Excerpt from Compellence and Accommodation in Counterinsurgency Warfare A Dissertation Presented to The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University Politics Department Robert J. Art, Advisor In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy by Jacqueline L. Hazelton August 2011 Part II Successful Enemy-Centric-Plus Counterinsurgency Chapter 3 The Case Of Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1976 INTRODUCTION Oman defeated a nationalist-Communist insurgency that enjoyed a secure cross- border base and external state support. It took 11 years and significant British and regional military and political backing. Oman, on the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, has remained a stable state and a Western ally ever since. How did it happen? The conventional wisdom on Dhofar says the rise of an enlightened leader brought fast economic and political development, gained the allegiance of the populace, and thus defeated the insurgency. This view supports the contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) emphasis on a population-centric approach to success.1 Archival research and interviews with British officers who led the campaign reveal a more complex, less ambitious success. The COIN campaign began with the use of collective punishment and reprisals against the populace as a whole, but the British-led Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) only managed to fight the growing insurgency to a stalemate. The campaign entered a new phase under a new, British-approved sultan. Hard fighting reliant on superior firepower and mobility eventually defeated the insurgency 1 A number of scholars include Dhofar in the ranks of population-centric successes. See, e.g., Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995) and Calvin H. Allen, Jr., and W. Lynn Rigsbee II, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution 1970-1996 (London: Frank Cass, 2000, 2001 reprint). 53 militarily and established security, but the win was aided by narrowly targeted accommodations that brought guerrillas over to the state side, and by the eventual military provision of a few basic goods and services to the populace. Economic development followed the conflict, and political development and popular participation remain limited in autocratic Oman more than 30 years later.2 In this chapter, I analyze both phases of the Dhofar campaign, from 1965 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1976, and show that it was not, in fact, fought according to the population-centric model despite its classification as a population-centric success in the literature. What worked in Dhofar was a combination of high force and limited accommodations, as my model predicts. The military campaign weakened the insurgency and the accommodations won over guerrillas whose knowledge and fighting ability strengthened the state’s military arm. The defectors served as a conduit for the exchange of information among the state, the populace, and the insurgency. The defectors used their abilities, including their ties to the populace and insurgency, to benefit the state in three ways. First, their irregular warfare skills, knowledge of the terrain, and language skills filled a significant gap in SAF’s capabilities. Second, they gained information that helped SAF locate and fight guerrillas and their networks. Third, they persuaded friends and relatives of the benefits of cooperating with the state. Dhofar displays significant within-case variation, contrasts to, and similarities with the other cases I analyze: The uses of force and accommodation changed considerably in the two phases; there were limited popular demands; the state was 2 Some observers note that participation and representation through the tribal system satisfies current political aspirations. Ian Gordon, major in the Muscat Regiment in Phase II, personal communication to author, November 27, 2009. 54 extremely weak; the case is typical in having outside support for both sides; the conflict had an ethnic component; there was significant variation in the level of great power backing for the state; and it is a typical case of limited great power intervention in that the intervener saw a core interest in the defeat of the insurgency but wished to devote as few resources as possible to reaching its goal. In this chapter, I briefly lay out the observable implications of the two theories I compare, give some background on this little-known case, and analyze the two strategic phases of the conflict to show how and why the high force, limited accommodation campaign succeeded. In my conclusion, I develop the significance of my findings and discuss their policy implications. To briefly recap the two models I apply to see which better explains this success: The four elements of a population-centric campaign are: 1) building the civilian arms of the state more than its military arms in order to provide good governance and gain broad popular support; 2) providing major reforms to gain broad popular support; 3) limiting the use of force to avoid civilian casualties that would reduce popular support; and 4) protecting the populace to build broad popular support. In contrast, the four elements of the high force, limited accommodation or enemy- centric-plus theory of COIN success are: 1) building and professionalizing the military arms of the state to improve targeting and reduce the routine, casual abuse of the populace; 2) providing limited, targeted accommodations to political entrepreneurs whose cooperation strengthens the state’s ability to target the insurgency; 3) targeting the insurgency directly, separately from the populace; and 4) targeting and controlling the 55 populace to restrict the flow of resources to the insurgency.3 I define success as the creation or restoration of law and order within the state’s territory. The chart below shows the role of this campaign in validating or invalidating each model. Chart 1 Conflict and Models: Results of Case Study Analysis Conflict Validation of Invalidation of Application of Invalidation of Population- Population- Enemy-centric- Enemy-centric- centric Model centric Model plus Model plus Model Dhofar No Yes Yes No 3 Political accommodations are generally less costly to the state than are fundamental political reforms. Reforms are more costly because they change the relative distribution of power and wealth within the state. The gamut from reform to accommodation is wide. At the high end, reform is major, permanent changes in structures and policies that govern the distribution and exercise of power within the state and affect everyone within it. Major reforms include increased political liberalization, i.e., holding free and fair elections, relaxing rules governing political expression, increasing respect for civil and political rights, developing a free news media, and making market-oriented adjustments in economic policies.3 Less costly accommodations target specific individuals and groups, rather than all of society, to reach specific goals such as the acquisition of information, cooperation, or an alliance. A moderate level of accommodation addresses bread-and-butter popular concerns, e.g., provision of clean water or reduced routine, random military mistreatment of civilians, but does not address structural imbalances such as wide wealth disparities. Moderate accommodations delivered episodically (e.g., civic action) lie at the lower end of the accommodation-to-reform spectrum, while continued moderate accommodations lie farther along toward the high end. 56 Chart 2 Cases and Strategies: Presence or Absence of Indicators in the Two Dhofar Cases Analyzed The Low Force, High Reform Model: The High Force, Limited Accommodation Model: Enemy-centric- Population-centric COIN plus COIN Cases Build Major Limit Protect Build, Limited Target Target, control civilian reforms fighting populace professionalize accommodations guerrillas populace state military separately discriminately from populace Dhofar YES 1965- 1970 Dhofar YES YES YES YES 1970- 1976 (Success) 56 BACKGROUND The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was once a great state. Sited on the southeastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, it rose as a naval power in the region. Its ships roamed the Indian Ocean and its people flourished from trading up and down the east cost of Africa and the west coast of South Asia in the 17th century.4 The sultanate once owned Zanzibar in Africa and Gwadur in Baluchistan. When the Dhofar insurgency began, the sultanate was ruled by Sa’id bin Taimur al Bu Sa’id, a traditionalist anxious to preserve his independence from his British patrons. He hoped to usher his people into the 20th century gradually.5 Sa’id had taken the throne from his father in 1932, at a time when his father had amassed great debt and tax revenues were shrinking. Sa’id saw revenues plummet further because of the worldwide depression and World War II, when markets for export such as limes, dates, and Oman’s prizewinning camels dried up and drought shriveled agricultural yields.6 Sultan Sai’id’s response to Oman’s economic decline was parsimony. At the time, the Omani state consisted only of Sultan Sa’id and his advisors. Each province had a wali [governor] appointed by the sultan and a qadi [judge]. The sultan’s British advisors ran the civil activities of the state from Muscat and controlled SAF, but Sa’id had his own circle of Omani advisors in Salalah, capital of Dhofar.7 4 John Townsend, Oman: The Making of the Modern State (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1977), p. 35. 5 Uzi