Economic incentives for sustainable hilsa fish management in Bangladesh An analysis of the legal and institutional framework Monirul Islam, Essam Yassin Mohammed and Liaquat Ali Working Paper Fisheries Keywords: October 2014 payments for ecosystem services, fisheries management, legal and institutional framework About the authors Monirul Islam, Department of Fisheries, University of Dhaka, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh, Email: [email protected] Phone: +880-1716363505 Essam Yassin Mohammed, International Institute for Environment and Development, 80-86 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8NH, United Kingdom Liaquat Ali, Bangladesh Centre for Advance Studies (BCAS), House - 10, Road - 16/A, Gulshan -1, Dhaka-1212, Bangladesh Produced by IIED’s Sustainable Markets Group The Sustainable Markets Group drives IIED’s efforts to ensure that markets contribute to positive social, environmental and economic outcomes. The group brings together IIED’s work on market governance, business models, market failure, consumption, investment and the economics of climate change. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Syed Arif Azad, Director General, Department of Fisheries, and Zahid Habib, Manager of Jatka Conservation Project, Department of Fisheries, for their contributions to this research. We would also like to thank to all the participants of the focus group discussions and interviews without whom none of this would have been possible. We would like to extend our gratitude to Clare Rogers for editing the manuscript, and Laura Jenks for managing the publication process. This research and publication was funded by Defra’s Darwin Initiative; however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government. Published by IIED, October 2014 Islam, M., Mohammed, E.Y., Ali, L. 2014. Economic incentives for sustainable hilsa fish management in Bangladesh: An analysis of the legal and institutional framework. IIED Working Paper. IIED, London. http://pubs.iied.org/15523IIED ISBN 978-1-78431-108-7 Printed on recycled paper with vegetable-based inks. International Institute for Environment and Development 80-86 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8NH, UK Tel: +44 (0)20 3463 7399 Fax: +44 (0)20 3514 9055 email: [email protected] www.iied.org @iied www.facebook.com/theIIED Download more publications at www.iied.org/pubs IIED WORkiNG PAPER Bangladesh’s hilsa shad (Tenulosa ilisha) comprises the largest single-species fishery in the country, constituting 11 per cent of the total catch and employing 2.5 million people directly or indirectly. Since 2003, following a sharp decline in catch figures, the hilsa fish has been the subject of a government conservation programme offering fishers economic incentives or payments for ecosystem services (PES). While PES schemes are widely used to conserve natural resources such as forests and watersheds, Bangladesh’s programme is a rare example of PES for sustainable fishery management. Catch figures have improved since the programme was introduced; but concerns remain about fishers’ socioeconomic conditions and the long-term sustainability of Bangledesh’s hilsa fishery. This paper analyses the conservation scheme’s legal and institutional frameworks, identifying challenges to its design and implementation, and makes recommendations to overcome them. Contents Acronyms 4 5 Hilsa shad conservation and economic incentives 21 Executive summary 5 5.1 Establishing the hilsa conservation programme 21 5.2 Economic incentives for hilsa conservation 22 1 Introduction 7 5.3 Enforcing regulations 24 2 Methodology 9 6 An assessment of the conservation 2.1 Key informant interviews 9 programme 25 2.2 Focus group discussions 9 6.1 Challenges to the programme design 25 3 Characteristics and history of hilsa shad fishery 11 6.2 Challenges for implementing agencies 27 3.1 Hilsa spawning and nursery grounds 12 7 Conclusions and recommendations 30 3.2 Feeding and growing grounds 13 7.1 Recommendations for programme design 31 3.3 Hilsa migration 14 7.2 Recommendations for programme 4 The legal, institutional and policy framework for implementation 31 hilsa fishery 15 7.3 Recommendations for agencies 31 4.1 Legal and policy framework 15 References 32 4.2 Institutional framework 19 www.iied.org 3 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR SUSTAINABLE HILSA FISH MANAGEMENT IN BANGLADESH Acronyms AIGA alternative income generating activities AUFO Assistant Fisheries Officer BDT Bangladeshi taka BFDC Bangladesh Fisheries Development Corporation BFRI Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute DoF Department of Fisheries FGD focus group discussion FRO Fisheries Regulation Officer MoFL Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock PES payments for ecosystem services SUFO Senior Fisheries Officer UFO Upazila Fisheries Officer 4 www.iied.org IIED WORKING PAPER Executive summary The hilsa shad (Tenulosa ilisha) is Bangladesh’s national fish, and holds great nutritional, cultural and Findings and economic significance for the country. The hilsa fishery is the largest single-species fishery in Bangladesh, recommendations constituting 11 per cent of the total catch; it employs • Some hilsa sanctuaries are not accurately 0.5 million fishers directly and another 2 million people demarcated. Five important hilsa nursery grounds indirectly. As an export, it contributes 1 per cent to the have been declared sanctuaries where fishing gross domestic product (GDP). Since 2003, following is prohibited for certain periods of the year, but a sharp decline in catch figures, the hilsa shad has been inaccurate demarcations can mean that incentives the subject of a government conservation programme are given to non-target fishers. With current changing offering fishers economic incentives – or payments for environmental conditions, it is vital to identify and ecosystem services (PES) – to compensate for lost demarcate sanctuary areas using a more efficient and earnings during restricted fishing periods. While PES dynamic habitat model. schemes are widely used to conserve natural resources such as forests and watersheds, Bangladesh’s • The fishing ban period in sanctuary areas is programme is a rare example of PES for sustainable not properly enforced. More efficient institutional fishery management. arrangements and better governance are needed to enforce regulations. An anadromous fish, hilsa migrates from the sea to inland rivers to spawn and to allow juvenile fish (jatka) • Incentives are only given to hilsa fishing to feed and grow. The decline in hilsa numbers has households during ban periods, yet all types of been attributed to overexploitation of both the brood fishing are banned. This has led to some non-hilsa hilsa and jatka during these crucial stages in their life fishers turning to hilsa fishing in order to qualify for cycle. The conservation programme aims to increase incentives, putting more pressure on hilsa numbers hilsa production and ensure its sustainability with a and the incentives budget. Designing an equitable twofold strategy: imposing fishing restrictions at certain benefit sharing mechanism and clearly defining the times of year and improving fishers’ socioeconomic principles of which fishers should be included in the conditions. Hilsa fishers, who are mostly poor, receive scheme and why is important. economic incentives in the form of food (and some • The banned monofilament net used for support for alternative income generation) during fishing jatka fishing is still openly produced and marketed, due ban periods as compensation for their lost earnings. to a High Court staying order. The government must While supporters of the programme point out that make every effort to get a verdict in their favour as hilsa production has steadily increased since these soon as possible to curtail the use of this net. measures were introduced, it does not necessarily ensure the sustainability of hilsa production, or • Cases of illegal jatka fishing have increased guarantee better socioeconomic conditions for the recently, despite a sharp drop in the early years of fishers. Other criticisms include limited institutional the conservation scheme. This could indicate that capacity, weak implementation of fisheries regulations enforcement measures, economic incentives and/ and the inadequacy of incentives given during fishing or awareness raising among fishers have become ban periods. less effective in recent years. Government needs to renew its efforts in all of these areas in order to curb This study is based on a review of legislative and policy illegal fishing. documents, interviews with key stakeholders and focus group discussions. It identifies a range of legal • Key players in the hilsa fishing industry do not and institutional challenges to the hilsa conservation support the conservation programme. Boat programme and its economic incentives, and makes owners, large net operators and aratdars provide recommendations to overcome those challenges. credit, boats and nets, and largely control the fishers’ operations; they consequently face losses during ban www.iied.org 5 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR SUSTAINABLE HILSA FISH MANAGEMENT IN BANGLADESH periods and should be included in the compensation • Gathering the ‘mobile court’ team in time to scheme. enforce fishery regulations is difficult. The members needed to operate the court are often • Households receive inadequate incentives. unavailable, physical and financial resources are Fisher households report receiving only 25–32 lacking, and local fishery officers are not authorised kilograms of rice per month during fishing ban to act