SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... The Science of Right in Leibniz’s Practical Philosophy A Dissertation Presented by Christopher Lowell Johns to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University August 2007 Copyright by Christopher Lowell Johns August 2007 Stony Brook University The Graduate School Christopher Lowell Johns We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Jeffrey B. Edwards (Dissertation Advisor) Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Allegra de Laurentiis (Chairperson of the Defense) Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Clyde Lee Miller (Department Reader) Professor Department of Philosophy Manfred Baum (Outside Reader) Professor of Philosophy Bergische Universität Wuppertal This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Lawrence Martin Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation The Science of Right in Leibniz’s Practical Philosophy by Christopher Lowell Johns Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University 2007 This dissertation examines a neglected area of Leibniz’s philosophy, namely, natural right ( jus ). Contrary to prevailing views, I argue that his “science of right” is nothing less than the theoretical foundation of his moral/practical philosophy. In contemporary terms, Leibniz’s conception of right may be called “subjective right,” and is informed by a variety of sources, most dominantly Aristotle and Roman Law. His practical philosophy is motivated generally by two main concerns: (1) to establish the moral limitations on power , whether natural, political, or divine power; (2) to reconcile utilitas (conceived as the good for oneself) with honestas (conceived as the good for others). The resolution to these problems lies in Leibniz’s a priori “science” of right. A key feature of this science is Leibniz’s demonstrative method, according to which right is the moral power ( potentia moralis ) and obligation is the moral necessity of a person ( substantia rationalis ) to perform and to demand what is just. On this deontic basis Leibniz “derives” additional founding principles, such as the three precepts of right (harm no one , give to each his due , and live honorably ) and justice as “charity of the wise.” Most treatments of Leibniz’s practical philosophy focus on the requirements of pleasure, happiness, love, divine retribution, metaphysical perfection, or on the compatibility of divine freedom with an optimum world. However, I argue that the these requirements, including caritas sapientis , fundamentally depend on his science of right as their normative foundation. On the most basic level, right is the self-limiting freedom and necessity of a moral agent. On the broadest level it implies a perfectionist virtue ethics. I support these claims through a detailed examination of Leibniz’s most important writings on natural right, from earliest to latest (1666-1706). I aim to determine the philosophical basis for his arguments and to understand and evaluate them in relation to their historical context. The relevant commentary is also engaged. Overall, the dissertation shows that Leibniz’s “science of right” provides complex and well-grounded responses to foundational moral issues of considerable historical and contemporary relevance. iii I dedicate this dissertation to my Mother, Marlene Ann Talbott-Green, Ph.D To the memory of my Father, Jonathan Herman Johns And to the memory of my Stepfather, Donald Chase Boyer The more power he has, the less license he takes, because if it is happiness to have the power to do whatever one wants, it is virtue to want only what one may do, that is to say, to want only what one ought to do. • Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Le Portrait du Prince, tirés des qualités du duc Jean Frédéric (1679) • Klopp 4.480: “Plus qu’elle a de pouvoir, moins elle prend de licence, parce que s’il est de la felicité de pouvoir tout ce que l’on veut, il est de la vertu de ne vouloir que ce que l’on peut, c’est à dire de ne vouloir que ce que l’on doit faire.” Table of Contents Abstract...........................................................................................................................iii Preface............................................................................................................................vii Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................ix CHAPTER ONE : SUBJECTIVE RIGHT AND THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NOVA METHODUS . ..........................................................................................................................1 Section 1: Introduction..................................................................................................... 1 Section 2: General Remarks on Parts I and II of the Nova Methodus .............................2 Section 3: The “New Method” of jurisprudence and its definitions: jus and obligatio ...8 Section 4: The derivation of precepts : the three degrees of natural right......................24 Section 5: Chapter summary and conclusion.................................................................37 CHAPTER TWO : JUSTICE , LOVE , AND THE MODES OF RIGHT IN THE ELEMENTA JURIS NATURALIS ..........................................................................................................................42 Section 1: Introduction...................................................................................................42 Section 2: The just as equity; justice as virtue of the mean ...........................................46 Section 3: Right, just, justice, and the nature of love ....................................................54 Section 4: The normative logic of right .........................................................................77 Section 5: Leibniz’s demonstration of ‘the good person is one who loves everyone.’ .88 Section 6: Concluding considerations............................................................................98 CHAPTER THREE : THE MIDDLE PERIOD : IUS , CARITAS , AND THE CODEX JURIS GENTIUM DIPLOMATICI ....................................................................................................................103 Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 103 Section 2: Early letters: Hobbes, Arnauld, Johann Friedrich.......................................104 Section 3: The late 1670’s: Right, right reason, and justice as caritas sapientis .........106 Section 4: Preface to the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus ..................................... 127 Section 5: Chapter conclusion .....................................................................................138 CHAPTER FOUR : LEIBNIZ ’S DEMONSTRATIVE METHOD ....................................................139 Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 139 Section 2: The distinction between necessary and contingent truths........................... 140 Section 3. Demonstration in general............................................................................ 147 Section 4: Definition defined....................................................................................... 152 Section 5: The case of the demonstrated moral conclusion.........................................159 Section 6: Did Leibniz demonstrate the proposition ‘justice is the charity of the wise’? ......................................................................................................................................163 Section 7: Chapter conclusion .....................................................................................164 CHAPTER FIVE : MORAL DOCTRINE AS A DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE IN THE NOUVEAUX ESSAIS ............................................................................................................................... 166 Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 166 Section 2: Locke on innate speculative and practical principles ................................. 167 Section 3: Leibniz on innate practical principles.........................................................173 Section 4: Moral doctrine, pure reason, and the science of right................................. 193 Section 5: Integration of principles in virtue ............................................................... 197 Section 6: Chapter conclusion .....................................................................................201 CHAPTER SIX : MONITA AND MEDITATION : CAUSES AND NOTIONS IN THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT .........................................................................................................................................203 v Section 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 203 Section 2: The Science of Right in Monita quaedam ad Puffendorfii Principia .........204 Section 3: The Science of Right