University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2013-04-30 Evolutionary Ethics? Substantiators, Skeptics, and Moral Realism Jimenez, Kieran Chad Jimenez, K. C. (2013). Evolutionary Ethics? Substantiators, Skeptics, and Moral Realism (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26002 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/662 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Evolutionary Ethics? Substantiators, Skeptics, and Moral Realism by Kieran Jimenez A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE CALGARY, ALBERTA APRIL, 2013 © Kieran Jimenez 2013 Abstract Hardly a week passes without new findings emerging from evolutionary psychology regarding how our view of morality has been influenced by our biological evolution. Evolutionary ethics is a normative project built upon these scientific insights. Evolutionary ethicists fall into two groups: substantiators or skeptics. Substantiators believe moral ideas can now be scientifically proven. Skeptics believe there are no moral truths because morality is just a biological adaptation. I believe the project of evolutionary ethics is misconceived. I argue that both the substantiators and the skeptics fail to show the direct relevance of biology to ethics. Moral truths can be established. But biology cannot support nor undercut these truths. I present the doctrine of moral realism as embodying the proper process of ethical inquiry, and I defend moral realism from evolutionary psychology’s skeptical conclusions. I determine that biology can indirectly inform ethics, but never guide it. The ethical realm is independent. ii Preface Before introducing my argument, I must say a few quick words in order to distinguish mine from that of others in the relevant literature. The following thesis is a critique of evolutionary ethics. That said, my critique is at once both narrower and broader than it may at first seem. My critique is narrower than it may at first seem because, in critiquing (and ultimately dismissing) evolutionary ethics, I do not also mean to dismiss evolutionary psychology. In addressing evolutionary ethics as, in some important sense, separable from evolutionary psychology, I depart from the conventional strategy of criticizing evolutionary ethics. The conventional critique (rightly) sees evolutionary ethics as unsound, and as based on evolutionary psychology, but therefore (wrongly) assumes that dismissing evolutionary ethics also entails dismissing evolutionary psychology. In the following pages, I articulate why I see the projects of evolutionary ethics and evolutionary psychology as separable, and why I see my narrow critique as superior to the usual, broad dismissal of both projects. Evolutionary ethics is unsound, but evolutionary psychology is viable. My critique of evolutionary ethics, far from aiming to thereby discredit evolutionary psychology, aims to ensure that we do not throw out blooming babies with unwholesome bathwater. As such, I believe these broader critiques are mistaken. My critique is broader than it may at first seem because, in critiquing (and ultimately dismissing) evolutionary ethics, I also mean to dismiss naturalistic ethics in general. Evolutionary ethics is just one particular form of naturalistic ethics, but my critique of it is meant to apply to all forms. All naturalistic approaches fail to appreciate what I present as the key insight of my critique: the independence of the ethical realm. That is, that all substantive ethical claims can only be supported (or undercut) by other substantive ethical claims. External (e.g. naturalistic, metaphysical, etc.) substantiation or skepticism is not possible. Unlike mine, many iii critiques of evolutionary ethics aim to dismiss evolutionary ethics without also thereby dismissing other forms of naturalistic ethics. I believe these narrower critiques are mistaken. Lastly, in perusing the relevant literature, I notice that advocates of opposing positions are often talking past each other, rather than talking to each other. I believe that this failure to communicate is due to the deeper failure to genuinely explore the other’s position. That is, to begin from the other’s premises, and follow the other’s argument to its conclusions. Rather, opposing advocates begin from distinct premises, and proceed to reach distinct conclusions. In contrast, I am concerned with a genuine exploration of opposing views. To that end, in critiquing both the substantiators and the skeptics, I begin from their own premises, and follow the logic (or lack thereof) of their own arguments. In so doing, I ensure that the conclusions I reach, though distinct from theirs, are not reached at in virtue of my having started from distinct premises. In other words, my conclusions, properly understood, are also their conclusions. Unless, of course, I have made some mistake(s) along the way… iv Acknowledgements Heartfelt thanks are due to my wonderful supervisor, Dr. Thomas Flanagan, for introducing me to bio-politics, and teaching me how to write. (Or, rather, how not to write!) I am also indebted to Dr. Joshua Goldstein, for first pulling back the curtain for me on the history of political philosophy—he has been an enthusiastic, patient, and constant mentor. Similarly, Dr. Pablo Policzer has continually prodded and challenged my views on the relationship between biology and morality, ensuring the question remained alive for me. The department’s administrative staff, particularly Judi Powell, have been an irreplaceable source of help, on matters big and small. My peers have supplied me with both motivation and relaxation. Sometime during the past few years, UC’s political science department became a home away from home, and I am grateful to have passed through when I did. And lastly, I thank my mother, Shauna, for listening to and encouraging initial thoughts, and for reading and appraising early drafts. Without her, this thesis would not have been possible. v Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Preface…………………………………………………………………………………….iii Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................................v Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... ix Epigraph ...............................................................................................................................x INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 The Question ....................................................................................................................1 Evolutionary Psychology ............................................................................................1 Ethics Proper ..............................................................................................................2 Reformulating the Question .............................................................................................3 EP’s Descriptive and Normative Projects ........................................................................4 EP’s Double-pronged Normative Project ...................................................................4 The Argument ..................................................................................................................5 Layout ..............................................................................................................................6 PART I: THE DESCRIPTIVE REALM..............................................................................8 Chapter One: EP’s Descriptive Project ............................................................................8 Introduction ................................................................................................................8 Layout .........................................................................................................................9 Darwin’s Disciples .....................................................................................................9 The Sociobiology Debate .........................................................................................13 Biological bias ..........................................................................................................16 Reductionism ............................................................................................................21 Conclusion ................................................................................................................25