OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR MELBOURNE CITY LINK DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE Public Safety Review September 2002 CONTENTS Executive Summary iii Findings and Recommendations viii Chapter 1 Introduction Terms of Reference 1 Background to the Review 2 Scope of the Review 2 Methodology of Review 3 Terminology 3 Chapter 2 Background The Project 4 Structure of Transurban 5 Contractual Regime 6 Chapter 3 Term of Reference 1 Contractual Regime 9 Legislation 22 Chapter 4 Term of Reference 2 Introduction and Overview 29 Safety Features of City Link 30 Legal Analysis of Safety Features 35 Other Legal Issues 39 Impact of Proposals on the State 44 Findings 46 Chapter 5 Term of Reference 3 Introduction 48 Context 48 Ongoing State Safety Role 49 Wider Ongoing State Tasks to be Performed 50 Factors for Administration of the City Link Arrangements 53 Models for the Management of the Contractual Arrangements 53 Findings 55 Chapter 6 Term of Reference 4 Overview 57 Preparation, Review and Implementation of Diversion Route Plans 57 Tunnel Closure Procedures 58 Co-ordination Issues 59 Findings 60 Chapter 7 Case Studies Recent European Tunnel Incidents 61 Burnley Tunnel Closure 64 Dislodgement of Rebroadcast Cable 66 Response to a Vehicle Breakdown in the Burnley Tunnel 67 Glossary of Terms 68 Diagrams Map of City Link and the Road Network 72 Map of City Link Road Interchanges 73 Diagram of Contractual Arrangements 74 Public Safety Review Executive Summary Terms of Reference 1. On 9 March 2001, the Minister for Transport, the Hon Peter Batchelor MP, announced a review of the public safety and traffic management aspects of City Link to be conducted by the Melbourne City Link Authority. The Review was completed by the Office of the Director, Melbourne City Link. 2. The task for the Review was to: I. Identify the current legislative and contractual requirements governing public safety. II. Evaluate whether these requirements adequately provide for public safety, and if appropriate, recommend: (a) changes to the contractual arrangements that the State should negotiate and/or changes to legislation; (b) the likely impact on the State of such changes. III. Suggest the appropriate government role, and the structure and resources that are required, in relation to public safety aspects of the Link. IV. Consider the consequences for traffic management likely to arise from safety incidents or from measures taken to preserve public safety and, if necessary, suggest improvements. The Review was also asked to advise on the government structure and resources needed for on-going management of the contractual arrangements with Transurban. 3. Two subsequent incidents were referred to the Review. In addition, recent European tunnel incidents were also referred to the Review so that the relative standard of the City Link tunnels could be assessed. 4. A reference group, comprising representatives of the Department of Infrastructure, the Department of Treasury and Finance, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, VicRoads and the Authority monitored the progress of the Review, and provided advice and guidance to the Authority. The Contractual and Legislative Requirements Governing Public Safety 5. A complex set of contractual arrangements provide the framework under which the City Link project was constructed and will be operated for the duration of the Concession Period (about 37.75 years). The contractual arrangements include III project specific legislation (the Melbourne City Link Act 1995) which ratified the Concession Deed (and associated deeds). 6. City Link is also subject to the general legislation of the State, relating to health, safety, law and order, emergency services or emergencies. 7. The road transport legislation that applies to the general road system in Victoria applies to City Link, except that the Transurban Parties1 exercise the road management powers on City Link, rather than VicRoads or local authorities. 8. The Transurban Parties are contractually required to comply with a range of detailed Technical Requirements which are set out in annexures to the contractual arrangements and, amongst other things, detail the operational and maintenance requirements for City Link, including safety requirements. 9. Traffic management and safety requirements include the prescription of traffic monitoring and control systems, fire protection systems, communications systems, mechanical ventilation systems, emergency egress tunnels and safety havens. Furthermore, the contractual arrangements impose high standards of maintenance and repair obligations on the Transurban Parties. 10. The Transurban Parties are also required to develop detailed management plans for a range of incidents (including an Emergency Management Plan and traffic diversion route plans). 11. These comprehensive traffic management and safety systems are intended to enable a rapid detection and response to all types of incidents. 12. Safety matters in the operations stage are further dealt with by the requirement that the Transurban Parties develop operations and maintenance manuals (Manuals) and operate City Link in accordance with these Manuals and the Technical Requirements. During the Concession Period, the Transurban Parties are required to update the Manuals in accordance with the Technical Requirements. 13. The Manuals contain the detailed policies and procedures covering all operating and maintenance activities. As part of the process leading to completion of construction, the Independent Reviewer has certified that the current Manuals are adequate. Adequacy of Current Arrangements for Public Safety 14. The Review has found that the contractual arrangements in place for the construction and operation of City Link have delivered a high standard of public safety. 15. The manner in which the contractual provisions for both construction and operation deal with safety issues is discussed in detail in this Review. 16. The Review has given particular attention to the tunnels because the tunnels pose special safety issues and because Victorians, in general, are not familiar with driving in tunnels. The Review has found that safety arrangements are certainly adequate and some of the safety features of the tunnels exceed Australian and international safety standards. 1 Refer to paragraph 1.8 and the Glossary for an explanation of the terms. IV 17. As a public company, Transurban’s obligations with respect to its customers and the public generally are very significant. Certain breaches by the Transurban Parties of a contractual requirement relating to public safety may also be a breach of a director or officer’s duty under the Corporations Act or other legislation. 18. The fact that a private company operates City Link is not considered to adversely affect public safety. The contractual and legislative arrangements provide a robust regime. Nevertheless a proactive, accountable and properly resourced monitoring capability on the part of the State is considered essential. 19. If the Transurban Parties fail to meet their obligations (in particular their safety obligations), the contractual arrangements enable the State to step in and operate the City Link. This would only occur where there has been a serious breach of the contractual arrangements that expose the public to imminent risk. In addition, the usual contractual and equitable remedies apply for breach of the contractual arrangements. 20. The State also has a limited legislative capacity to step-in and operate City Link in the event of an emergency. Though general transport legislation enables VicRoads to close roads generally, it is not clear whether VicRoads has the legal capacity to close City Link (or part of it) in the interests of public safety. 21. The Review finds that though the contractual arrangements, as supplemented by legislation, are generally adequate, the arrangements could be improved by clarifying that VicRoads has the capacity to close City Link in the interests of public safety. 22. The Review has found that plans for the diversion of traffic on and off City Link have been properly developed and integrated into VicRoads traffic diversion plans, and have operated successfully when the Burnley Tunnel was closed in February 2001. 23. The Review has identified two areas where the Technical Requirements need to be improved. The first relates to emergency management procedures, and in particular to the frequency with which the Emergency Management Plan must be reviewed and the frequency with which emergency exercises must be conducted. The Review considers that this issue can be addressed by contractual amendments, requiring the Transurban Parties to review their Emergency Management Plan every six months and to conduct an annual emergency exercise, with the requirement that at least once every three years, the emergency exercise be a simulated exercise. 24. The second relates to the frequency with which the Manuals (including the interface protocols and procedures with VicRoads) must be updated. The Review considers that this issue can be addressed by contractual amendments, requiring the Transurban Parties to conduct a program of ongoing review of the Manuals, with a complete review of the Manuals not less than once every two years. 25. The Review does not recommend major changes or additions to the contractual or legislative arrangements. Rather the Review considers that the Government’s focus should be on ensuring adherence to the existing arrangements and establishing ongoing accountability for monitoring the concession in