EPISTEMOLOGY Identity,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 41 Le temps retrouvéA la recherche du temps perdu, Le temps retrouvé 43 Untimely Meditations, By Duncan Pritchard 44 45 Essays and Lectures as best I can the actual methodology employed by analytical 46 view there has been a tendency in the recent debate about the 47 He does not, of course, give reason the same place in our nature as Kant does (he replaces M The Gay Science is that analytical philosophers do when they do philosophy, and this is especially Le temps retrouvé, Le Côté de Guermantes particular, I claim that once we understand the methodology actually employed 51 To the Lighthouse by analytical epistemologists properly then we will see that it is not as exposed 1 A Sketch of the Past, 53 A Sketch of the Past 54 Proust holds that one is for the most part completely closed down by habit: “habit hides almost the whole universe from us throughout our lives,” Le temps retrouvé, 55 56 Collected Tales, Sketches, Speeches – As we will see below, I think this way of describing the methodology of 57 Late Night Thoughts on Listening to Mahler’s Ninth Sympthony (London: Routledge, the philosophical data provided by intuition, I still think we need to recognise The Myth Makers, Much of the focus when it comes to the role of intuition in epistemology is on our intuitive responses to cases, where we are asked to form an intuitive extensional intuitions Duncan Pritchard joined the University of Edinburgh’s philosophy department in 2007 as the new Chair in Epistemology. His work covers a range of questions in epistemology, including epistemic value, testimony, radical skepticism, and virtue epistemology. His books include (Oxford University Press, 2005), (co-authored with Adrian Haddock and Alan Millar, Oxford University Press, 2010), and (Oxford University Press, 2012). He is currently writing a book on radical skepticism, which is due to be published by Princeton University Press. vol.XVIII 2012 vol.XVIII 2012 Call this class of intuitions general intuitions Within any one domain, such as epistemology, there will inevitably be that the agent lacks knowledge, and thus that the extension of this term does not instance, have an intuition about the intension of a term which is called into There is much more to the role of intuition in epistemology than tension that will need to be resolved, perhaps by highlighting an important ambiguity in the intensional intuition or by showing that the extensional input to epistemology is that provided by our intuitions regarding the intension intensional intuitions Similarly, one might be led by one’s intensional and extensional Here are some claims about knowledge which might plausibly be intuitions might lead one to adopt a particular account of knowledge, but one might then realise that this account is unable to accommodate an important general intuition about knowledge, such as the putative general intuition noted p entails p S’s knowledge that p entails that S believes that p S’s knowledge that p entails that S is in possession of reasons for thinking that p S’s knowledge that p entails that S’s belief that p is not true simply as a The foregoing reminds us that intuitions are not set in stone but are S’s knowledge that p is the result of S’s exercise of a relevant cognitive instead highly defeasible, even when we consider them only in the light of other intuitions (we will consider some non-intuitive data that is part of the This list is clearly not exhaustive, and nor are all the claims on this list beyond think we should regard all of our intuitions as individually defeasible, I also think suggest that some intuitions will be less defeasible than others, and some classes As an illustration of this point, notice that our most deep-seated agents lack knowledge in cases where the proposition believed by the agent is many of our most fundamental intensional intuitions about this term would be unlikely to count as a theory of knowledge between the relevant extensional and intensional intuitions when it comes to knowledge on which it was not factive, did not entail belief, particularly since there seem to be cases where our extensional and intensional There is a further type of intuitive data which is relevant here, a kind at here is that our most basic intensional intuitions about a concept play the role of intuitive data which is closely related to intensional intuitions but ultimately of picking out the very thing that we are trying to understand, and hence we can also have general intuitions about that term which are neither about its Call our most deep-seated intensional intuitions about a concept, intensional platitudes mere true belief is often cited as an important epistemological intuition, but while this intuition is clearly about knowledge, it does not fall into either of the en masse Other intuitions of this sort could be that 3 4 vol.XVIII 2012 vol.XVIII 2012 that an agent lacks knowledge even while granting that it would be in some are a case in point here, in that given the rational basis the agent possesses in support of her belief it clearly would be appropriate for her to assert that she has 5 that an agent possesses knowledge and yet nonetheless hold that for independent 6 But other cases might be far less compelling, even though they do still elicit the relevant mind on this score is a case where such an assertion, though true, would in that The extent to which an extensional intuition carries epistemic weight We have then a subtle distinction between extensional and linguistic can depend on other factors too, such as the degree to which it trades on a real- intuitions, and now that this distinction is on the table it ought to be clear that part of the skill of the analytical epistemologist will lie in determining which to be an extensional intuition could prove to in fact be a linguistic intuition, and which concern far-fetched scenarios (for example, cases that appeal to science vice versa in some suitably robust sense of “possible” (for example, metaphysically 7 Ceteris paribus, the more far-fetched the example is, and particularly A badly constructed example could obscure things, and so it may take a very the more dubious the example is in terms of its possibility, the less epistemic weight any extensional intuition based on this case will have, for the simple A poorly formulated intensional intuition might gloss over an important about whether an agent in an example has knowledge could muddy the how there is a complex interplay between them, both in terms of determining their relationships to each other, and in determining their respective epistemic will also be on display when the analytical philosopher adroitly conducts the We can explore this point by delineating a further kind of category of That it is part of the methodology of analytical epistemology to regard intuitions which concerns intuitions about the correct linguistic usage of the linguistic intuitions data is clear from considering how analytical epistemologists respond to epistemologists might appeal to intuitions we have about the correct usage of the word ‘‘knows” in a particular conversational context as part of the relevant were able to shock epistemologists into seeing that the received wisdom in the theory of knowledge was wrong demonstrates that great skill can sometimes There is, of course, a close relationship between extensional intuitions most naturally understood as a kind of ‘‘intellectual seeing,’’ it is tempting to to distinguish them, for although there will clearly be a great deal of overlap reveals that this would be a non-sequitur 11 vol.XVIII 2012 vol.