, and the weakening of partisan ideology-based politics. The thesis adds further elements to reinforce the already vast literature on the crisis of – especially party – democracy in Europe. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 11 1.1 PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ........................................................................................... 11 1.2 WHY DO POLITICIANS APPOINT TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS? .................................... 13 1.3 TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS AS SYMPTOMS OF THE CRISIS OF PARTY DEMOCRACY 19 1.4 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS AND METHODOLOGIES EMPLOYED....................................... 20 CHAPTER 2 AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 27 2.1 SCARCE AND SPARSE LITERATURE ON TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ........................... 28 2.2 TECHNOCRATIC PRIME MINISTERS AND THEIR MINISTERS: WHAT IS A “TECHNOCRAT”? 31 2.3 NEUTRALITY VIS-À-VIS POLITICAL PARTIES ............................................................................... 34 2.4 KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE ....................................................................................................... 37 2.5 AN AGENDA OF SUPPOSEDLY VALUE-NEUTRAL, IDEOLOGY-FREE SOLUTIONS .............. 40 2.6 AN INDIRECT LINK TO ELECTORAL OUTCOMES ....................................................................... 42 2.7 MEDIA RECOGNITION OF THE TECHNOCRATIC NATURE OF THE CABINET ..................... 46 2.8 CONCLUSION: NON-PARTISAN, AND YET POLITICAL CABINETS ........................................... 47 CHAPTER 3 TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS AS CRISIS GOVERNMENTS 50 3.1 ACTORS, MOTIVATIONS AND PROCESSES .................................................................................... 51 3.2 WHY DO TECHNOCRATS GET APPOINTED? A CRISIS MODEL OF TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENT .................................................................................................................. 55 3.3 MODERATING VARIABLES: THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS ................... 59 3.4 DATA AND MEASUREMENTS ........................................................................................................... 63 3.5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS ................................................................................................................... 66 3.6 CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 77 CHAPTER 4 A CASE-BASED ANALYSIS OF TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENT .............................................................................................................................. 79 4.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS 4 AND 5....................................................................................... 79 4.2 SCANDALS AND TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS .................................................................... 81 4.3 SCANDALS’ IMPACT ON VOTERS ......................................................................................................... 83 4.4 WHAT IS A SCANDAL? ........................................................................................................................ 84 4.5 CASE SELECTION CRITERIA ............................................................................................................. 85 4.6 BULGARIA: DIFFUSE AND SPECIFIC CORRUPTION AS A TRIGGER FOR TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENT .................................................................................................................. 86 4.7 CZECH REPUBLIC: NON-POLITICAL POLITICIANS ARE PREFERABLE TO ‘UNTRUSTWORTHY FIGURES’...................................................................................................................... 90 4.8 GREECE: TECHNOCRATS AS CATHARTIC ELEMENTS FOR A CORRUPT CLIENTELISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM ........................................................................................................................................ 94 4.9 HUNGARY: LOSING CREDIBILITY BECAUSE OF A SCANDAL BUT MAINTAINING INFLUENCE THROUGH TECHNOCRATS ................................................................................................... 97 4.10 ITALY: TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND ITALIAN REPUBLIC ...................................................................................................................... 99 4.11 POLAND: UNPOPULAR CHOICE