__________________________________________________________________________________ How interstate relations affect the likelihood of the coup d’état in Africa, 1945-1999 ___________________________________________________________________________ T.S. Leenstra 11262214 Master Thesis MA Political Science: International Relations University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Social Sciences June 23, 2017 Under the supervision of: st 1 reader: Dr. A.A. Steele nd 2 reader: Dr. J. Krause 1 _________________________________________________________________________ Abstract This thesis examines the effect of interstate signals on the likelihood of coups in Africa between 1945 and 1999. The purpose of this thesis is to improve our understanding how interstate relations affect the probability of coups. The dominant school of thought in the literature relies heavily on intrastate conditions (structural factors in society) to explain coup attempts. These explanations appear inadequate to explain considerable variation in coup attempts in Africa: why numerous African states with similar country characteristics faced several coups, while others did not. This thesis addresses the empirical puzzle by claiming that external actors play a key role in destabilizing unfavored governments in Africa. The general argument asserts that hostile signals send by external actors to a targeted state shape a favorable climate to launch a coup against the incumbent government. This argument is tested using measures for troop mobilizations and sanctions as costly signals in combination with events data as a measure for cheap signals. This thesis uses a nested analysis research design as outlined by Lieberman (2005). The first part entails a preliminary large sample of cases (LNA) which found no significant results of the expected relationships. The second part engages in an in-depth case study (SNA) of Libya to show a non-relationship more generally, and seeks alternative explanations to explain Libya’s non-coup outcome. The final section concludes that structural intrastate factors partly explain the variation of interest. The effective coup-proofing techniques implemented by Qaddafi offer a more satisfying explanation in relation to the non-coup outcome. The results demonstrate that hostile signals do not increase the probability of coups in Africa. __________________________________________________________________________________ Keywords: coups, P5 member states, Africa, interstate relations, signaling theory, nested analysis. 2 Table of contents 1. Introduction 4. 2. Literature review 8. 2.1 The relevance of International actors 9. 2.2 Coup attempts 10. 2.3 The coup d’état and its relevance 10. 2.4 The purpose of study 11. 3. Theoretical framework 13. 3.1 Rational choice theory 13. 3.2 Signaling theory 15. 3.3 Indicators of hostile signals: MID’s, sanctions and cheap hostile signals 18. 3.3.1 (MID’s) Military interstate disputes 18. 3.3.2 Sanctions 19. 3.3.3 Cheap hostile signals 20. 3.4 Control variables 21. 3.5 Interstate relations and coup risk 22. 4. Research design 25. 4.1 Data 25. 4.2 Nested analysis research design 26. 4.3 Variables of the theoretical model 27. 4.3.1 Dependent variable 27. 4.3.2 Independent variables 27. 4.4 Limitations 28. 5. Data analysis 29. 5.1 Descriptive statistics 29.. 5.2 Bivariate analysis 30. 5.3 Multivariate analysis 32. 5.4 SNA model building 34. 5.5 Case selection 34. 6. Case evidence of Libya & alternative explanations 36. 6.1 Libya and interstate relations 36. 6.1.1 US-Libya relations 37. 6.1.2 Critique on Thyne’s theory 38. 6.2 Alternative explanations: structural factors in Libyan society 39. 6.2.1 Economic performance 40. 6.2.2 Strength of civil society 40. 6.2.3 Regime legitimacy 41. 6.2.4 Recent coups 41. 6.3 Three forms of political violence: coups, revolutions, civil wars 42. 6.4 The final piece of the puzzle: Qaddafi’s efficient coup-proofing techniques 43. 7. Conclusion & discussion 46. Bibliography 48. Appendix: Stata Do-File 51. 3 1. Introduction On the 24th of June 1960, Patrice Lumumba became the first democratically elected prime minster of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the height of the Cold War, an anxious Washington presided by Dwight Eisenhower, feared a spread of communism in the heart of Africa. A country rich in minerals and of significant strategic importance to the United States (US) to restrain Soviet ambitions in the region. Due to Lumumba’s inclination towards the Soviet-Union in the Congo’s struggle for independence, the US, together with Belgium, deliberately set out to isolate the Congo from outside influence and simultaneously aimed to oust Lumumba from power to safeguard Western interests.1 As a result, the US exercised diplomatic pressure on Lumumba, ceased financial assistance and imposed (economic) sanctions on the Congo.2 Moreover, Lumumba further undermined Western interests by engaging in an intrastate military conflict with the pro-Western mineral rich Katanga province to curb its secessionist ambitions. The following quotation clearly illustrates Washington’s hostile position towards the Congo and its resolute stance for regime change. “On 26 August 1960, the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, sent a telegram to Lawrence Devlin, the CIA station chief in Leopoldville, saying: ‘In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that Lumumba’s removal must be an urgent and prime objective’. At a meeting of the US National Security Council (NSC) three days later, President Eisenhower, authorized the CIA to ‘eliminate’ Lumumba”.3 In 1961, already after seven months after his democratic victory, Lumumba was captured and assassinated through a Western backed military coup led by pro-Western army Colonel Mobutu Sese- Sokko. The coup d’état in the Congo is just one clear example where external actors played a key role in destabilizing a foreign government and fostered a favorable climate to stage a coup against an incumbent regime.4 Despite considerable involvement of the US in coup attempts in the Congo and elsewhere in the third world, substantial variation exists in coup attempts on a global scale. Uganda for instance, experienced seven coups between 1966 and 1986. Whereas, Botswana never experienced a coup. Considerable variation exists in the proliferation of coup attempts elsewhere in Africa. While Ghana and Sudan were frequently confronted with coups, Senegal and Eritrea faced none. Again, where countries like Burundi, Sierra Leone and Liberia were continuously plagued by coups, Namibia, Malawi and Mozambique witnessed none. Figure 1 reflects the dispersion of global coup activity and reports values for the total number of coup attempts experienced by a state between 1960 and 1999.5 These comparisons raise the following question: what explains the variation in coup attempts in Africa, diversified from practically zero to more than ten in a specific country between 1945 and 1999? Since the end of the Second World War the world witnessed 616 coup attempts, where 245 occurred in Africa alone.6 Coups, irrespective to their outcome, “can alter political processes and social institutions as drastically as any classic revolution”.7 Despite this recognition among academics and policy makers of the immense consequences for society and the international community, the relevance of coups is seldom covered in the coup literature to claim generalizations about their causes.8 Since coups occur all over the world, they – to a certain extent – are a general phenomenon.9 This suggests there is room for a theory to explain the general causes of coups. 1 Foreign Affairs (2004). 2 Meredith (2006). 3 Meredith (2006) Chapter 6, pp.106. 4 De Witte (2002), Van Reybrouck (2010). 5 Powell (2012). 6 Luttwak (2010), Powell and Thyne (2011). 7 Luttwak (1979). 8 O’Kane (1984). 9 O’Kane (1984). 4 The coup literature offers two different approaches to address the causes of coups, which I prefer to categorize as traditional and progressive approaches. The traditional coup literature focusses primarily on internal characteristics of the state, such as economic performance, regime legitimacy, internal stability, military spending and whether a country experienced a coup in the past.10 These characteristics are framed into intrastate conditions, which on average can predict the probability of a coup in the near future.11 This line of research argues that these objective preconditions influence the stability of the incumbent regime and determine the underlying structural risk of a coup.12 More specifically, the general argument asserts that coups occur as a result of deep rooted causes in society, which in turn can shape a viable political climate to stage a coup. Accordingly, a coup, prerequisites the presence of these objective preconditions to be possible, these conditions simultaneously serve as reliable indicators to determine the likelihood whether a coup would be attempted. Importantly, this assumption is widely shared in the coup literature, and various studies corroborated these findings over time.13 Hence, the relevance and impact of these structural factors is undisputed and I recognize its explanatory power. However, this line of reasoning raises an empirical puzzle: various countries in Africa, where structural factors which shape the underlying structural risk of a coup are present, were indeed plagued by a series of coups, while others seemed immune to the coup. In other words, following the traditional approach, we would expect a coup in each of these countries, because the level of coup