Recentdevelopments in Swisscompetitionlaw Prof. Christian Bovet 1. Introduction •Main issues of interestto in-house counsel •Evaluation of Swisscompetitionlawunderway •Humanresourcesand financialmeansof Comco: a problem? DPC/RPW 2007/2, p. 174 « TARMED » •Privateenforcementin Switzerland: a remedy? DPC/RPW 2007/3, p. 495 « Cheesemaker » 2. Arbitration • ATF/BGE 118 II 193 (1992) G. S.A. vs V. S.p.A. Arbitrabilityand jurisdictionissue • ATF/BGE 130 III 35 (2003) A. vs. B. Ltd et al. Ex officio and right to beheard • ATF/BGE 128 III 234 (2002) X. Ltd contre Y. BV Arguments to bepresentedto and addressedby the arbitration tribunal and the FederalCourt • ATF/BGE 132 III 389 (2006) X. S.p.A. contre Y. S.r.l. Competitionlawisnot part of (international) public policy 3. Dominant positions: Publigroupe •Differentconditions appliedto similartransactions by an undertakingholding a dominant position shouldin principlebeconsideredas an abuse •However, thismaybeadmittedin limitedcases, e.g. whenan intermediaryreceivesa double fee •Reachingan amicablesettlementdoesnot ruleout sanctions DPC/RPW 2007/2, p. 190 « Guidelines » 4. Dominant positions: Swisscom • Market: wholesalemobile terminationrates •Dominant position of Swisscom •On the otherhand, atleast untilMay 2005, no dominant position of Orange and Sunrise accordingto Comco •Abuse of Swisscom’s dominant position sanctionedby a CHF 333,365,685 fine => appealpending(1st) DPC/RPW 2007/2, p. 241 Swisscom OSLCart6 5. Computation of fines (Mit. circ.) Setting Leniency: OSLCart5 (Agg. circ.): Immunity/ up to 10% TO CH in the Reduction relevant markets, 3 years Max. 49a II: OSLCart4 (add.): 10% collaboration in Practice lasts1-5 years: TO up to 50%, detection over 5 years: CH, + suppression Practices +10% / add. year 3 49a III: OSLCart3 (basic amount): years 5 III -Disclosure up to 10% TO CH in the 5 IV -Statuteof limitation relevant markets, 3 years 7 -Exc. authorisation 6. Mergercontrol: Swissgrid • Swisslawismerger-friendly: –ratherhighthresholds –EC standard (Reg. 139/2004, Art. 2) : «…not significantly impedeeffective competitionin the commonmarketor in a substantialpart of it» –Vs. Swissstandard (LCart/KG, Art. 10): «…able to eliminate effective competition» •ATF/BGE 133 II 104 Swissgrid: test stricterfor mergercontrol thanfor (existing) dominant positions 7. Mergercontrol: retail distribution • Most recentdecisions, in particular: – DPC/RPW 2006/1, p. 131 Denner/Pickpay – DPC/RPW 2008/1, p. 129 Migros/Denner – Coop/Carrefour (to bepublished) • One trend: marketconsolidation and concentration • Severalrisks(only?): –Collective dominance in threesegments of local markets –But alsoin upstreammarkets(buyingpower) • However, corrective measuresconsideredas sufficient 8. Proceduralquestions •No right to obtainthe openingof a formal investigation accordingto LCart/KG, Article 27 DPC/RPW 2007/3, p. 478 «Creditcards» •No right to obtaina «declaratory»decision in relation to abstract situations relatingto an indefinitenumberof personsor undertakings Idem •Comco’snew Noticeon business secrets www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/00213/Merkblatt_Geschaefts geheimnisse-f.pdf?lang=fr&PHPSESSID=951c.