UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles The Origins and Consequences of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Matthew Stuart Gottfried 2014 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Origins and Consequences of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises by Matthew Stuart Gottfried Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2014 Professor Steven L. Spiegel, Co-Chair Professor Arthur A. Stein, Co-Chair This dissertation identifies the determinants of public opinion in coercive terrorist crises and explores how the effects of coercive terrorism on public opinion incentivize the decisions of democratic leaders. Using a multi-method research design, the project includes innovative randomized survey experiments fielded in Lebanon and the United States, statistical modeling of Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process, and interviews with government officials and policymakers. I find that public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises are highly dependent on the intensity of terrorist campaigns, government concessions and intransigence, prior population exposure to terrorism, prior attitudinal strength and ambivalence, partisanship, and the reaction of the political opposition. Yet, the data reveal that publics are surprisingly resilient to this type ii of coercive diplomacy across all of my case studies. If terrorism provides any sense of urgency to change course, it is likely the result of inaccurate leader perceptions rather than being grounded in strong empirical reality. These findings have important policy implications. Leaders coping with the aftermath of terrorist attacks can use the results to generate appropriate policy responses to the changing international and domestic environments. They provide international mediators important intellectual capital as they work to facilitate and resolve longstanding international disputes. They increase our knowledge of how the threat of terrorism, not just the act itself, can affect government policy. As al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups attempt to coerce governments across the globe, such information is of critical importance to policymakers. Lastly, they improve our understanding of the nature of coercive diplomacy and international conflict in general. iii The dissertation of Matthew Stuart Gottfried is approved. Tim Groeling Robert F. Trager Steven L. Spiegel, Committee Co-Chair Arthur A. Stein, Committee Co-Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2014 iv To Mom, Dad, and Glenn v Table of Contents 1 Introduction: The Domestic Politics of Coercive Terrorism . 1 1.1 The Definition of “Terrorism” . 4 1.2 The Mechanism of Public Opinion . 10 1.3 Is Terrorism an Effective Coercive Instrument? . 16 1.4 Plan of the Dissertation . 27 2 The Determinants of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises . 30 2.1 The Threat of an Irrational Public . 31 2.2 The Emergence of a Rational Public? . 35 2.3 What Shapes Public Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crises? . 41 2.3.1 “Event-Driven” Hypotheses . 41 2.3.2 “Elite-Cue” Hypotheses . 48 2.4 Research Design . 54 2.4.1 Experimental Survey Research . 54 2.4.2 Statistical Analysis of Israeli Public Opinion . 60 2.5 Conclusion . 61 3 Terrorism, Coercion, and Public Opinion in the United States . 63 3.1 A History of Sporadic Terrorism . 65 3.1.1 Terrorism in the Early Years . 65 3.1.2 The Anarchist Wave . 67 3.1.3 The Anti-Colonial Wave . 70 vi 3.1.4 The New-Left Wave . 71 3.1.5 The Religious and Far-Right Wave . 74 3.2 The U.S. Survey Experiment . 81 3.3 Results . 86 3.3.1 The Cost of Appeasement and Terrorism . 86 3.3.2 The Mediating Effect of Partisanship and Opposition Praise . 91 3.3.3 The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in the United States . 95 3.4 Conclusion . 96 4 Terrorism, Coercion, and Public Opinion in Lebanon . 98 4.1 Lebanon’s Turbulent History . 99 4.1.1 Sectarianism and Civil Conflict . 99 4.1.2 Terrorism and Sectarianism in Post-Civil War Lebanon . 103 4.1.3 The Hariri Assassination and Modern Lebanese Politics . 106 4.2 The Lebanese Survey Experiment . 113 4.3 Results . 117 4.3.1 The Cost of Appeasement and Terrorism . 117 4.3.2 The Mediating Effect of Partisanship and Opposition Praise . 122 4.3.3 The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in Lebanon . 125 4.4 Discussion . 128 4.5 Conclusion . 131 5 Terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict . 133 5.1 The Origins of Conflict and Early Terrorism . 134 vii 5.2 The Rise of Arab Guerilla Activity and Terrorism . 140 5.3 Terrorism Goes International . 143 5.4 The First Palestinian Intifada . 150 5.5 The Road to Oslo . 154 5.6 Conclusion . 160 6 Sabotaging the Peace? Coercive Terrorism in the Oslo Peace Process . 162 6.1 The Role of Public Opinion in the Oslo Peace Process . 166 6.2 The Data . 169 6.3 Empirical Strategy and Results . 175 6.3.1 Determinants of Average Israeli Approval . 176 6.3.2 Determinants of the Distribution of Israeli Approval . 182 6.3.3 Determinants of Individual-Level Approval . 195 6.4 Discussion . 208 6.5 Conclusion . 213 7 Conclusion: The Stability of the Public Mood in Coercive Terrorist Crises . 215 7.1 Under What Conditions is Terrorism Coercive? . 216 7.2 Implications and Conclusion . 221 Appendix . 225 Bibliography . 232 viii List of Figures 1.1 Basic Causal Mechanism of Coercive Terrorism . 11 1.2 Presidential Job Approval of George W. Bush . 23 2.1 Experimental Survey Research Design . 56 2.2 Modern Terrorism in Lebanon and the United States . 58 3.1 U.S. Presidential Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crisis . 87 3.2 Substantive Effects on Approval in the United States . 92 3.3 The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in the United States . 96 4.1 Distribution of Questionnaires (%) per Lebanese Qada . 115 4.2 Lebanese Prime Minister Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crisis . 119 4.3 Substantive Effects on Approval in Lebanon . 123 4.4 The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in Lebanon . 126 4.5 The Costliness of Terrorism in Lebanon and the United States . 127 6.1 Israeli Public Support for Oslo and Palestinian Terrorism . 173 6.2 Expected Proportion of Approval of Oslo Peace Process . 192 6.3 Demographic Features Predicting Support for Oslo Peace Process . 197 ix List of Tables 2.1 Determinants of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises . 53 3.1 Threat Perception of Terrorism in the United States . 81 3.2 Comparing U.S. Sample “Audience” to ANESP and U.S. Census . 85 3.3 Determinants of Approval in the United States . 90 4.1 Threat Perception of Terrorism in Lebanon . 113 4.2 Lebanon Survey Demographics . 116 4.3 Determinants of Approval in Lebanon . 121 6.1 Determinants of Monthly Support for Oslo . 178 6.2 Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 1) . 185 6.3 Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 2) . 186 6.4 Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 3) . 187 6.5 Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 4) . 188 6.6 Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 5) . 189 6.7 Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 6) . 190 6.8 Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 1) . 200 6.9 Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 2) . 201 6.10 Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 3) . 202 6.11 Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 4) . 203 6.12 Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 5) . 204 6.13 Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 6) . ..