EOTVOS LORAND UNIVERSITY BUDAPEST European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation A.Y. 2015/2016 THE EU-TURKEY DEAL, A SOLUTION THAT CAN WORK A legal analysis on the flaws of the EU-Turkey deal and its viability under International and European Law Author: Andrés Fernández Casanova Supervisor: Dr. Orsolya Salát ABSTRACT The EU-Turkey Statement of the 18 March means the confirmation of the change of direction of the EU migration and asylum policy. The so-called EU-Turkey deal –more criticised than praised – casts serious doubts on its compatibility with international standards. This dissertation will try to identify the legal flaws of the deal and the challenges with its implementation. For this purpose, it will focus on three different aspects: the consideration of Turkey as a ‘safe’ country; the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights of ‘collective expulsions’; and the capacity of Greece to pursue the implementation of the Statement. Despite the challenges, the EU-Turkey deal goes in the good direction: It helps to retain the confidence in that a European solution is possible, notwithstanding the new nationalistic realities that seem to take over in the EU. If the Union is able to overcome the legal and material obstacles of the agreement with Turkey, despite of being far from becoming a new global system of refugee responsibility sharing, it can be a solution that works for the EU, and a silver lining for the future of international refugee protection. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 3 1. THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE EU-TURKEY DEAL .................................. 8 1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Is the EU-Turkey Statement an international agreement? ................................... 9 1.2.1 Formal questions ........................................................................................... 9 1.2.2 Does the Statement create new obligations? .............................................. 10 1.2.3 Is the Statement producing legal effects? ................................................... 13 1.2.4 Why the Council wants to conceal the legal nature of the deal? ................ 14 1.3 Is it possible to challenge the legality of the EU-Turkey deal? ......................... 14 1.4 Interim conclusions ........................................................................................... 16 2. IS TURKEY A ‘SAFE COUNTRY’ FOR REFUGEES? ............................... 18 2.1. The different ‘Safe country’ notions ................................................................ 18 2.1.1. Returning Turkish nationals: the ‘Safe country of origin’ notion ............. 19 2.1.2. Returning Non-Turkish nationals: the ‘Safe third country’ and the ‘First country of asylum’ notions. .................................................................................... 19 2.2. Is Turkey a ‘safe third country’? ...................................................................... 21 2.2.1. Legal background ...................................................................................... 21 2.2.2. Does Turkey comply with the requirements of EU law? .......................... 24 2.3. Is Turkey a ‘super safe country’? ..................................................................... 34 2.3.1. Legal background ...................................................................................... 34 2.3.2. Does Turkey comply with the requirements under EU law? ..................... 35 2.4. Is Turkey a ‘first country of asylum’? .............................................................. 36 2.4.1 Legal background ......................................................................................... 36 2.4.2 Does Turkey comply with the requirements of EU law? ............................ 37 2.5. Excourse: Foreshadowing the creation of ‘safe zones’ in Syria ....................... 44 2.6. Interim conclusions .......................................................................................... 45 3. COLLECTIVE EXPULSIONS ......................................................................... 46 3.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 46 3.2 The evolution of the prohibition of collective expulsions in European law ..... 47 3.2.1 The first conception of collective expulsions: Conka v. Belgium and Georgia v. Russia ................................................................................................... 49 3.2.2 The second conception of collective expulsions: Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy and Sharifi v. Italy and Greece ...................................................................................... 50 3.2.3 Extending the scope of collective expulsions: Khlaifia v. Italy ................. 51 3.3 Is the prohibition on collective expulsions in conflict with the deal? ............... 53 3.4 Interim conclusions ........................................................................................... 55 4. THE CHALLENGES OF GREECE ................................................................. 58 4.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 58 4.2 The situation of refugees in Greece ................................................................... 58 4.3 The hotspots in Greece ...................................................................................... 61 4.3.1 The ‘hotspot approach’ ............................................................................... 61 4.3.2 The role of the hotspots in Greece .............................................................. 62 4.3.3 Reception conditions at the hotspots: prolonged detention for all asylum seekers ................................................................................................................... 63 4.4 The lack of procedural safeguards for asylum seekers ...................................... 65 4.5 Interim conclusions ........................................................................................... 67 CONCLUSION: The legal viability of the EU-Turkey deal .................................. 70 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 77 INTRODUCTION The EU-Turkey deal has been motive of hope for the EU and reason of concern for human rights organisations. The context of urgency in which the deal has been negotiated can justify its poor preparation at the political level, but, in any case, can suppose a disregard for human rights. This dissertation will focus on the following question: Can the deal be viable under international and EU law, despite of its legal challenges? For this purpose, the following pages will try to provide arguments to the following hypotheses: Whether the deal can be considered as an international treaty; whether the returns under the agreement are compatible with EU standards; whether the swap foreseen in the deal can conflict with the prohibition on collective expulsions; whether the aspirations of the deal can be achieved by Greece, considering its factual circumstances. It is said that the European refugee crisis started in 2014, with the high amount of refugees and migrants that began to arrive in the EU. This situation led to precipitated initiatives and discordant responses by member states. In September 2015, in an attempt to assist the overburdened Italy and Greece, the EU adopted the ‘Plan A’, consisting in a innovative ‘hotspot’ approach and a relocation scheme based in two decisions to distribute up to 160.000 asylum seekers from those countries amongst member states.1 Unfortunately, this ‘Plan A’ supposed an affirmation of the lack of solidarity amongst member states even in times of imperative need. The ‘Plan A’ was ineffective and the relocation numbers are very low compared to the initial expectative.2 The ‘Plan A’ seemed to work well on the paper, but failed in practice. 1 See European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece , 14 September 2015. & European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece , 22 September 2015. 2 European Union: European Commission, Second report on relocation and resettlement, 12 April 2016. See relocation numbers as of 12 April 2016. 3 In the meantime, in December 2015, many member states, afraid of mass arrivals reaching their territory as a consequence of the Balkans route and the porous borders of the frontline countries, opted to partially close borders and resume border checks between Schengen States.3 The failure of ‘Plan A’ brought a renewed emphasis on national solutions that alarmed Brussels and the capitals of Europe. After the successful closure of the Balkans route in February 2016, the pressure was now under Greece, which was named by the European Commission for not controlling its external borders.4 The whole Common European Asylum System (hereinafter CEAS) and Schengen area were about to collapse and politicians increased the pressure for the urgent need of a reduction