TRANSLATION/TRADUCTION FREDERICK B. CHARY, translator and editor (Gary, Ind., U.S.A.) The Diary of Bogdan Filov-1944 [This is the fourth and last year (1944) of extracts from the diary of Bogdan Filov published in Southeastern Europe. Filov was Prime Misister of Bulgaria from 1940 to 1943 and a member of the regency council from September, 1943, to 8 September 1944. These extracts have been taken from two Bulgar- ian newspapers, Naroden and Otechestven Front, which published them in 1945.] . In these entries covering the last months of Bulgaria's alliance with the Axis, we can read Filov's account of the anxiety and confusion of the regency and government as they vainly tried to avoid the inevitable consequences of the impending German defeat. Although Bulgaria was at war only with Great Britain and the United States, Filov and his colleagues correctly realized that the looming Soviet victory in Eastern Europe would probably bring about the "Bolshevization" of the kingdom (see entry for 13 February). In consequence of these circumstances, we see Bulgaria's attempts to find a way out of the war by approachingg the West, the straining of her relations with Germany, the increased Soviet demands on the kingdom, the increased partisan activity, and the growing frustrating confusion in the internal politics of the country as the old regime disintegrates. In scattered references we learn of the contracts between the Bulgarians and the Allies which continued from the previous year and finally led to clan- destine peace negotiations in Cairo in August (14 February, 22 February, 13 March, and 15 August). Bulgaria almost to the last tried to hold on to some of the territory gained in the war, but with the exception of Dobrudja this was clearly impermissible from the side of the Allies (30 January and 23 March). Furthermore and above all, the regents hoped to avoid Soviet control over post-war Bulgaria, but England and the United States refused to negoti- ate with the kingdom without the participation of the USSR, even though as mentioned above the latter was not at war with Bulgaria.1 1. For a survey of the peace negotiations with the Allies, see MarshallLee Miller,Bul- garia During the Second World War ' (Stanford, Calif., Stanford Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 169-73, 180-94. 49 The danger of Turkey's entering the war still disturbed the government al- though this lessened during the year and finally a secret treaty was signed by the states (1 February, 9 May, 15 August, etc.). There was also fear of a possi- ble Allied invasion in Yugoslavia or at least of their bolstering of Tito's parti- san forces (31 March). The most manifest danger from the Allies, however, was the heavy bombing during the first three months, especially the devastat- ing raids of 10 January and 29 and 30 March. Sofia was evacuated and govem- ment offices moved some hundred miles south of the capital to Cham-Koriia in the Rhodope mountains. The German community began to make prepara- tions to go back home. The Allies were trying to bomb Bulgaria to the peace table. Filov hoped that his ambassador in Turkey-the courtly pro-Western Nikola Balabanov-could convince the English and Americans that the raids were causing hatred towards them and lessening the chances for peace (311 January), but the Allied response was determined by Prime Minister Churchill, summed up in his message to President Roosevelt, "If the medicine has done good, let them have more of it."2 Throughout the year Filov also wrote of the regency and government's fear of the Soviet threat to the kingdom as the Red Army drove the Wehr- macht back towards Central Europe. Moscow's request to reopen three consu- lates at the Bulgarian ports where the Germans were building ships and con- ducting other military activity weighed heavily on the shoulders of the king- dom's leaders (14 February, 9 March, 3 May, etc.). Berlin put all of the pres- sure at its command, short of an open break, on Sofia to resist but eventually. was forced to acquiesce; and in a sarcastic and condescending fashion the Wil- helmstrasse agreed to remove German offensive weapons from Varna (13 July), allowing Bulgaria to agree to the Soviet demands. Bulgarian leaders also worried about their occupation corps in Serbia, i.e., those troops located in Serbian territory other than Macedonia and Pirot, which the kingdom claimed. At first Filov justified the corp's presence as a deterrent to Tito (31 January), but as time went on the regents and ministers sought a way to withdraw them (31 March, 1 August, etc.). Prime Minister Ivan Bagrianov committed himself to withdrawing the corps at a special ses- sion of parliament on 17 August.3 Nineteen-forty-four witnessed the continued rapid growth of the Bulgarian partisan movement after the rather sparse support which it enjoyed previous- 2. Churchill to Roosevelt (no date), located in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, Map Room Folder "Bulgarian Peace Feelers ;"item no. 575. Also reprinted in Frances L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and ManfredJonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret WartimeCorrespondence (New York: Satur- day ReviewPress, 1975), p. 434. 3. Bulgaria, Narodno Subranie, Stenografski Dnevnitsi, 25th Obiknoveno Narodno Subranie, 7th extraordinary session (17-23 Aug. 1944), p. 8. .