International Journal of Philosophy and Theology December 2014, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 45-59 ISSN: 2333-5750 (Print), 2333-5769 (Online) Copyright © The Author(s). 2014. All Rights Reserved. Published by American Research Institute for Policy Development DOI: 10.15640/ijpt.v2n4a3 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.15640/ijpt.v2n4a3 What’s Justice got to do with it? Douglas Langston1 Abstract Contrary to the common view that the four cardinal virtues are interconnected such that anyone possessing one must possess the others, I argue that there is an asymmetry betweenjustice and theother three. While temperance, fortitude, and prudence are required for justice, justice is not requiredfor any of the other three. This asymmetry occurs not only because justice is a motivational virtue while the other three are structural (or both structural and motivational) but also because justice must be seen in terms of right actions rather than good actions. While it is the case that prudence, temperance, and courage make an agent a good agent, one can be just without being good. Keywords: Justice; Cardinal Virtues; Structural Virtues; Motivational Virtues; Unity of the Virtues; Virtue Ethics Thomas Aquinas, among others, held that there are four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. They are cardinal in the sense that the other virtues hang on them. Since ‘cardo’ in Latin translates as ‘hinge’, they are aptly named because Aquinas believes that the other virtues hinge on the four.1 That is to say, in order to possess any of the other moral virtues, one needs aspects of the four cardinal virtues. More importantly, in something of a nod to the traditional claim that there is a unity to the virtues, it is often held by virtue theorists that the four cardinal virtues entail one another. If, for example, one has justice, one must also possess prudence, fortitude, and temperance. And this view seems to make great sense. If we think of justice as an inclination to act justly, it seems thata person possessing justice should be practically wise (prudence), in controlof his emotions (temperance), and steadfast in the face of difficulties (fortitude).2 1New College of Florida, 5800 Bay Shore Road, Sarasota, Florida 34243, USA. Email: [email protected], Phone: 941-355-0083, Fax: 941-487-4479 46 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2(4), December 2014 Socrates says as much to Protagoras, the sophist, in the Protagoras when he tries to undermine the unity of the virtues only to endup defending it.3 While few contemporary virtue theorists endorse the unity of the virtues (the view that in order to possess any virtue you must possess them all), it is not uncommon for these theorists to endorse the special interconnections of the four cardinal virtues.4But this is problematic. And its difficulty comes from the relationship that justice has to the other three virtues. While it is true to say that justice requires the other three cardinal virtues, the other three do not require justice. Why this is so reveals much about the nature of the virtues. Before we can appreciate the asymmetry between justice and the other three cardinal virtues, we need to explain what these virtues are. 1. Defining the Cardinal Virtues Robert Adams and Robert Roberts regard fortitude (courage) – steadfastness in the face of difficulties-- as a structural rather than a motivational virtue.5Motivational virtues like honesty, charity, and friendliness are specific qualities we try to develop through specific intentions. We want to be honest, so we intentionally perform actions that are honest and avoid dishonesty. Structural virtues, on the other hand, are virtues that are more general skills and are typically instrumental for developing the motivational virtues. Moreover, they can be used by virtuous as well as non-virtuous agents. For example, a thief practicing his trade might well display great courage in the face of his lawful pursuers. That he uses courage for a non-virtuous end does not count against his showing courage in his crimes. Patience is also a structural virtue. A thief may be extremely patient in the pursuit of his coveted good. Temperance can be thought of in different ways. While it is widely regarded as care in consumption of alcoholic drinks, it is better to generalize it and see it as control of one’s emotions and passions. It is the proper governance of ourselves. It may well be thought of as a structural virtue since control of one’s self is critical for developing any motivational virtue. But it is also a motivational virtue whose goal is harmony/balance of self. Douglas Langston 47 Prudence is one of the most confusing and complicated virtues. People often view it as synonymous with carefulness.One who is prudent about financial matters is extremely careful about them, for example. But there is a long tradition that views prudence as practical wisdom. Aristotle seemed to treat it this way. In the Middle Ages, intellectual prudence was equated with practical reason; yet it was widely acknowledged that moral prudence was a moral virtue tied closely to intellectual prudence. One could either say that there were two prudences – intellectual and moral – or claim that prudence itself was both moral and intellectual. If one were to think of intellectual prudence as the general capacity to know what is appropriate in various circumstances, moral prudence was the specific knowledge of how to act in a specific circumstance that was derived from previous practice and conscious reflection on these practices.So understood, prudence (practical wisdom) is an element of every virtue, for each virtue is a way of acting or being in a recognized circumstance. It thus has many of the features of a structural virtue for it must be an instrumental part of every virtue since each virtue involves the proper behavior and intentions in appropriate circumstances. Justice is a virtue that, in its usual conception, is directed outside one’s self. For most thinkers, justice is pre-eminently the fair distributions of goods we make according to merit, virtue, or need.6 There are, of course, various schemes for distribution and they are often divided into deontological and consequentialist views. There is another sense of justice, identified with the Platonic tradition. In this tradition, justice is seen as the harmony of parts: either parts of the individual or parts of a society. Harmony of the individual, however, seems to be a function of temperance.7To prevent unnecessary duplication among the virtues, it is appropriate to limit justice to the fair distribution of goods according to merit, virtue, or need. So seen, justice is decidedly a motivational virtue. Given these understandings of the four cardinal virtues, it is not difficult to explain the oddity of justice among the four. Justice must require the other three cardinal virtues since the fair distribution of goods requires the control of one’s emotions and passions (temperance),steadfastness in initiating and continuing/correcting the distribution (fortitude), as well as an understanding of the appropriateness of the distribution (prudence).But justice does not seem to be required for any of the other three cardinal virtues. 48 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2(4), December 2014 Detailing this asymmetry is particularly revealing of the nature of the relationship among justice and the other cardinal virtues. If fortitude and temperance are structural virtues, it is not surprising that prudence would require them. But prudence does not seem to require justice. In fact, prudence in a particular circumstance might well lead one not to act justly.8 If prudence is seen as practical wisdom and a necessary component of every virtue (thus functioning as a structural virtue), justice, fortitude, and temperance (and every non- cardinal virtue) will require prudence. Temperance will, of course, require prudence, but it will also require fortitude (as a structural virtue). Yet, temperance does not require justice, for one can have temperance (control of one’s own passions and emotions) without justice. And fortitude does not require justice since one can be steadfast in the face of difficulties without engaging in what one deems the fair distribution of goods.It appears that the structural natures of prudence, fortitude, and temperance make them necessary for one another and for justice. The fact that justice is a purely motivational virtue makes it different from the other three cardinal virtues. Moreover, justice’s role as controlling one’s relationships with others makes it less like the other three that are focused on the self in isolation from others. While prudence and fortitude are very involved in our relationships with others, they are involved more as ways the self is brought to bear in our external relationships. Unless we are, as selves, prudent and courageous, we will not deal with others justly. In his discussion of the cardinal virtues, Thomas Aquinas touches on some of these observations.Aquinas thinks that the moral virtues work with reason to control the appetites. He divides the appetites into the concupiscible (controlled by temperance) and the irascible (controlled by fortitude). Prudence is most directly connected with reason, since it is “right reasoning about what is to be done.”9 While prudence is an intellectual virtue (since it is connected with reason), it is also a moral virtue because of its matter: it rectifies the appetites.10Justice controls what is due to another.11 It controls operations and the other three cardinal virtues control the appetites.12Justice is the highest moral virtue, according to Aquinas, because it is the closest moral virtue to reason (which is intrinsically superior to any other aspect of a human being).